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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates in depth several aspects of economic activity through 
an aggregated metric, which aims to account for the inherent distressful characteristics 
of the financial system. This work is strongly motivated by the extraordinary 
evolution of the financial and economic landscape and the induced fragility within its 
foundations, especially during the last years. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the theoretical considerations on the topics 
discussed in this thesis. Additionally, the motivations and a brief presentation of the 
thesis contents are provided. 
Chapter 2 empirically investigates the leading indicator properties of the 
aggregate systemic risk indices to the real economy. In order to do that, I construct a 
series of financial stress indices for 25 countries. The countries are bundled into three 
groups (OECD, Asian, Latin American countries) and, apart from the national 
indexes, regional and a global index are computed. In order to do this, a number of 
variables from the banking sector, financial and capital markets and the foreign 
exchange market of each country, have been used for the implementation of these 
indicators. The indexes are successful early warning indicators, accurately capturing 
previous financial stress periods, while the financial turmoil of 2007-2009 is, without 
doubt, the most severe one. Forecasting exercises indicate the improved ability of 
indices-enhanced models to successfully predict the evolution of economic activity. 
Chapter 3 investigates the interrelations and financial interconnections of the 
Eurozone economies. Financial stress indices are constructed for, both, countries and 
their four most important financial markets (banking, money, equity and bond). Using 
VAR models, a number of innovative conclusions are reached, such that: 1) not all 
peripheral countries (and especially Greece and Portugal) should be blamed for the 
crisis exacerbation 2) there is clear evidence of stronger interdependencies between 
banking and bond markets and 3) a degree of segregation (in terms of financial stress 
interdependence) between peripheral and core Eurozone economies. 
The last essay aims to the deeper empirical investigation of potential cross-
covariances and spillover effects between the Eurozone economies and financial 
markets. Full, asymmetric GARCH-BEKK models are estimated, both on a market (or 
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country) wide level and, then, with the full spectrum of Euro Area markets. In other 
words, we complete an empirical examination, both “within” and “between” 
Eurozone economies and markets. The results reveal a number of interesting insights: 
on country wide level, there is strong volatility transmission channel from the most 
heavily hit, from the crisis, economies towards the rest. Additionally, the crucial 
importance and role on this transmission from the banking and bond markets is 
underlined. Contrary to common wisdom, Greece is not the main propagator of 
volatility uncertainty, while it is between the most important receivers of volatility 
risk. The same holds for other peripheral economies, while the importance of money 
market is also evident in the large, “between”, empirical approach. 
 
  
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….7 
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………….10 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………….15 
 
1. Background Information and Motivation………………………………15 
 2. On Financial Stability, Systemic Risk and Its Metrics………………...17 
 3. A Short Historical Account……………………………………………...19 
 4. Thesis Overview………………………………………………………….20 
 
Chapter 2: Exploring the Financial Conditions – Economic Conditions Nexus: 
Empirical Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries………………...22 
 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………...22 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………23 
 2. Financial Stress Indices: An Account of the Literature……………….25 
     2.1 An Attempt to Define Financial Stress……………………………...27 
     2.2 Financial Stress Indices: Empirical Work for Advanced 
Economies……………………………………………………………………28 
     2.3 Financial Stress Indices: Empirical Work for Developing 
Economies……………………………………………………………………53 
 3. Data Description and Methodology……………………………………..63 
 4. Discussion of Results……………………………………………………..67 
    4.1 Global Financial Stress Index……………………………………….68 
    4.2 OECD and OECD Countries Financial Stress Indices…………….71 
     4.3 Asian and Asian Countries’ Financial Stress Indices……………...77 
     4.4 South American & South American Countries’ Financial Stress 
Indices………………………………………………………………………..79 
 5. Predicting Economic Conditions with Financial Conditions………….81 
     5.1 Model Specification & Methodologies Used for the Forecasting 
Exercise………………………………………………………………………82 
    5.2 Testing for Unit Roots………………………………………………..84 
5 
 
     5.3 Forecasting Results…………………………………………………..87 
     5.4 Forecast Evaluations………………………………………………....93 
 6. Conclusions and Implications for future research……………………100 
 
Chapter 3: An Investigation of Systemic Stress and Interdependencies within the 
Eurozone and Euro Area 
Countries…………………………………………………………………………...103 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….103 
 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..104 
 2. Financial Stress Measures for Eurozone and European Countries: An 
account of the relevant literature…………………………………………107 
 3. Data and Empirical Methodology………………………………….......124 
3.1 Dataset Description……………………………………………125 
  3.2 Methodological Approach…………………………………….132 
   3.2.1 Financial Stress Indexes Construction……………..133 
   3.2.2 Vector Autoregressive Empirical Analysis………...134 
 4. Eurozone Financial Stress Narrative…………………………………..139 
  4.1 Eurozone Financial Stress Indices……………………………139 
  4.2 Euro Area Countries Financial Stress Indices………………141 
 5. Empirical Analysis……………………………………………………...147 
  5.1 Euro-Wide VARS……………………………………………..149 
  5.2. Country-Specific VARS.……………………………………...164 
  5.3. Further Evidence and Robustness Checks…………………..164 
   5.3.1. Generalized Impulse Responses…………………....165 
   5.3.2. Block Exogeneity Tests……………………………..165 
   5.3.3. VARS with PCA-based Financial Stress Indexes…166 
 6. Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………167 
 
Chapter 4: Volatility Co-movements and Spillover Effects within the Eurozone 
Economies: A Multivariate GARCH Approach using the Financial Stress 
Index………………………………………………………………………………..169 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….169 
 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..170 
6 
 
 2. Eurozone Crisis and Modeling of Spillover Effects…………………..171 
 3. Dataset and Methodological Approach………………………………..178 
  3.1 Dataset Description and Aggregate Method…………………179 
  3.2 Spillover Definition…………………………………………….183 
  3.3 Volatility Transmission Models: Empirical   Methodology…184 
 4. Discussion of Results……………………………………………………186 
  4.1 Indexes Descriptive Statistics and Stationarity……………...187 
4.2 BEKK models………………………………………………….189 
   4.2.a Market level and Country-wide models……………190 
   4.2.b Cross market models………………………………..199  
 5. Concluding Remarks…………………………………………………...203 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions……………………………………………………………206 
 1. Overview………………………………………………………………....206 
 2. Key finding and policy implications…………………………………...207 
 3. Future research avenues………………………………………………..211 
 
Appendix 
Chapter 2…………………………………………………………………..213 
Chapter 3…………………………………………………………………..217 
Chapter 4…………………………………………………………………..264 
 
References…………………………………………………………………………275 
  
7 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Global and Regional FSI…………………….69 
Table 2.2: OECD: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type………….76 
Table 2.3: Asia: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type…………….78 
Table 2.4: Latin America: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type…80 
Table 2.5: Unit Root Tests for OECD Countries………………………………….85 
Table 2.6: Unit Root Tests for Asian Countries…………………………………..86 
Table 2.7: Unit Root Tests for Latin American Countries……………………….87 
Table 2.8.A: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for OECD Countries – 1.88 
Table 2.8.B: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for OECD Countries – 2.89 
Table 2.9: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for Asian Countries………91 
Table 2.10: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for Latin American 
Countries…………………………………………………………………….92 
Table 2.11: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for OECD Countries – Rolling 
Forecasting Case…………………………………………………………….96 
Table 2.12: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for Developing Economies – Rolling 
Forecasting Case…………………………………………………………….97 
Table 2.13: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for OECD Countries – Dynamic 
Forecasting Case…………………………………………………………….98 
Table 2.14: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for Developing Economies – 
Dynamic Forecasting Case…………………………………………………99 
Table 3.1: Indicators of Financial Stress…………………………………………126 
Table 3.2: ADF Test Results………………………………………………………149 
Table 3.3.A: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries……151 
Table 3.3.B: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries……152 
Table 3.4.A: Summary of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries…….154 
Table 3.4.B: Summary of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries……..154 
Table 3.5.A: Summary of Money Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries………156 
Table 3.5.B: Summary of Money Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries………157 
Table 3.6.A: Summary of Equity Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries………159 
Table 3.6.B: Summary of Equity Stress Shocks in Eurozone 
Countries…………………………………………………………………………...159 
Table 3.7.A: Summary of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries…...……161 
8 
 
Table 3.7.B: Summary of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries………...162 
Table 4.1: Indicators of Financial Stress…………………………………………180 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Stress Indexes Returns………….188 
Table 4.3: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Countries Case…………………...191 
Table 4.4: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Countries Case…………………...192 
Table 4.5: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Banking Sector Case……………..194 
Table 4.6: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Banking Sector Case……………..194 
Table 4.7: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Money Market Case……………..195 
Table 4.8: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Money Market Case……………..195 
Table 4.9: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Equity Market Case……………..197 
Table 4.10: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Equity Market Case…………….197 
Table 4.11: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Bond Market Case……………...198 
Table 4.12: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Bond Market Case……………...198 
Table 4.13: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Cross-Markets Case……………201 
Table 4.14: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Cross-Markets Case……………202 
Appendix – Chapter 2 
Table A.1: Principal Component Analysis for Banking Sector – 1…………….228 
Table A.2: Principal Component Analysis for Banking Sector – 2…………….229 
Table A.3: Principal Component Analysis for Money Markets………………..230 
Table A.4: Principal Component Analysis for Equity Markets………………..230 
Table A.5: Principal Component Analysis for Bond Markets………………….231 
Table A.6: Sample of European Banks…………………………………………..232 
Table A.7 Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for Financial Stress Indices of Eurozone 
Countries…………………………………………………………………...249 
Table A.8 Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for Banking Stress Indices…………..250 
Table A.9 Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for Money Market Stress Indices…...251 
Table A.10 Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for Equity Market Stress Indices….252 
Table A.11 Block Exogeneity Wald Tests for Bond Market Stress Indices……253 
Appendix – Chapter 4 
9 
 
Table A.1: Euro Area Countries FSIs Correlation Matrix……………………..269 
Table A.2: Euro Area Banking FSIs Correlation Matrix……………………….269 
Table A.3: Euro Area Money FSIs Correlation Matrix....……………………...269 
Table A.4: Euro Area Equity FSIs Correlation Matrix………………………269 
Table A.5: Euro Area Bond FSIs Correlation Matrix…………………………..270 
Table A.6: “News Effect” Coefficients from the Intra-Market GARCH-BEKK 
(1,1) Models………………………………………………………………...271 
Table A.7: Probability Values for the “News Effect” Coefficients from the Intra-
Market GARCH-BEKK (1,1) Models……………………………………272 
Table A.8: “Volatility Spillover” Coefficients from the Intra-Market GARCH-
BEKK (1,1) Models………………………………………………………..273 
Table A.9: Probability Values for the “Volatility Spillover” Coefficients from the 
Intra-Market GARCH-BEKK (1,1) Models……………………………..274 
 
 
  
10 
 
List of Figures 
 
Graph 2.1: Global Financial Stress Index…………………………………………69 
Graph 2.2: OECD Financial Stress Index…………………………………………72 
Graph 2.3: Asian Financial Stress Index………………………………………….78 
Graph 2.4: Latin American Financial Stress Index………………………………80 
Graph 3.1: Euro Area Financial Stress Indexes…………………………………140 
Graph 3.2: Response of Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress Shocks….150 
Graph 3.3: Response of Banking Stress Indices to Banking Stress Shocks……155 
Graph 3.4: Response of Money Market Stress Indices to Money Market Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………158 
Graph 3.5: Response of Stock Market Stress Indices to Stock Market Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………160 
Graph 3.6: Response of Bond Stress Indices to Bond Stress Shocks…………...163 
Appendix 
Chapter 2  
Graph A.1: OECD Countries FSI Indices – 1…………………………………...213 
Graph A.2: OECD Countries FSI Indices – 2…………………………………...214 
Graph A.3: Asian Countries FSI Indices………………………………………...215 
Graph A.4: Latin American Countries FSI Indices……………………………..216 
Chapter 3 
Figures 1 – 3: Austrian Financial Stress Indices………………………………...217 
Figures 4 – 6: Belgian Financial Stress Indices………………………………….218 
Figures 7 – 9: Finnish Financial Stress Indices………………………………….219 
Figures 10 – 12: French Financial Stress Indices………………………………..220 
Figures 13 – 15: German Financial Stress Indices………………………………221 
Figures 16 – 18: Greek Financial Stress Indices…………………………………222 
Figures 19 – 21: Irish Financial Stress Indices…………………………………..223 
Figures 22 – 24: Italian Financial Stress Indices………………………………...224 
Figures 25 – 27: Dutch Financial Stress Indices…………………………………225 
Figures 28 – 30: Portuguese Financial Stress Indices…………………………...226 
Figures 31 – 33: Spanish Financial Stress Indices………………………………227 
11 
 
Figure A.34: Response of Austrian Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………233 
Figure A.35: Response of Belgian Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………234 
Figure A.36: Response of Finnish Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………235 
Figure A.37: Response of French Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………236 
Figure A.38: Response of German Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………237 
Figure A.39: Response of Greek Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………238 
Figure A.40: Response of Irish Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………239 
Figure A.41: Response of Italian Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………240 
Figure A.42: Response of Dutch Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………241 
Figure A.43: Response of Portuguese Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………242 
Figure A.44: Response of Spanish Financial Stress Indices to Financial Stress 
Shocks………………………………………………………………………243 
Graph A.45: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Countries………..244 
Graph A.46: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Banking Sectors...245 
Graph A.47: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Money Markets…246 
Graph A.48: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Equity Markets…247 
Graph A.49: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Bond Markets…..248 
Graph A.50: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Countries – First 
Principal Component Based FSI………………………………………….254 
Graph A.51: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Banking Sectors – 
First Principal Component Based FSI……………………………………255 
Graph A.52: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Money Markets – 
First Principal Component Based FSI……………………………………256 
12 
 
Graph A.53: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Equity Markets – 
First Principal Component Based FSI……………………………………257 
Graph A.54: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Bond Markets – First 
Principal Component Based FSI………………………………………….258 
Graph A.55: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Countries – Weighted 
Loadings Based FSI………………………………………………………..259 
Graph A.56: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Banking Markets – 
Weighted Loadings Based FSI……………………………………………260 
Graph A.57: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Money Markets – 
Weighted Loadings Based FSI……………………………………………261 
Graph A.58: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Equity Markets – 
Weighted Loadings Based FSI……………………………………………262 
Graph A.59: Generalized Impulse Responses for Eurozone Bond Markets – 
Weighted Loadings Based FSI……………………………………………263 
Chapter 4 
Figure A.1: Euro Area Countries FSIs…………………………………………...264 
Figure A.2: Euro Area Countries FSIs Returns…………………………………264 
Figure A.3: Euro Area Banking FSIs…………………………………………….265 
Figure A.4: Euro Area Banking FSIs Returns…………………………………..265 
Figure A.5: Euro Area Money FSIs………………………………………………266 
Figure A.6: Euro Area Money FSIs Returns…………………………………….266 
Figure A.7: Euro Area Equity FSIs………………………………………………267 
Figure A.8: Euro Area Equity FSIs Returns…………………………………….267 
Figure A.9: Euro Area Bond FSIs………………………………………………..268 
Figure A.10: Euro Area Bond FSIs Returns…………………………………….268 
 
 
  
13 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would not be able to complete this thesis, without the support, 
encouragement, friendship and love of numerous people. My deepest gratitude is 
addressed to my supervisors, Prof. Ronald MacDonald and Dr. Vasilios Sogiakas. 
Their superb guidance, advice and support throughout these years are invaluable. It 
was an honour to work with them. 
I would also like to thank Prof. Mario Cerrato, for his insightful guidance, 
during the first stage of my PhD. Many thanks are also for the administrative staff 
and, especially, Jane Brittin and Christine Athorne for their constant support, during 
these years. I should also extend my gratitude to the ESRC for providing the funding 
for my studies. 
I should also thank my excellent colleagues, John Ebireri, Bernardo Fernandez 
and John Olukuru for the great office environment. We had many fruitful academic 
discussions and a long lasting friendship. Also, Dr. Hyunsok Kim and Man Luo were 
constant supporters and inspirators for the advancement of my work. Dr. George 
Magkonis is also great friend and colleague, which I dearly thank him. 
Last but by no means least, a big and loving thank you to Spyridoula. She was 
always there for me, in good and bad times. This work would never be completed, 
without her support and love. Thanks to my sisters, Eleni and Vasia. To my parents, 
Georgios and Stavroula, thanks for your eternal support and care. I love you very 
much too. 
  
14 
 
Author’s Declaration 
 
 
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, 
that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any 
other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution. 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Printed Name: 
 
 
  
15 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1. Background Information and Motivation 
 
 
The crisis that was initiated in US subprime mortgage market (a relatively 
negligible, in terms of size, financial sector) quickly spread throughout the global 
financial system. The re-pricing of global risk conditions, due to this financial 
meltdown, quickly led to excessive imbalances in the world economies. In 
conjunction to the shifting investors’ expectations and the adverse liquidity 
conditions, the world economy was forced to succumb to a prolonged period of 
heightening financial stress and economic recession, known now as the “Great 
Recession”. 
There is no doubt that the effect of this crisis is evident to the economic 
performance of most countries around the world. Especially for the case of Eurozone 
economies, the repercussions of the multifaceted crisis are still evident. A number of 
countries (Greece, Portugal and, until very recently, Ireland) are under international 
financial aid programs, while in all EU countries there was a need for financial 
assistance towards banks and other financial institutions. The recession still holds for 
the area, while the positive growth rates for some of these countries are rather anemic. 
The failure to foresee the latest financial and real crisis is one of the major 
accusations against the economic profession. In retrospect, there is a wide belief that 
there were signs able to indicate the forthcoming financial catastrophe. But, in 
general, these signs were mostly neglected or not taken into account. Nevertheless, 
such kind of accusations may not entirely reflect the prevailed conditions. As it is 
underlined by Rivas and Quiros (2012), the economic profession was rather 
unprepared, in terms of empirical models and tools, for the suitable monitoring of the 
swiftly evolving financial conditions. Most of the macroeconomic models used by 
16 
 
central banks and supervisory authorities, did not consider financial frictions as an 
important element of their framework. Instead, they used to consider markets are 
highly efficient and self-regulating. 
On top of the above, the perplexed nature of the current crisis outbreak, as it is 
described by the importance of a number of liquidity, credit and money factors 
(Brunnermeier, 2009), as well as non financial factors (such as consumer and business 
confidence, increasing risk aversion, see Kenny and Morgan, 2011), amplified the 
negative conditions for the distressed economies. The role of the modern financial 
system, its shadow aspects and its structural fragility were also important contributors 
to the creation of excessive financial stress. 
In the light of this discussion, the aim of this thesis is the detailed investigation 
of several aspects of the recent financial crisis, through the employment of an 
aggregated metric, able to capture the multilateral features of the financial conditions. 
That is, the financial stress index. Using this innovative and modern tool, it is feasible 
to study the evolution of financial stress and its effect on the real economic activity. 
Moreover, the study of the Eurozone crisis and the detailed investigation of crisis 
transmission channels is another contribution of this thesis. This examination is 
possible, through the development of econometric models, capable of capturing the 
risk perception for different segments of the European economies and financial 
markets. This analysis is conducted both within and between these markets and 
countries. Based on this work, this thesis aims to fill gaps in the relevant literature of 
financial crisis monitoring, systemic risk measurement and transnational risk 
diffusion. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses some 
relevant theoretical concepts, regarding financial stability and systemic risk definition. 
Then, since financial stress indices are an aggregate measure of the aforementioned, a 
short historical overview of the literature evolution towards these indices is presented. 
This introduction concludes with a short overview of the chapters that follow. 
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2. On Financial Stability, Systemic Risk and Its Metrics 
 
 
One of the most difficult to define economic concepts is financial stability. It 
is by no chance that, until today, economists still find it easier to theorize financial 
stability as the period when financial instability does not exist. Another difficulty has 
to do with the nature of the financial system, which is quite diverse and complex. 
Given this situation, the provision of systematic studies for the causes and 
consequences of financial instability is even more perplexed. On the same time, it 
recently became one of the most interesting aspects of modern economies, due to the 
increasing integration of international financial markets, the globalization of the 
financial institutions activities and the tighter financial links among large groups of 
countries. 
As this is a matter of intensive economic policy interest, economists from 
international organizations and central banks started to work on these issues long 
before the outbreak of the current financial crisis. For instance, Crockett (1996) is 
among the first to provide a solid and detailed discussion of the financial stability 
concept, underlying its importance for the rational allocation of savings and 
investments, along with financial health’s importance on the real economy smooth 
operation. The role of financial intermediation is emphasized, while the assets quality 
problems, the assets price volatility and the network effects on the stability of the 
financial system are pinpointed. 
In a more recent paper, Gramlich and Oet (2011) set the theoretical 
background for the development of a well justified early warning system for the 
structural fragility of financial systems. In their effort to identify the elements of 
financial systems, which contribute to the development of excessive systemic risk, 
they discuss the following features: comprehensiveness (important risk attributes 
should be part of the framework, from any possible perspective), consistency (in 
terms of the risk players connectivity and causal interactions between them), 
flexibility (easily adjustable to take into account new aspects of financial risk), 
forward looking (useful feature, especially for a timely tool, able to warn for 
forthcoming financial meltdowns), based on a correspondence with empirical data 
(that is, a model for which sufficient data volume exists) and suitability (a handy 
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model, concentrated to the major aspects of financial markets and economies). Taking 
into account the combined effect of these features and the already discussed 
complexity in defining financial stability, the authors conclude that it is fruitful to 
develop early warning indicators, based on indexes of structural financial fragility. 
Such indices can be a weighted, single factor. It is a clear call for the usefulness and 
development of aggregate systemic risk indexes. 
On the same vein, and closely related with the concept of financial stability 
and its measurement, is the concept of systemic risk. There is considerable interest 
among researcher in the most representative quantification of it. As early as the 
beginning of the previous decade, when there was still no evidence of systemic risk 
vulnerabilities for the developed economies, De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) provided 
a detailed survey of the relevant literature. In their work, the authors analyze the 
importance of the markets and financial institutions interconnections, while they also 
consider financial markets spillover effects as an important element of systemic risk 
propagation. Recently, the renowned interest in this concept is proclaimed, as it is 
evident by the recent publications of Allen and Carletti (2013) and Liang (2013) 
among others. According to the former, until the global financial crisis outbreak in 
2007, most regulators and markets participants were focused to the default 
probabilities of individual financial institutions. Since then, systemic risk is at the 
epicenter. The authors divide its characteristics into four types: panics (banking crises 
attributed to changing expectations), banking crises due to asset prices falls, contagion 
and currencies mismatches. All of them contribute for systemic risk to build up. 
Gerlach (2009) is another proponent of aggregate financial soundness indicators, as 
tools to gauge financial conditions. 
Overall, the fuzzy concept of financial stability and the measurement of 
systemic risk are strongly intertwined. Modern research tends towards the adoption of 
sophisticated, aggregate indexes, which are efficient representations of the level of 
systemic risk. This tendency is a natural extension of a relevant set of aggregate 
indicators, developed for the assessment of monetary policy efficacy. The next section 
briefly sketches this literature. 
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3. A Short Historical Account 
 
 
From the above discussion, the concept of price stability is much more 
straightforward, compared to financial stability. Given this and the pronounced 
interest of central banks to safeguarding their inflation targeting mandate, many of 
them developed the so called monetary conditions indexes. Usually, these indices 
consist of a weighted average of the short term interest rate (main policy rate) and the 
exchange rate of the country’s currency. As a tool, it was quite popular to small open 
economies, for which changes in these two variables are of utmost importance for the 
formation of aggregate demand. It performs as a tool for gauging the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
The pioneering central banks in the construction of such aggregate indexes 
were Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Gradually, many more 
countries adopted this framework. For instance, both developed (like UK and 
Australia) and developing (Turkey and India) economies assimilate this tool in the 
assessment of their monetary policy analysis1. 
Based on this experience, many central banks have recently decided to 
proceed with the research on similar aggregate indices for the assessment of their 
economies financial conditions. It was a decision based on the arguments presented 
and analyzed before. Additionally, the creation and maintenance of larger dataset, 
with important financial factors, rendered the computation of financial stress 
indicators easier. 
Since the relevant literature is still to its infancy, this thesis also contributes to 
the quantification of systemic risk, with the development of the financial stress 
indicators, proposed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For more, consult Kannan et al. (2006), Kesriyeli and Kocaker (1999), Batini and Turnbull (2000). 
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4. Thesis Overview 
 
 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The main research efforts and the ensuing 
empirical findings and policy prescriptions are described in chapter two to four. Here, 
a short description of the aforementioned is provided. 
Chapter 2 examines the leading indicator properties of the financial stress 
indices. The main research question, which is addressed at this chapter, is whether the 
aggregate systemic risk indicators can successfully predict real economy. Moreover, 
an identification of the types of financial episodes (together with their duration) is 
conducted, based on threshold values representing periods of excessive financial 
stress. Most of the scrutinized countries and regions are sensitive to securities-sourced 
financial instabilities. Based on the RMSFE ratios, I find that FSIs are good medium 
to short term predictors for the case of OECD countries. For the case of Asian and 
Latin American countries, the forecasts are better in longer time periods. Diebold-
Mariano and Clark-West tests of equal forecasting accuracy verify these results. 
Chapter 3 examines for potential interrelations and financial connections 
between the Eurozone countries and financial markets. One of the major innovations 
here is the constructions of financial stress indexes on a segmented basis. That is, for 
each country, I calculate five indices, one for each market examined (banking sector, 
money, equity and bond markets) and a national index. This is the first ever effort for 
such a detailed and decomposed analysis of the financial stress and its relevant 
sources for the Euro Area. Additionally, the dataset is large and diverge, consisting of 
banks balance sheet data (together with a large set of financial factors). The divergent 
character of the crisis is manifested in each one of the countries examined through the 
copious discussion of the indexes performance. Using a VAR modeling framework, 
my findings indicate that euro peripheral economies are not the main channels of 
financial shocks transmission to the rest of the Eurozone. Banking sectors and bond 
markets are highly interconnected. EMU is found to be disaggregated, in the sense 
that core and peripheral countries are mostly responsive to their own “club” financial 
shocks. 
Chapter 4 investigates volatility comovements and spillover effects within the 
Euro Area economies. The separate examination of the markets is accompanied by an 
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examination of the cross markets case. High frequency financial stress indices are 
employed, something not common until now. Full asymmetric BEKK-GARCH 
models are estimated, on a bivariate basis, in order to assess the volatility transmission 
channels between and within all markets involved in this examination. A long time 
period is covered, reaching September 2013. Results indicate the importance of the 
banking and bond markets in the volatility transmission of excessive financial stress. 
Additionally, money market is another risk transmitter, especially in the case of cross-
markets analysis. Strong bidirectional effects between countries, either from the core 
or peripheral clusters, are established. Although, GIIPS countries significantly 
contribute to the cross-volatility, larger and considerably more robust European 
economies (like France, Belgium and Netherlands) are also consistent transmitters of 
volatility risk and comovements. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. First, a short overview of the research aim and 
scope is provided. Then, the main contributions and policy implications from each 
chapter are discussed. Finally, a few recommendations for future research efforts are 
made. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Exploring the Financial Conditions – Economic Conditions 
Nexus: Empirical Evidence from Developed and Developing 
Countries 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Systemic financial crises can lead economies to major instabilities and, eventually, 
economic and financial losses. For this reason, there is a need for tools capable of 
indicating whether a financial catastrophe is on its way or not. This paper contributes 
to the relevant literature, by constructing a series of financial stress indices for 25 
countries. The countries are bundled into three groups (OECD, Asian, Latin American 
countries) and, apart from the national indexes, regional and a global index are 
computed. In order to do this, a number of variables from the banking sector, financial 
and capital markets and the foreign exchange market of each country, have been used 
for the implementation of these indicators. The indexes are successful early warning 
indicators, accurately capturing previous financial stress periods, while the financial 
turmoil of 2007-2009 is, without doubt, the most severe one. Also, empirical evidence 
is provided on the capability of these indices to work as successful predictors of the 
macroeconomic conditions in the economies of our sample. Finally, some 
propositions are made on how this kind of financial fragility tools can be improved 
and further research paths are also identified. 
 
JEL Classifications: C43, G01, G15, F37 
 
Keywords: Financial Fragility, Financial Stress Index, Monitoring, Forecasting 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial crises are an integrated part of the function of the world economies. 
Their implications can be quite severe, leading to huge economic and financial losses, 
together with an unprecedented misallocation of income and resources in the 
economies. This is a major reason that substantial research effort has been devoted to 
the study of the effects of financial instability in economic activity, in the last two 
decades. A considerable number of papers have been published, dealing with this 
topic, suggesting and empirically applying a series of econometric techniques, mainly 
trying to offer useful tools for crises episodes’ predictions. The results were 
interesting, but partial, in the sense that most of these models were dealing with 
specific types of financial upheavals (either balance of payments, banking or currency 
ones), while the modeling approaches employed could not offer a tool able to capture 
the current situation in the financial markets, in a timely manner and of a continuous 
nature. Moreover, the lack of an operational framework for measuring financial 
stability can be surpassed, through the adoption of metrics characterized as macro-
prudential2. Additionally, a special interest on important financial institutions is 
crucial, as well as the incorporation of systemic risk into the tools policy makers and 
investors use (Borio and Drehmann, 2009). Such tools, satisfying the aforementioned 
characteristics are the financial stress indices we develop here. 
The previously mentioned weaknesses of the crises models can be ameliorated 
by the utilization of a financial stress index (FSI henceforth), which is a composite 
indicator, consisting of a series of properly weighted financial variables, offering an 
overview of the financial markets health. This approach exhibits a number of 
advantages, like the easiness in the construction, together with the ability to offer a 
continuous, uninterrupted picture of the conditions in the financial markets. In this 
paper, we proceed to the construction of such indices for 25 countries, together with 
the computation of three regional ones, after grouping the countries in their respective 
bunch (OECD, Asian and Latin American countries). Moreover, we present a global 
financial stress index, which is the outcome of the aggregation of the three regional 
indexes. Additionally, an analytical exposition of the type (according to which market 
                                                 
2 Macro-prudential policies or metrics are those taking into account the financial system as a whole, as 
oppose to micro-prudential that focuses to individual financial institutions’ health. 
24 
 
was the source of each episode, either banking, securities or foreign exchange-related) 
and the average duration of the financial distress experienced by each country and 
region, is being provided. As it will be made clear, these indices seem to perform 
quite well, for most of the regions and countries. It is by no surprise the fact that the 
current financial crisis, initiated on 2007, has been proved to be the most severe one 
for most of the countries, at least for the time period that reliable data are available. 
Hence, we believe that this piece of work contributes towards the creation of a more 
efficient financial stress index, where efficiency coincides with higher accuracy on 
signaling forthcoming, financially stressful periods. Beyond this extremely useful 
feature of these indicators, it should be emphasized that FSIs are a first-rate 
macroprudential tool. They offer an (almost) live representation of the financial 
system conditions, rendering the monetary authorities able to prepare for safeguarding 
the stability of the financial system through the adoption of relevant macroeconomic 
policies. 
 Moreover, a forecasting exercise is materialized, aiming to provide empirical 
evidence on the relation between the financial conditions prevailing in an economy 
and the respective macroeconomic situation. Efforts to explain the connection 
between financial markets with real economic activity are timed from the early 90’s. 
Important pieces of research in this respect are those by Estrella and Hardouvelis 
(1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997), among others. In there, the authors achieved 
to establish a relation between the two sectors. Still, this work can be characterized as 
incomplete. The main reason is that they only used stand alone indicators, from a 
specific, narrow financial market, without being able to establish a more general 
interconnection between the finance spectrum and economic conditions. The modern, 
complex financial markets require the use of more advanced metrics of the financial 
conditions, like the financial stress indexes. In this way, a more informative, 
conclusive picture of the financial conditions is provided. There are proposals for the 
comparative advantage of composite stress indicators as more powerful predictors of 
real economic variables3, like the papers of English et al. (2005) and Erden and 
Tsatsaronis (2013). The recent financial meltdown has stimulated the production of 
even more research on this respect. Our work aims to extend the relevant literature in 
many aspects. First of all, we provide stress indices for a large group of developed and 
                                                 
3 Such variables are GDP, industrial production, inflation, investment etc. 
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emerging economies. Until now, most papers focus on developed economies (mostly 
US) or to a small number of countries. Additionally, we proceed to a descriptive 
analysis and identification of the sources of financial stress for all these countries, 
based on the root causes of each systemic risk episode signaled by the indices. This is 
very helpful, especially for monetary policy authorities and their ability to prepare for 
such events outbreaks and the amelioration of their consequences in the economy. 
Third, it is shown that our FSI-enhanced model can provide more accurate forecasts 
for the future economic activity of the economies in our dataset. This is the first 
attempt to use such aggregate measures of financial risk and stability in such an 
empirical framework, for such a big and diverse group of economies. Finally, the 
improved ability of financial stress indices to predict real economic activity is verified 
by the application of two equal forecasting ability statistical tests. These are the 
Diebold Mariano test and the second one is the test of Clark and West (2007). There is 
very strong evidence in favor of using such aggregate indicators, especially for the 
case of OECD countries. 
This paper is organized in five sections, the contents of which are as follows. 
In section 2, an exhaustive review of the financial stress literature is offered. Section 3 
provides a description of the data, together with an analytical presentation of the 
empirical approach implemented in the construction of our financial stress indices. 
Section 4 discusses the results of our financial stress indices’ construction work, while 
the section 5 develops a model for testing the forecasting properties of a FSI-
augmented model. Finally, section 6 concludes, together with a brief discussion of 
further research paths, able to improve these kinds of indices functionality and 
usefulness as forecasting tools. 
 
 
2. Financial Stress Indices: An Account of the Literature 
 
The literature on financial stress (or, as some of the authors call them, 
financial fragility) indices (FSI), has mushroomed the last decade. It is a branch of the 
research developed as a continuation of the early warning indicators (EWI) literature, 
models that have been used in previous empirical work on, mainly, currency and 
banking crises episodes. As it will be made clear, these two approaches on modeling 
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periods of financial crises look similar, although, they have quite distinctive 
characteristics. First of all, previous models were models analyzing country-specific 
or only specific types of crises episodes (either, currency, banking or balance of 
payments crises). The most recent periods of turmoil (especially, the sub-prime crisis 
beginning on 2007) showed that crises are systemic-wide and are not confined to a 
single market of the economy anymore. Also, exactly because of this nature of 
financial crises, there is a need to alter the modeling approach followed up to now, in 
order to be able to capture this special feature of modern financial abnormalities. 
Before, wide use of binary choice models (either probit or logit ones) has been made, 
predetermined in this way the outcome (being a choice between a crisis or non-crisis 
state) for each time period under consideration. With the FSI approach, a series with 
continuous values is provided, offering a timely illustration of the market conditions, 
thus, better monitoring of the financial system is possible. Moreover, most of the 
work done was focused on developing economies, something justifiable by the fact 
that these economies were the most vulnerable to periods of financial instability. 
Recent abnormal periods showed that new tools of monitoring the stability of the 
financial system are needed, able to anticipate the sources of financial stress and, most 
importantly, to be easily implementable and used as forecasting tools, in order to 
provide accurate and swift indication of forthcoming periods of instability. The 
relevant literature, discussed here, provides some answers to these complex and 
interesting issues. 
This section is divided into three main parts. In the first one, we provide a 
synopsis of studies, aiming to provide a definition and the basic feature of financial 
stress. As Allen and Wood (2006) comment, the aforementioned concept is not that 
clear from the economic and financial literature, in contrast with the idea of price 
stability. This vagueness of financial stress is, potentially, one of the reasons that 
central banks failed, until recently, to accommodate the need of safeguarding this 
aspect of the financial system. Then, we proceed to an exhaustive overview of the 
financial stress indices literature. First, a discussion of the papers related with 
developed economies is given, while the last part of this literature review copes with 
aggregate financial conditions metrics for emerging markets. Our main focus here, 
apart from the construction of financial stress indices for the twenty five countries of 
our sample and the regional and global index, is the predictive power of such indices 
for the real economy. Thus, the analysis in the aforementioned two sections of the 
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survey deal with forecast models for, both, real economy’s variables, as well as future 
financial stress level. 
 
2.1 An Attempt to Define Financial Stress 
 
One of the challenges financial economists face is the formulation of a 
complete and well-rounded definition of financial stress. It is a notion hardly 
definable and measurable, compared to concepts like price stability or inflation 
targeting4. A very brief, but obviously incomplete, definition of this concept is offered 
by Illing and Liu (2006), where they define financial stress as the force exerted on 
economic agents by uncertainty and changing expectations of loss in financial markets 
and institutions. A relatively broader, but more representative (of the interacting 
forces within a financial system), definition of financial stability (this time) is 
provided by Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009). They mention that “Financial stability 
encompass the smooth functioning of a complex nexus of relationships among 
financial markets, infrastructures and institutions operating within the given legal, 
fiscal and accounting frameworks”. Thus, a dysfunction in any or some of these 
channels of interaction can lead to a financial stress period. Also, such a definition is 
inclusive, in the sense that gives a clearer idea of the importance of the financial 
system for the whole economy. 
A major contribution to the creation of a definition for financial stability is 
made by Allen and Wood (2006). In their paper, the authors underline that the 
wording “financial stability” has not been used by central bankers, up until 1994. In 
their view, in order to be able to formulate a clear and understandable definition, it 
should satisfy the following desired features. It should be related to welfare effects on 
the economy; it needs to define something observable by the public, while it also 
should be something controllable by the public authorities. Moreover, a clearly 
defined political entity has to be responsible to accommodate for the stability of the 
financial system and, on the same time, the definition should be broad enough. In this 
way, the whole spectrum of instability sources (like financial and non-financial 
institutions, sovereigns and others) would be included, something quite crucial for the 
                                                 
4 As it is commented in Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009), very few central banks include any quantifiable 
measure of financial stability to their Financial Stability Reviews, compared to indicators of economic 
activity incorporated to their annual or semi-annual reports. 
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measurement of the current financial crisis effects. Finally, the definition does not 
need to be too precise5. Based on the above, Allen and Wood (2006) conclude that 
time periods during which a large number of economic agents (households, firms, 
governments) experience financial crises that are not warranted by their previous 
behavior are periods of financial instability. The most important aspect of such 
periods is that they have a strong, adverse, macroeconomic effect. As a consequence, 
financially stable periods are those that incidences, like the previously described, are 
not likely to happen. This is very important, according to the authors, since it entails 
the non incorporation of such negative expectations into the agents’ formation of 
economic decisions. 
In any case, the proper and accurate definition of financial stress (or financial 
stability, if someone would like to start from this point) remains an open issue and, 
probably, this is the main reason for the inexistence of any well-founded theoretical 
models dealing with such issues. 
 
2.2 Financial Stress Indices: Empirical Work for Advanced Economies 
 
The development of financial stress indices was initiated from economists in 
developed economies. It is reasonable, since the necessity for such tools was stronger 
to the economies mostl harshly hit by the recent financial crisis, while this trend was 
enforced from the failure of previous relevant tools to offer clear indication of the 
forthcoming financial meltdown. Additionally, a great deal of such research is 
accomplished by economists in policy making institutions, such as IMF, OECD and 
central banks. The majority of the papers cope with the US economy, while there is 
growing interest from other countries around the world and, especially, from 
Eurozone. Here, we provide a detailed account of the different approaches used to 
construct such aggregate stress indexes for advanced economies. As mentioned 
before, the focus here is also on papers proceeding to forecasting exercises, for the 
real economic activity, as well as for projections of the level of financial stress. 
Apart from their effort to provide a conclusive definition for financial stability, 
Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009) provide an excellent review of the empirical work done 
on this topic up to now. They supply an exhaustive account of the different 
                                                 
5 The argument behind this has to do with the necessity to avoid cases of false alarms. These are cases 
where the financial system becomes more turbulent but not into a crisis period. 
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quantitative measures used in the relevant literature, by segregating them to sectors of 
the economy. In particular, the real sector of the economy is described by GDP 
growth, inflation and the fiscal position of government, measures that can depict the 
risk of overheating of the economy. Then, regarding the corporate sector, its stability 
can be evaluated by its leverage and expense ratios, together with the foreign 
exchange exposure risk and the corporate defaults. The household sector is important 
in this kind of research as well, where emphasis has been given to measures reflecting 
their net assets and net disposable income. Real exchange rates, foreign exchange 
reserves, capital flows and currency mismatches have been used as indicators of the 
conditions prevailing in the external sector of the economy, while, the financial 
sector’s situation is mirrored by monetary aggregates, real interest rates, banks’ 
capital and liquidity ratios, credit ratings and the banks’ lending activities. Finally, 
regarding financial markets, the most frequently measures are equity indices, liquidity 
premia, corporate bond spreads and volatility measurements. The authors proceed to a 
survey of a series of developed and emerging economies central banks’ financial 
stability reports, aiming to investigate whether they use any composite indexes of 
financial stability. Surprisingly, the outcome is quite disappointing, with most of them 
not utilizing any such indicator or, at the best, tracking only partial ones (only for 
some of the markets of the economy). Those central banks’ reports containing a 
unified index are quite diverse, in the sense that the sample includes institutions from 
both developed (Swiss National Bank) and developing (Czech National Bank, Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority) economies and, also, such measure are quite recent 
additions in these reports (they are traced not more than two or three years back). 
Hence, according to the authors, there is still great scope for research and 
implementation of such indices, not only because they are advantageous (compared to 
indices depicting the conditions in single sectors of the economy) but, also, because 
the challenge of using such quantitative measures as forecasting tools for the onset of 
financial crises, largely, remains unanswered. 
Further stimulation and feedback on what kind of variables should be included 
to composite systemic risk indicators is given by Nelson and Perli (2007). Here, the 
authors discuss a number of financial indicators Federal Reserve monitors, in order to 
gauge the financial system’s stability. There is a range of single and composite 
indexes, covering interest rates and asset prices-based measures, like bid-ask spreads 
and securities trading volumes, liquidity premiums ( yields of less liquid securities – 
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yields of highly liquid ones), yields between riskier and less risky assets and, also, 
equities premium and interest rates (as well as stock prices) options. They also present 
indicators from the mortgage market (like the average duration of fixed-rate 
mortgages, included to mortgage-based securities), while indicators for individual 
(financial and non-financial) institutions are also monitored from the FED (creation of 
CDS indexes, based on weighted average value of them, since it is believed that CDS 
are more representative of the market conditions, compared to corporate bond yields). 
This is an interesting piece of work, but it should be emphasized the fact that it does 
not discuss or present the most recent work conducted by FED economists, in the 
construction of financial stress indices. Nevertheless, it does offer a good starting 
point, especially for the choice of indicators that can be useful and informative for the 
composite stress indexes. 
In their work, Illing and Liu (2006) outbid for the creation of an FSI as a well-
suited index of financial stress for developed economies, compared to other early 
warning indicators. According to their justification, such a stress index is more 
suitable because it is a continuous, high frequency reference variable, covering a 
range of markets (equity, bond, forex and banking ones), and hence, takes into 
consideration the complex issues of financial stability in advanced economies. The 
authors are mainly interested into three tasks here. First, they want to specify which 
time periods can be considered as stress periods for the Canadian economy, then 
which variables they should use to create their FSI and, finally, which one of the 
different FSI’s they compute is the most efficient. For the first task, they conducted a 
survey within the Bank of Canada economists, collecting answers on a series of 
questions. Then, having specified the financially abnormal periods, they experiment 
with different methodologies and a series of variables, in order to develop a financial 
stress index for the Canadian economy. They construct three measures of financial 
stress. The first one is the standard measure, as they call it, where the variables used 
are those proposed by the relevant literature on the financial markets (and described 
afterwards), the second one, called the refined measure, contains only those variables 
that can be refined and, thus, potential extra information can be extracted and, finally, 
a measure based on GARCH techniques is constructed for the “price” variables 
(Canadian general and banking sector equity indices and the Can$/US$ exchange 
rate). In particular, the variables that were included to their index are the following: 
the beta of the Canadian banking equity index and the bank bond yield spread (from 
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the long-term governmental bond yields), representing the situation in the banking 
sector of the country. Here, the refined measure consists of two conditions that set a 
threshold for the values of beta, being higher than 1 and the returns to the bank index 
to be lower than the overall market returns6. For the foreign exchange market, they 
focus on the Canadian dollar volatility, using the CMAX calculation as a measure of 
it7. For the refined approach, they implement the following model, in order to gauge 
the exchange rate to its short-run fundamental value: 
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The idea behind this approach lies in the avoidance of false financial stress signals 
from the foreign exchange market. Since Canadian economy operates with a free 
floating exchange rate regime, a depreciating currency (that would, potentially, imply 
an increasing likelihood of a currency crash) is not necessarily against the stabilizing 
process of the economy. That is why the authors use model (1.1) to estimate the 
Canadian dollar’s fundamental value, based to its fundamentals. 
Then, regarding debt markets, they use the Canada-US covered interest differential 
and the corporate bond yield spread (from the long-term government bond yield) as 
indicators of the prevailing credit risk in the market, while, liquidity risk is captured 
here from three variables: the treasury bill bid-offer spread, the so-called TED spread, 
which is the difference of the commercial paper rate from the treasury bill rate and, 
finally, the inverted yield curve (long-term government bond yield – 90-day 
commercial paper rate). The refined measure of risk spreads is obtained by creating a 
threshold value, which fractionate the excessive corporate bond spreads from the 
lower values (which represent a tranquil period in the debt markets)9. Lastly, the 
conditions in the equity market are represented by the equity risk premium: 
                                                 
6 In this way, it is implied that, whenever these two conditions hold, the banking sector might confront 
higher stress, compared to the rest of the market. Whenever these two conditions are not satisfied, a 
value of zero has been put to the refined series. 
7 CMAXt= xt/max[x∈(xt-j| j=0,1, ..,T)], where xt = value of canadian dollar vis-à-vis US dollar and 
T=one year time period. 
8 Here, rfx is the real exchange rate, comtot is an index of real non-energy commodity prices, enetot an 
index of real energy prices, intdif the Canada-US 90-day commercial paper  rate differential and 
debtdif is the Canada-US debt/GDP differential. 
9 The threshold is estimated by a simple OLS regression, where the corporate bond yield is the 
dependent variable and the exogenous ones are the Moody’s Issuer Based Default Rate, the 10-year 
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which is the outcome of the deduction of the annual return to equities from the risk-
free real return on governmental bonds10. Trying to further refine their work, Illing 
and Liu (2006) apply different weighting scheme on their variables, so as to identify 
which one leads to the creation of a single FSI that outperform the rest of them and, 
consecutively, is the most efficient in capturing period of financial turmoil. They try 
four methodologies, factor analysis (which uses weighted linear combinations of the 
variables), credit weights (the contribution of each market to the total credit available 
in the Canadian economy is the important factor here), the variance-equal weights 
approach (by standardizing each variable by subtracting its mean and dividing the 
result by its standard deviation) and they also use the variables cumulative distribution 
functions to combine them (this scheme requires the transformation of each series into 
percentiles, based on its CDF and, then, average them using their arithmetic and 
geometric means). Based on the different indices’ performance (in terms of Type-I 
and Type-II errors, as defined by their survey for extreme events in the Canadian 
economy and the capability of the indices to capture them), they conclude that the best 
financial stress index seem to be the credit-weighted one, although, in individual 
markets, some other indexes might perform quite well (for example, the GARCH 
measure for the stock market). 
A, somehow, substitutionary approach has been followed by Aspachs et al. 
(2006), in order to create a metric of financial fragility. The advantage of their 
approach, according to the authors, consists on the use of a general equilibrium model 
[compared to the atheoretical method followed by Illing and Liu (2006)] to decide 
which variables to use on their index and, additionally, the construction of such 
indices for seven, instead of one, countries. More precisely, their model is a micro-
founded, general equilibrium one, where the assumptions of endogenous default and 
heterogeneous agents are made11. An important aspect of such a model is that, 
                                                                                                                                            
governmental bond yield, the Bank of Canada reference rate and the Commodity Research Bureau’s 
price index. 
10 Here, it is easily palpable that high equity risk premium would indicate a period of financial stress in 
the market. 
11 This is the model developed by Goodhart et al. (2006). 
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because it is based on the heterogeneity assumption, it allows dealing with a banking 
sector which consists of institutions with different exposure to credit risk and, because 
of this, they face different probabilities of default. Through numerical simulation and 
calibration of the model to values for the British banking system, they conclude that 
“The crucial aspects of the impact of shocks on the banking system are contained in 
two factors, bank profitability and bank repayment rate [i.e. probability of default 
(PD)]. Hence, they attempt to find out the variables that represent these two factors 
and the most appropriate weighting scheme to use, in order to end up with a financial 
(in-) stability indicator. In order to decide upon the necessary variables to include, 
they examine the welfare effects (in terms of adverse consequences on the growth rate 
of GDP) of a series of them, specifically, the percentage change in banking sector 
equity values, the country-specific banking sector PD (using the so-called distance to 
default indicators, developed by IMF), inflation (percentage change on CPI), property 
prices and short term interest rates. Implementing individual country’s VAR and a 
panel VAR methodology, they verify the predictions of their theoretical model (for 
the importance of bank profitability and PD’s as crucial for the stability of a financial 
system). Finally, in order to obtain a single index of financial fragility, they proceed to 
a variance decomposition technique, derived by a panel VAR, to decide upon a 
weighting scheme for their index. Thus, they calculate a financial stress measurement 
by considering that a country’s welfare is 90% affected by PD’s and only 10% by 
equities values. 
Even though the use of this kind of financial distress indexes is not yet that 
much popularized, especially among the policymakers, a considerable effort is being 
made to introduce such policy tools in the central banks’ financial monitoring 
ammunition, especially from economists of the US Federal Reserve System. A recent 
example of this is the work done by Hakkio and Keeton (2009), who introduced the 
Kansas City FED FSI (KCFSI). Their index consists of eleven variables, representing 
one or more of the features financial stress has. These are the increased uncertainty for 
the fundamental value of assets and the behavior of other investors, while the 
increased asymmetry of information and the decreased willingness to hold risky assets 
(the so-called “flight to quality”) are also important determinants of it. Finally, the 
flight to liquidity (as the decreasing holdings of illiquid assets is know) also 
contributes to heightening financial turmoil. In more details, KCFSI consists of the 
following variables: the TED spread (3-month LIBOR – Treasury bill rate), the 2-
34 
 
years swap spread (which is the difference between a floating rate payment, based on 
LIBOR, from a fixed rate payment, which derives from the treasury bill rate, 
augmented by a premium), the yield differential of previously issued securities from 
the most recently issued one, of the same maturity (called as the off-the-run – on-the-
run ten year treasury spread). Additionally, a number of bond spreads are also 
included in this index12, together with the correlation of the stock returns with the 
two-year governmental bond yield, the implied volatility of the stock prices13 and the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the bank stock prices (calculating as the standard deviation 
of the banks stock index daily returns from the S&P 500 index). Finally, the KCFSI is 
completed with the inclusion of the cross-sectional dispersion of bank stock returns 
(computed using the interquartile range of banks’ stock returns). The authors have 
used principal components analysis to decide upon the weights of each of these 
variables, while they employed monthly data for the period February 1990 to March 
2009. Inspecting the performance of KCFSI, they show that it works relatively well, 
with only two financial crises (the Mexican and the Asian ones) not being captured by 
the index (according to the authors, because of the limited spillover effects of these 
episodes to the US financial markets). In order to test for the effect of financial stress 
to real economic activity, the authors proceed to a comparison of the KCFSI values 
with the SLOOS values14. Regressing SLOOS to lagged values of it and of KCFSI, 
they found out that KCFSI tends to lead changes in credit standards, while the same 
holds for the interrelation of KCFSI with CFNAI (Chicago FED’s index of economic 
activity). Econometric estimations indicate that KCFSI helps predicting CFNAI 
values, showing that financial stress can lead to slower economic activity (also, the 
previously established relation of KCFSI with SLOOS implies such an adverse effect 
of financial conditions to the real economy, through the changes on the credit 
standards). Through impulse response analysis, the authors support that a financial 
shock negatively affect CFNAI, even though the effect is not big enough to create, by 
itself, a recession. 
An investigation of the relation between US financial conditions and economic 
activity, through the use of both single and composite financial indicators, has been 
                                                 
12 These are the Aaa – 10-year government bond spread, the Baa – Aaa bonds spread, high yield (i.e. 
junk) bond  - Baa bonds spread and the difference between consumer ABS from 5-years Treasury 
bond. 
13 The authors use the well-known CBOE volatility index, mostly known as VIX index, representing 
the expected volatility in S&P 500 index in the options market. 
14It is an index showing how tight credit standards are. 
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accomplished by Hatzius et al. (2010). Apart from the empirical work, this paper 
provides an excellent theoretical account of the importance of the financial conditions 
for, both, the assessment of the monetary policy decisions effectiveness and the future 
economic activity. A detailed discussion of the monetary transmission mechanism – 
financial conditions nexus is provided, together with a summary of a number of 
financial conditions indices built up until now, together with their features. Their final 
target is the creation of a new FCI which overcomes the limitations of the previous 
ones. These are the limited time span, the exclusion of important financial conditions 
because of the aforementioned limitation and the lack of purification of previous 
indexes from the effects of the business cycle and of the monetary policy changes (as 
they are projected on the financial indicators incorporated to them). Thus, they decide 
to use 45 indicators for their new FCI, indicators representing interest rate spreads, 
asset prices, quantities and survey indicators. Two are the main criteria for the choice 
of variables, the wider time coverage, comparing to previous FCIs and the long data 
history, going back at least to 1970’s. In order to construct this aggregate index, they 
use principal components analysis, but with some special characteristics (compared to 
previous cases): first, the authors allow for unbalanced panels (meaning that the data 
series do not cover the same time period, nor are they of the same frequency), second, 
they eliminate the variability of the included indicators which can be attributed to 
current and past influence of real economy variables and, finally, they use more than 
one principal components in the analysis. Their model has the following form: 
 
 ( )it i t itX L Y      (2.3) 
 it i t itF u     (2.4) 
 
where itX = financial indicator i, tY = vector of macroeconomic indicators and it = 
error term uncorrelated with current and lagged valued of macroeconomic indicators. 
Hence, the error term represents the financial variables purified by the business cycle 
effects which, in turn, is decomposed to the tF =kx1 vector of unobserved financial 
factors that capture the co-movement of the financial indicators. This vector should be 
estimated for the acquisition of the FCI. Based on the approximate dynamic factor 
models’ literature, which suggests that least squares estimations of this vector are 
accurate for use in forecasting exercises, the authors consider this approach to obtain 
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estimates of tF . The process is the following: first, they regress each individual 
financial indicator onto the current and two lagged values of the relevant 
macroeconomic variables (here, they use GDP and inflation) and they extract the 
residuals of these regressions as estimates of it . Then, through equation (1.4), they 
estimate the factors (vector tF ). The R
2 criterion provides evidence of great variability 
on the number of factors that achieve the best fit for each series. Thus, the authors 
decided to consider models with one, two and three factors. Nevertheless, there seems 
to be consensus on the loadings signs (negative ones for interest rate spreads, positive 
for credit flows and asset prices indicators). Inspecting the performance of the FCI, it 
is found that it behaves similarly to the previous indices, with the exception of the 
second half of 2009, where it shows a further worsening of the financial conditions. 
Proceeding to the evaluation of the forecasting accuracy of this and previous FCIs, the 
author firstly test the predictive ability of a number of single-variable financial 
indicators. These are the term spread (10-year Treasury note – federal funds rate), the 
real M2, the S&P500 stock index, the level of federal funds rate and the short-term 
credit spread (3-month commercial paper rate – 3-month Treasury bill rate). Using 
these indicators, they try to predict (in 2 and 4 quarters ahead) the growth rate of the 
following macroeconomic variables: real GDP, payroll employment, industrial 
production index and unemployment rate. They do it both in- and out-of-sample, 
while the regression specification is 
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with ty  representing the real activity indicator in each case, while tx  is the respective 
financial indicator. The number of lags, for both cases, was restrained to four. For the 
post-sample prediction, the authors use the same specification as previously, 
recursively estimated through the end of the sample period (fourth quarter of 2009). 
Here, lags for the explanatory variables were chosen according to the BIC criterion. 
The out of sample forecasts constructed for the period 1971Q1 onwards and they were 
compared with forecasts from an AR model (that is, excluding the financial indicator 
variable). For the in-sample forecast, it is found that the financial indicators are useful 
in explaining the variability in real economy variables, for both two and four quarters 
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ahead. Apart from the stock market index, the rest of them present high instability, 
something that can be possibly attributed to changes in the financial structure of US 
economy through time. Regarding the out-of-sample prediction results, the models 
with financial indicators provide satisfactory results, only until the mid-80’s. 
Additionally, they become in par with the simple AR model in the most recent period 
(last five years), while S&P500 and the credit spread did quite well the last decade. 
Checking the out-of-sample predictive performance of a number of FCIs15, the 
improvement on the forecasting accuracy is general, especially at periods which are 
recognized as financially stressful ones. But, on average, they are not better than the 
stock market index, while the most noticeable improvement for the FCI model 
performance is during the last decade. Moreover, during the 90’s, some of these 
financial conditions index are not better than the simple AR or the single indicators 
models. The results are rather mixed but this does hold for the authors’ FCI, which 
performs better than the rest of the models (and the previous FCIs models) for the last 
five years, but not for the second half of the 1990’s. In the last section of this paper, 
the authors provide an evaluation of the innovative characteristics of their FCI, in 
terms of its forecasting performance. Thus, they first recalculate the index by using 
only a balanced panel of series (the longest ones). In this way, they found that the 
baseline FCI works better as a prediction tool. Then, they disaggregate the index into 
five subgroups of indicators and test each group’s predictive performance. Again, no 
single group performs better than the aggregate FCI. Also, the FCI where the 
macroeconomic influences are not excluded [represented by the GDP and inflation in 
the tY  vector in equation (1.3)] is compared with the baseline one and the result is in 
favor of the one for which these effects are purged, but only for the period since early 
1990’s. Finally, when also the federal funds rate is excluded from the composite index 
construction, the forecasting performance of this index is similar to the benchmark 
one, an indication that pure monetary shocks do not contribute much to the prediction 
of future economic activity. All in all, Hatzius et al. (2010) financial conditions index 
is effective on predicting economic activity, especially in times of high financial 
distress. Otherwise, results are mixed. 
In order to overcome the predicaments of the existence of a wide number of 
interesting financial series with different time spans and frequencies, which could be 
                                                 
15 The authors do this using the same specification as in equation (13), but this time the individual 
financial indicator x is replaced by the FCI under consideration each time. 
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used in the construction of a composite financial stress indicator, Brave and Butter 
(2011) use a dynamic factor model that allows the inclusion of unbalanced series in 
the index. In this way, they take into account one hundred financial indicators for the 
US economy, with different frequency and time coverage (47 of them are weekly, 29 
monthly and 24 quarterly series, covering the period 1971-2010). In broad terms, their 
model consists of the following equations: 
 
 t t tX F      (2.6) 
 1t t tF F      (2.7) 
 
where tX = financial indicators matrix,  = factors loadings,  = transition matrix 
and tF = factors matrix. The transition matrix represents the evolution of the latent 
factors over time. In this model, the authors define the model’s dynamic structure to 
be of finite order, namely, 15 weeks (lags). By estimating Γ, they extract their FSI. As 
it is obvious, this model is similar to the one discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Additionally, in order to capture the effects of the economic conditions (apart from 
the financial ones), they compute the so-called adjusted-FSI, by including the 
aforementioned CFNAI index and inflation in their estimation procedure. They do so 
by, first, regressing each individual financial indicator on current and lagged values of 
CFNAI and inflation and, second, the standardized residuals from these estimations 
are used in the construction of the adjusted-FSI. By inspecting these two indices, they 
conclude that both perform well, except a few cases where they do not (especially at 
the beginning of their sample in early 70’s). Finally, the authors perform a forecasting 
exercise, similar to the one proposed by Hatzius et al. (2010) and, also, conducted 
here. Questioning whether FSI predicts any impacts of financial conditions to 
economic activity, they try to check whether the predictive ability of a model where 
the FSI is included, is superior to a simple AR model which includes only 
autoregressive lags of a number of macroeconomic variables. The model used for this 
forecasting exercise is 
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where, tY is the logarithm of the macroeconomic variables
16, CFNAI the 3-month 
moving average of CFNAI and FCI the 13-week moving average of adjusted FCI, 
FCI residual or adjusted FCI residual17 (depending on specification). They recursively 
forecast for horizons of 1, 2, 4 and 6 quarters ahead, starting with data from 1973Q1 
through 1984Q4. The evaluation is done through the calculation of the mean squared 
forecast error (RMSFE) ratio, which provides the ratio of the AR forecasts of the 
macroeconomic variables over the aforementioned model. If RMSFE <1, there is an 
improvement on predictive accuracy, when a version of the financial stress index is 
included in the model. According to the results, the inclusion of the FCI residual 
(together with the CFNAI) improves forecasts at every horizon and for every variable. 
Similar results, using again a dynamic factor model for the construction of FCIs for 
US and Euro Area, are obtained by Matheson (2012). Again, for different GDP 
forecast models, the FCIs are shown to be a very useful indicator for foreseeing the 
evolution of economic activity. 
In their next paper, Brave and Butters (2012) compare their approach to 
financial stability examination, to a patient’s health check. They consider a number or 
interesting research questions, like whether the risk for the financial system is the 
same or not whenever an economy faces low or high values of a stress index. Also, 
they try to provide an answer on the perceived “normal” level of financial stress and 
how well it can be captured by the economic tools in use. In order to answer the 
aforementioned, they employ an aggregate stress index (based on the methodology 
used in their previous paper, they name it Chicago FED FCI). The accuracy of their 
index is tested, using an epidemiologic tool, called receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) analysis. ROC is a non parametric approach, based on curve analysis. It helps 
on assigning each time period as a crisis or non-crisis period. Through this approach, 
the FCI evaluation can be accomplished, based on whether the index can capture 
deteriorating financial conditions, when prior knowledge for past financial crises 
exist. The past information is based on the crisis dating work produced by Laeven and 
Valencia (2010) and Lopez – Salido and Nelson (2010). The outcome of their 
empirical work shows that their index is highly predictive, both in contemporaneous 
                                                 
16 These are GDP, Gross domestic purchases, Final sales, Nonfarm private inventories, residential 
investment, and nonresidential investment, PCE: durables, PCE: nondurables and PCE: services.  
17 FCI residual and adjusted FCI residual are the portion of the FCI and adjusted FCI that cannot be 
predicted from the index’s historical dynamics. In other words, it corresponds with the error term from 
the transition function (12). 
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form, as well as for one and two-years ahead horizons. In order to verify the improved 
ability of their index on projecting future financial conditions, the authors compare its 
ability with the forecasting performance of other well known stress indices of the US 
economy (KCFSI, IMF FSI, STLFSI, credit/GDP measure of systemic risk and bank 
conditions measures taken from the previously mentioned crisis dating papers). In this 
comparison, they find a relatively better performance for Chicago FED FCI, 
especially for short term predictive horizon (less than a year). 
The creation of synthetic stress indexes for the US banking sector has been 
attempted by Puddu (2008). In doing so, the author implements two approaches, the 
signaling one and the qualitative response analysis, in order to identify the weights to 
be assigned to the individual indicators included in the composite stress index. Then, 
their appraisal is conducted by comparing his results with indexes constructing with 
the two most popular aggregation techniques (these are, the variance-equal weights 
and factor analysis). Six variables are used in this index, covering the period 1984 
through 2007, in quarterly frequency. These are the returns on assets (ROA), net loans 
losses/average total loans (LSTL), non-performing loans/total loans (NPTL), loan loss 
reserves/total loans (LLRTL), net interest margin (NIM) and the number of 
commercial banks failed (FAILS). At first, Puddu defines stress periods by taking into 
account the number of failed banks in each quarter. Then, regarding signaling 
approach, he defines the “noise” of each indicator included in the aggregate index, 
according to its type I (i.e. the existence of a crisis episode not captured by the 
indicator) and type II (no crisis but signal by the indicator) errors. In functional form, 
the noise-to-signal ration is 
 
 (  ) 1 (  )in P no alarm crisis P alarm no crisis     (2.9) 
 
As it can be easily concluded, the lower the noise, the higher the indicator’s weight 
will be. After deciding about the weights in this way, the bank stress index is 
computed as 
 
 1 2 3 4 5Stress = w ROA w LSTL w NPTL w LLRTL w NIM      (2.10) 
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For the second methodology (qualitative response analysis), the author uses the so-
called zero-inflated regression approach, which employs a Poisson and a negative 
binomial distribution for the dependent variable18. This approach seems to have some 
advantages, mainly because of the many zero values that FAILS have (many quarters 
on which there were not any bank failures). The regression estimated is represented as 
follows: 
 
 
( )  if 0
( )  if y >0 
it t t
t
it t t
G Z y
y
F X


   
  (2.11) 
 
The first part of this specification takes care of the elements affecting the zero values 
of FAILS, while the second one is for the non-zero part of the dependent variable. itZ  
and itX  are vectors of the explanatory variables used in the estimations (mentioned 
above). Under this analysis, the authors constructs a number of indices, according to 
the signs ascribed to the individual indicators, first according to what economic theory 
suggests for them, then based on the signs found for them during crisis periods and, 
finally, according to the signs of the estimated coefficients. The outcome is promising, 
with good performance from the stress indexes, capturing periods of banking 
abnormalities and recession periods. The results are quite similar to the one provided 
by the variance-equal approach (especially for the index compiled with the signaling 
approach). Finally, by using lagged macroeconomic variables (specifically CPI, GDP, 
credit ratio19, median price of sold houses), a prediction of the bank stress index has 
been done, with mixed out-of-sample results. 
The Cleveland Financial Stress Index (CFSI) is created by a team of 
economists at Cleveland FED. It is a systemic stress index for the United Stated, the 
background of which is presented in Oet et al. (2010) and their subsequent paper on 
2011. They are mainly interested in the construction of an early warning system for 
the adequate supervision of the markets, as well as for the proper identification of 
systemic risk. In order to do it, they combine tools and methods of micro-prudential 
and macro-prudential nature. In their own words, the necessity for such an aggregate 
financial stress index is derived from “…lack of tools for identification of systemic-
                                                 
18 Remember, the dependent variable is the number of banks failed each quarter (FAILS). 
19 It is defined as the ratio of the sum of assets and liabilities of US commercial banks over GDP. 
42 
 
level distress. Without an early warning tool to identify the onset of symptoms of a 
banking crisis, the ability of the Federal Reserve to carry out its core financial stability 
functions is increasingly inhibited”20. The authors offer a well rounded discussion of 
what should constitute a useful and operationally efficient EWS for systemic stress. In 
addition to effects from asset prices, spreads and macroeconomic conditions, they 
input explanatory variables that represent risk-taking behavior, aspects of financial 
fragility, financial firm’s connectivity and contagion risks. So, they choose to 
incorporate series of daily frequency from four different financial markets: interbank 
market (financial beta, bank bond spread, interbank liquidity spread and interbank 
cost of borrowing), foreign exchange market (weighted dollar crashes), credit markets 
(covered interest spread, corporate bond spread, liquidity spread, commercial paper to 
treasury bill spread, Treasury yield curve spread) and, finally, equity market (stock 
market crashes). The aggregate index is constructed in the following way: 
 
 ( ) *100j
m z
t jt jt jtj
FSI w f z dz
        (2.12) 
 
z is the value of each indicator j at time t, where each one of these variables is 
transformed according to its cumulative distribution function (CDF). The weighting 
scheme followed (wjt represents the weights) is based on the FED’s Flow of Funds 
statistical table. According to this, each sector’s total dollar value over the aggregate 
dollar value of all flows of funds in the economy represents the weight for each one of 
the four markets involved in this index construction. Finally, the authors transform the 
daily index into quarterly frequency by averaging the FSI’s values for each quarter. 
The CFSI is maintained and regularly updated by the Cleveland FED. 
A thorough review of the US financial stress indexes is provided by Kliesen et 
al. (2012), together with a forecasting exercise. In their survey, authors discuss the 
potential difference between FSIs and FCIs. In general terms, they conclude that the 
two types of indexes have significant overlap, both in terms of the stand alone 
indicators included, as well as to the weighting methodologies followed. Focusing in 
the case of US economy, it is reasonable to find that the US indices cover longer time 
                                                 
20 Their first paper, in 2010, deals with an EWS for banking instability, while their work for the CFSI is 
completed in the following paper in 2012. In both cases, however, the methodological approach is not 
different and their aim is the capture of systemic risk. 
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periods, given the abundance of information and time series available. They also point 
out the lack of relevant research for emerging markets, since most work has been done 
for developed countries (since more data are available for those). Then, the variables 
most frequently used in US indexes are discussed. As it would be expected, economic 
fundamentals, yields and interest rate spreads (measuring term premiums or liquidity 
premiums), stock market indicators, volatility and foreign exchange indicators are 
some of the most frequently used variables. Regarding the aggregation 
methodologies, it is very common to standardize them (in order to avoid any 
predicament with the different measurement units and values of the variables) and, 
then, equally weights, PCA-based or model based aggregation approaches are the 
most popular. Finally, the authors provide some empirical evidence, in relation to the 
effect of financial stress on real economy. Initially, the provide evidence of negative 
correlation between financial stress and economic growth, represented by year-over-
year changes of US industrial production index. Then, they estimate a VAR model, 
with industrial production and GDP growth rates, a US stock index (Wilshire index) 
and FSIs as endogenous variables. The forecasting exercise is conducted for horizons 
up to 12 months ahead. The indices evaluation is based on the root mean squared 
errors (RMSE). Based on this, they find little variation, in terms of ability of 
aggregate systemic risk indices to forecast real economic activity. FCIs are better in 
predicting real economic variables, while FSIs are better performers for stock market 
forecasts. Finally, both are equally good on forecasting GDP growth. 
Another paper, dealing with the US financial conditions and their relation with 
economic activity, is the one by Beaton et al. (2009). In order to do this, these 
researchers construct two financial conditions indices: one based to a structural vector 
error correction (SVECM) model, while the other one is the outcome of Bank of 
Canada’s MUSE general equilibrium macroeconomic model. In both cases, the effects 
of current and past financial shocks are taken into account to GDP growth effects. In 
the previously mentioned cases of indices, the variables employed are not exactly the 
same. In the SVECM model, they include the commercial paper rate, a business 
borrowing spread, the lending standards for consumer spending and the financial 
wealth. In the latter case, the dataset is richer, including the federal funds rate, a 
business borrowing rate, lending standards for consumer spending (as well as for 
mortgage loans), the lending standards for business investments, the financial wealth 
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and, finally, the mortgage interest rate together with the real effective exchange rate. 
Their indices are aggregated, following 
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The term in the brackets is the response of GDP growth to previous financial shocks. 
The sum of the GDP growth responses to each financial shock, in each time period, 
produces the FCI. Based on this, the authors find that, on average, US financial 
conditions are liable for 5% shrinkage to US growth rate for the fourth quarter of 2008 
and the first and second quarter of 2009. Another interesting finding here has to do 
with the zero lower bound, a situation prevailing in the monetary policy of the US 
economy. The inability of the FED to stimulate the economy with lower interest rates 
is estimated to have reinforced, by almost 40 per cent, the negative effects of 
tightening financial conditions on the level of GDP. 
An exploration of the predictive ability of 12 US financial stress indices on 
stock returns and a number of macroeconomic variables is carried out by Aramonte et 
al. (2013). Their modeling approach is based on the following model: 
 
 1t t ty FCI        (2.14) 
 
which is a simple regression model, incorporating lagged values of the stress indices 
as explanatory variable. The dependent variables include the well known S&P 500 
index, seven equally weighted portfolios of equities (finance, construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade and services), total credit (consumer 
credit, together with commercial and industrial loans), housing starts and 
manufacturing activity21. Their predictions are performed on monthly and quarterly 
basis and their main finding is that eleven out of the twelve tested indices can predict 
returns on finance portfolio, while only four for the S&P 500 index. Nevertheless, the 
RMSE are quite different in most cases, something indicative of the varying level of 
forecast accuracy. This is attributed by the authors to the phenomenon of non-
                                                 
21 Here, it is defined as the sum of durable goods orders, industrial production and total manufacturing 
inventory). 
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synchroneity. Since many indices include the VIX index, produced by options trading, 
they believe that the fact that derivatives trading stops 15 minutes after the actual 
trading of the underlying assets stops, can create this previously mentioned 
phenomenon and, hence, affects the predictive ability of the relevant stress indexes. 
The authors proceed to a number of extra checks of the forecasting ability of the FCIs, 
first by excluding the first day of each month from the sample22 and, then, by 
excluding the crisis period (after 2007) from the model’s sample. In the latter case, the 
forecasting capability of the indices is eliminated whatsoever. Similar conclusions are 
reached, when the macroeconomic variables are the subject of the projections. As a 
result, the researchers try to create a composite FCI, derived from the existent 
aggregate indicators. Their rationale is to avoid the sketched lack of consistency in the 
forecast results. In order to do this, they sort indexes according to how well they can 
capture information in the rest of the FCIs. This is achieved by using the adjusted R2 
from a regression of the changes in the first principal component of an index i from 
changes in the first principal component of the rest of the indices. Based on this 
approach, the best five indexes are chosen. As a second step in this routine, all 
possible combinations of these five indicators are created. Then, they finally estimate 
the first principal component of each one of these bunches of indices and follow the 
same regression process as before. That is: 
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Based on this analysis, Aramonte et al. (2013) note that the first principal component 
(fpc) of St.  Louis Fed, Bloomberg, Chicago Fed and Citi stress indices is the best 
performing composite FCI of this piece of work. 
A different approach on computing an FSI for the US economy is followed by 
Gallegati (2013). Here, the author adopts the wavelet multi resolution analysis, in 
order to get the aggregate stress index. On the same time, he evaluates its predictive 
power over future financial stress level. Wavelet analysis offer additional insights into 
the series relation, because it can decompose them in, both, time and frequency 
spectrum. Based on this decomposition, the author chooses the index’s components, 
                                                 
22 In this case, very few (five) indices could predict finance portfolio. 
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according to their statistical significance in each frequency band. Initially, Gallegati 
creates an aggregate index with the following components: TED spread, inverted term 
spread, corporate bond spread, Baa – Aaa spread (these are bonds ratings) and stock 
market returns. This index is based on simple aggregation and it covers the period 
1980 to 2012, in monthly frequency. As a second step, he proceeds to the wavelet 
analysis, which entails decomposition of each series by applying the so-called 
maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform. For each one of the time scale 
components, the variables chosen are the statistically significant ones. Then, sub-
indexes, for each one of the frequency components are constructed, weighted 
accordingly and create the final aggregate FSI. In mathematical forms, the wavelet 
methodology used, is as follows: 
 
 2 1[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]i j i j i j i i iI S I D I D I D I D I         (2.16) 
 
where, [ ]j iS I is the smooth component of the signal and [ ]j iD I the detail signal 
components (frequency components). Then, the sub-components indices are created 
as 
 
 1, 1 ,[ ] [ ]jD j j k j j kCI D I D I      (2.17) 
 
while the final FSI is made up of the previous CID’s. This means that FSI is 
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The author’s forecasting exercise used a simple AR model as the benchmark one, 
while the counterpart is an wavelet-based FSI enhanced model. The models are 
estimated for the period 1990.1 to 2006.4 and the forecast is produced for the period 
2007.1 to 2012.2. The forecast horizons are one, two, four and six quarters. The 
recursive forecast produces improved results for the model included the FSI, 
especially for longer horizons23. 
A study of the impact of financial stress episodes on economic activity and the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is supplied by Li and St-Amant (2010). 
                                                 
23 The forecast evaluation is, once more, conducted using the RMSE. 
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In this paper, Canada is the country under investigation and a threshold VAR (TVAR) 
model is employed for the econometric analysis. According to the authors’ view, the 
recent literature on the previously mentioned economic phenomena emphasizes the 
existence of non-linearities and the respective dynamics (e.g. regime switching in 
output fluctuations and asymmetries in responses to different shocks). On top of that, 
the relevant empirical literature provides inconclusive results. As a result, they use a 
TVAR model, so that they can capture the economic features discussed above. They 
assume there are two regimes, based on whether financial stress (represented by the 
Canadian FSI constructed by Illing and Liu, 2006) breaches a certain threshold or not. 
Regime switching can be endogenous, emanating from changes in other variables as 
well (like interest rates). The model’s specification is 
 
    1 1 2 20 1 1 0 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t t d tY Y L Y Y L Y I c U             (2.19) 
 
where Y represents a vector of Canadian data (real output growth, inflation, real 
overnight rate and FSI). Additionally, 11  and 21  are lag polynomial matrices, tU  
are the structural disturbances, while  t dI c   is the indicator function that equals 
to 1 whenever t dc   , 0 otherwise (regimes). It should be noted that 10  and 20 are 
contemporaneous relationships in the two regimes, where the set causal structure 
precludes any effects from monetary policy (interest rate) to output and inflation but 
not on the FSI. Finally, the integer d in the indicator function is unknown and should 
be estimated along with the rest of the model’s coefficients. The sample period for the 
analysis is 1981Q4 to 2006Q4. The model is estimated using least squares and the 
empirical work is completed with the employment of impulse response analysis. 
According to it, contractionary monetary shocks have larger effects on output than 
expansionary ones, while their negative output effects are bigger in the low financial 
stress regime. On top of that, such adverse monetary shocks increase the likelihood of 
moving or remaining to the high financial stress regime, indicating the strong 
connection between systemic risk and the monetary policy followed by central banks. 
Higher financial stress is characterized by weaker output growth and higher inflation 
and interest rates. Finally, it is shown that the effects of, both, small and large shocks 
are approximately proportional. 
48 
 
Apart from the previously discussed rich literature on, mainly, the US stress 
indices, there are a number of papers examining the financial stress for a wider group 
of developed economies. For instance, Guichard et al. (2009) create financial 
conditions indices for US, UK, Japan and the Eurozone. In this case, the weighting 
scheme followed is product of an OECD large structural model. The calibrated 
weights differ from country to country, based on each case special features (for 
instance, bank lending standards are more important for Euro Area and Japan, while 
corporate bond yields have higher importance in the case of US and UK). As a second 
approach to the weights computation, the authors use a VAR model, as well as 
reduced form equations that incorporate output gap in their explanatory variables. In 
all cases, the size of the weights does not diverge substantially. In brief, their major 
finding has to do with the severity of the current crisis. In terms of output loss, it is the 
biggest crisis in history for all the countries in the sample. Also, the widening of 
corporate bond spreads seem to be liable for almost half of the financial conditions 
worsening, especially since the third quarter of 2008. Moreover, the stricter credit 
conditions played a major role in the crisis deepening, while the deteriorating equity 
prices (especially in US and UK), together with the falling house prices are expected 
to act as a deathblow to economic activity. Given this perspective, the authors suggest 
that unconventional monetary policies (like those already followed by central banks 
around the world) are necessary, in order to overcome the growth obstacles induced 
by the financial meltdown of the last five years. 
An attempt to project financial stress level for 13 OECD economies24 is made 
by Slingenberg and de Haan (2011). Three criteria are adopted here, for the inclusion 
of stand-alone indicators to the aggregate stress index. These are, the coverage of the 
whole financial system, the availability of data in high frequency and the ability to 
construct comparable indices. Based on these, they end up using the following 
variables in their FSIs: stock price volatility (modeled as a GARCH(1,1) process), 
corporate bond spreads, TED spread, banking sector beta and the real effective 
exchange rate volatility (estimated in the same fashion as the stock price volatility). 
The authors’ indices are created following the equally weighted approach and they 
define crisis periods as those periods, where the FSI value is higher than one standard 
deviation above the mean. In the second stage of their empirical work, the authors 
                                                 
24 These are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, UK and US. 
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study whether the FSIs and a number of other single financial and economic variables 
can accurately predict financial stress. They choose 30 variables, classified in the 
following categories: current account, capital account, financial sector, real sector and 
asset prices variables. The forecasting model is 
 
 t m t m n t n tFSI FSI X          (2.20) 
 
where the lagged X represents the variables previously discussed. This is the extended 
model, while the benchmark one includes only lagged values of the FSIs. In the 
estimation process, the first half of the sample is used for the initial estimation, while 
the out of sample dynamic forecast is materialized in the second half and for forecast 
horizons of one, two, four and eight quarters. The forecast evaluation is made through 
the RMSE ratio of the benchmark against the model (1.20). Finally, the McCracken 
(2007) test and the direction of change (DoC) statistic25 are used for the examination 
of the statistical significance of the differences in RMSE. The results are quite 
diverse, with very poor forecasting results for some countries (only one leading 
indicator for Sweden) and very good for some others (Spain has 13 variables as 
leading indicators of its financial stress). Credit growth and business credit improve 
forecast in most cases. For the two quarters ahead case, oil prices and inflation are 
good leading indicators. Finally, the DoC statistic gave bad results, indicating that the 
additional explanatory variables do not offer extra information for the change of FSI. 
The authors’ results remain the same, even after accounting for a different weighting 
approach for the FSI and for potential non-linear relationships between the potential 
leading indicators and the aggregate stress index. 
The Eurozone crisis has reasonably led to an increasing interest for the study 
of the financial stress effects on the monetary union’s growth prospects. One such 
paper is prepared by Van Roye (2011). In this work, the author prepare a financial 
market stress index (FMSI), as he call it, for Germany and Euro Area, using the 
proposed approximate dynamic factor model of Brave and Butters (2011). The dataset 
employed is of monthly frequency and there are three groups of variables included: 
                                                 
25 The DoC statistic tests whether the model’s forecast the direction of change of the stress index 
correctly. If it does, the value of the statistic is one, zero otherwise. For this case here, they sum the 
results of the two models used and get their ratio. If the ratio has a value of 1, this implies equal 
performance. Values smaller than 1 implies that the augmented model is better, the opposite for values 
higher than one. 
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those representing the banking sector (like TED spread, money market spread, 
banking sector beta, bank stock returns, marginal lending facility and some more), the 
securities market (corporate bond spread, corporate credit spread, government bond 
spread, the slope of the yield curve among others) and, finally, the foreign exchange 
market (only REER volatility here). The model is estimated for a period, spanning 
1981Q1 to 2011Q3 (in quarters). The economist’s interest in not that much on the 
behavior of the stress indices, but mostly on the impact of systemic risk on real 
economic activity. In order to assess this impact, he employs a Bayesian VAR 
(BVAR) model, with the following general form: 
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Here, G(L) is a lag polynomial of order p, Yt an (n*1) vector of stationary 
macroeconomic variables and ηt a (n*1) vector of i.i.d. error terms. Because of the 
difficulty to come up with a prior distribution for μ with this model, the following 
transformation is considered: 
 
 ( )( )t tG L Y      (2.22) 
 
which is the so-called mean adjusted VAR model. Since the author follows a 
Bayesian analysis, he uses Minnesota prior to specify the prior probability 
distribution. For the impulse response analysis, on which he bases his inference, the 
author follows the well known Cholesky decomposition for the shocks identification. 
According to the findings, the response of FMSI to its own shock is very persistent, 
while the stress shock presents a strong, negative effect on output but a modest one in 
inflation rate. On the contrary, the interest rate is slightly reduced. Regarding the Euro 
Area, the results from the impulse responses is similar to the German case, with the 
inflation rate more responsive to the stress shock. Concerning the relevant variance 
decomposition, it is shown that financial stress shock can explain 15% of variation in 
real GDP growth, 7% in inflation and 5% in interest rate. For the euro union, the 
relevant explanatory power of financial stress is 30%, 18% and 50% respectively. In 
the last part of this paper, Van Roye (2011) employs the BVAR model to perform a 
recursive forecasting exercise, for one to eight quarters ahead, beginning from 
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2003Q3 until the end of the sample. As expected, the models tested are the one 
including the FMSI (and one without it). RMSE is the evaluation means. As 
benchmarks, the author uses a no-change forecast and a recent mean forecast models: 
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meaning that the forecast value depends on the most recent actual values. Based on 
these estimations, the FMSI-augmented BVAR model outperforms the rest. 
The observation that monetary stability is strongly linked with financial 
stability, together with the fact that financial conditions can greatly affect domestic 
demand and the likelihood of boom-bust episodes, is empirically examined by 
Mallick and Sousa (2013). In order to do this, they employ an econometric 
framework, similar to the previously discussed paper. They use a Bayesian Structural 
VAR (BSVAR) model and a sign-restriction VAR. The financial shock, again, is 
defined as extreme values of a financial stress index, computed according to 
Cardarelli et al. (2011). Other variables that are included in the system are the ECB 
policy rate, real GDP, inflation rate, commodity price and the growth rate of broad 
money (that is, the difference between M3 and M1). The Euro wide variables are the 
outcome of the weighted (by each country’s GDP) average of the pre-1999 eleven 
countries that formed the initial Euro Area. The sample period is from January 1980 
to April 2008. Regarding the BSVAR model, it is formed as: 
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Here, n represents the number of variables in the system, t the fundamental economic 
shocks and t the VAR innovations. According to this approach, variables X can be 
separated in 3 groups: those that respond to a monetary policy shock with a lag, those 
that contemporaneously respond and, third, the instrument in use (policy rate). Thus, 
 1 2, ,t t t tX X i X . In the signs-restrictions model, the important component of the 
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model is the reduced form VAR and the impulse vector λ. The model’s representation 
is: 
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As it is evident, Y is the vector of the aforementioned variables and B(L) is a lag 
polynomial of order p. Σ is the covariance matrix of the vector of the reduced form 
residuals, while P is the identifying matrix, relating error terms u with the structural 
shocks ν. Finally, λ is the so-called impulse vector that projects the innovation of the 
structural shocks to the contemporaneous impact responses of all variables in Y. The 
essence, here, is the use of the estimated coefficient matrix B(L) for the production of 
the structural impulse responses. The author’s main findings here are quite interesting, 
underlying the amplifying effect of contractionary monetary policy to the financial 
stress level. Especially in recessionary periods, this effect is even stronger. Also, the 
unexpected fluctuation of the FSI explains a considerable part of output fluctuation. 
Additionally, the stress index variation suggests that monetary authorities should 
respond aggressively, in order to stabilize output. In the authors’ view, this is a clear 
indication for a switch to policy makers’ interest, from exclusively targeting inflation 
to monitor, as well, the financial conditions of Eurozone. 
An attempt to forecast systemic risk and systemic events for a group of 
developed and emerging economies is made by Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013). These 
economists construct financial stress indices for 18 emerging and 10 advanced 
markets, with their sample covering the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the 
fourth of 2009. Their composite indexes include the TED spread, equity returns (with 
negative sign), and the realized volatility of the general stock index, the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) and the three month treasury bill, respectively. The 
aggregation is achieved with the use of a simple arithmetic mean of the five stress 
indicators, which were first transformed, according to their quartiles26. In functional 
form, the stress index for each country is 
 
                                                 
26 The quartiles were derived, using their cumulative distribution function. 
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Since, their interest is to incorporate the indices into a logit model, they decide to 
identify systemic events as these cases where the FSI is above the 90th percentile of 
each country’s distribution of the index. This definition produces 94 systemic events 
in their sample. The control variables in the logit model are ratios of money to GDP, 
M2 to GDP, REER, NEER, real GDP, CPI, credit to private sector/GDP, real money, 
real M2, real house prices, real equity prices, general government debt and general 
government deficit, P/E ratio, the stock market capitalization/GDP and several 
transformations of them (rate of change and others). The authors group these variables 
into three groups: domestic, global ones and interactions of them. Based on the 
estimations, they find that their baseline model is the best one, in terms of fit, 
significance of estimated coefficients and the signs. For both emerging and advanced 
economies, the factors influencing systemic risk are the same, with the former being 
more vulnerable to global factors. Their final comment is that the best choice for 
policy makers interesting in monitoring systemic risk, is to take into consideration 
multiple factors, compared to stand alone indicators. 
 
2.3 Financial Stress Indices: Empirical Work for Developing Economies 
 
Recognizing that there is a gap on financial stress measuring for Colombia, 
Morales and Estrada (2010), seek to compute an FSI à la Aspachs et al. (2006). In this 
sense, they include banks’ profitability and probabilities of default, as components of 
their indexes, together with a series of variables that sketch out the capital, liquidity 
and credit risk conditions in the country’s financial markets. In order to improve the 
value of their FSI, the authors construct one for each different type of financial 
institutions that operate in the Colombian market. These are commercial banks, 
mortgage banks, commercial financial companies and financial cooperatives. Their 
sample is comprised of 170 institutions, for the period 1995.1-2008.11, with data on 
monthly frequency to have been used. The variables that were invoked in their model 
were the following: returns on assets, returns on equity, non-performing loans/total 
portfolio, net loan losses/total loan portfolio, intermediation spread (lending rate – 
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deposit rate), liquid liabilities/liquid assets, ration of interbank funds to liquid assets, 
uncovered liabilities ratio and the number of financial institutions with high stress 
level in each time period27. Additionally, they apply three different weighting 
schemes; the most commonly used variance-equal weighting, principal components 
analysis and count data modeling. According to this work, the FSI behavior, 
irrespective of the weights applied, is similar and accurately represents the financial 
instability period of the Colombian economy on late 90’s. The same holds for the 
institutional indices as well. In the final part of this piece of work, the authors perform 
a forecasting exercise, checking whether it is possible to predict future values of the 
FSI. They use two models, an ARIMA one and a VECM. In the first case, the model 
seems to underestimate the observed values of the index, but captures the trend, while 
the VECM model, where four macroeconomic variables have also been included 
(inflation, unemployment, an economics activity index and a home price index), the 
forecasted FSI decline for the next 18 months. 
Important research on financial stress has been conducted by the economists of 
IMF (2008). In their paper, they seek to create a FSI, able to accurately catch previous 
crisis episodes and analyze them for 17 advanced economies. Their approach is very 
similar to the one followed on the empirical part of this piece of work and embodies 
seven variables for the banking, securities and foreign exchange markets. These are 
the banking sector beta, the TED spread and the inverted term spread (for the banking 
sector), corporate spread (corporate bond yield – long-term government bond yield), 
stock decline28 and time-varying stock volatility [representing by a GARCH(1,1) 
volatility model of general stock index] for the securities markets and the time-
varying real effective exchange rate volatility (modeled as the stock volatility) for the 
foreign exchange market. In order to aggregate these constituents into a single index, 
they follow the equal-variance weight approach and, finally, they rebase it to range 
from 0 to 100. They identify periods of financial stress as those where the index is at 
least one standard deviation above its trend. Thus, they provide individual FSI’s for 
these 17 economies, although they provide graphical evidence only for 6 of the 
countries, while they do not exert to provide any aggregate (in other words, a global) 
FSI. Additionally, they present an account of the number of episodes, for all the 
                                                 
27 In order to determine this number, they set threshold values for all the aforementioned variables and, 
according to these thresholds, they could evaluate whether a financial institution was or not in stress in 
each time period. 
28 Stock index at t-1 minus stock index at t, divided by stock index at t-1. 
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countries, in the last three decades, disaggregating them according to the source of 
each of these upheaval periods (whether they stemmed from the banking, securities of 
foreign exchange markets). Their index is able to capture 90 percent of the banking-
led crises and more than 80 percent of the currency crises. Finally, following a 
methodology developed by IMF29, the authors distinguish the stress periods identified 
before which were followed by a recession. Thus, they infer that banking distress 
periods are more often followed by severe downturns, compared with foreign 
exchange or securities-borne crises periods and, also, that a financial crisis can be 
more protracted whenever the economy is characterized by increasing expansion of 
credit, a surge in house prices and expanding borrowing by households and firms. 
Following a similar to the IMF (2008) empirical methodology, Melvin and 
Taylor (2009) narrate the repercussions of the subprime crisis to the foreign exchange 
market, while they proceed to the creation of an FSI which, according to the authors, 
might be successfully used as a predictor of any future excessive negative returns in 
the foreign exchange market. The account they made of the effects of the current 
crisis to the forex market has two cornerstones: the time when a major unwinding of 
the carry trade occurred (in August 2007), where it was evident that the upheaval was 
transmitted from the other financial markets to the foreign exchange one and, later on 
September 2008, the Lehman Brothers incidence which rendered the market quite 
volatile and uncertain of the trustworthiness of the respective counterparties. 
Attempting to investigate whether it would be possible for a currency trader to foresee 
these extreme events, the authors construct a financial stress index, in the same way as 
IMF did before30. They do it for seventeen countries (the same as those used by the 
IMF), for the period December 1983 to October 2008. The distinctive feature of this 
piece of research is that they exclusively focus on the so-called global FSI, which was 
computed by simply averaging the national indices. According to established 
threshold of considering a period as a stressful one whenever the index is at least one 
standard deviation above its mean, they comport in favor of its performance. 
Especially for the current crisis, and for the situation sketched previously for the 
foreign exchange market, the authors believe that the index is quite effective to 
                                                 
29 According to this methodology, an episode of financial stress is followed by a recession if a peak-to-
trough business cycle begins within six quarters of the onset of the financial crisis. 
30 The only difference is in the way they estimated the volatility of the stock and the foreign exchange 
market. Here, they have used the square root of an exponential moving average of the squared 
deviations from the exponential moving average of each market’s returns. 
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capture the foreign exchange market irregularities (mainly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers). Finally, the perform a simple prediction exercise, by employing a 
simple binary probit model, where the depended variable is a binary variable, 
representing periods of significant negative returns to an investment in the Deutsche 
Bank Carry Index and the FSI is the exogenous variable. The results are promising 
and provide an initial testimonial for the usefulness of such kind of indices as 
forecasting tools. 
The questions of how severe the current financial crisis is for advanced and 
emerging economies, together with an investigation of whether some level of 
financial distress has been transmitted to emerging from the advanced economies, are 
provided with an answer to the paper by Balakrishnan et al. (2009)31. In order to do 
this, they first construct FSIs, using monthly data, for 26 countries, for a period from 
January 1997 to the latest available for each one. Their methodology is quite similar 
to the one used by Cardarelli et al. (2009, 2011), with two notable differences: the use 
of the sovereign debt spread32 and the calculation of an exchange market pressure 
(EMPI) index for each of the countries. Thus, their FSIs consist of the following five 
variables: the banking sector beta, stock market returns, stock market volatility, 
sovereign debt spreads and the EMPI, which is defined as: 
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where ,i te  is the month-over-month percentage change in the exchange rate, while 
,i tRES  is the month-over-month percentage change in total reserves of the respective 
economy. Finally, these individual variables standardized values are aggregated, so 
that each country’s FSI (EM-FSI) is created. Assuming that whenever the EM-FSI 
breaches the threshold of one and a half standard deviation above the mean is an 
indication of financial stress, the authors conclude that their indices perform quite 
well in capturing periods of intense financial upheavals. The next step in their 
                                                 
31 This paper is included to this section of the chapter, since the main focus is the crisis effects on the 
emerging economies. 
32 It is the difference between country’s bond yield from the 10 year US Treasury yield, using 
JPMorgan Global spreads in the construction of this interest rate differential (or, whenever such data 
are not available, they used the 5 year CDS spreads). 
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research is the use of a fixed effects panel model, in order to check if a co-movement 
factor of their EM-FSIs exists. Their model specification is: 
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in which i  = country-specific fixed effect and tMonth = dummy variable for month t. 
In this way, t  represents the common time-varying element of each index. By 
estimating the model, Balakrishnan et al. (2009) found that, about, 50% of the EMFSI 
variation is explained by this common factor. Naturally, their interest was turned to 
the identification of the determinants of this common component ( t ). In doing so, 
they employed the following model: 
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in which AEFSI represents the advanced economies FSI (as taken by previous 
research from IMF) and GF are the so-called global factors33. From this model, they 
infer that 41 percent of the common component variation can be attributed to the 
AEFSI. Having established a relation between financial stress in emerging and 
developed economies, the authors proceed to further investigation of this relation, by 
using a two stage technique. This approach offers insights in the stress co-movement 
intensity (on stage 1), while stage 2 indicates cross-country variations in these co-
movements. Thus, for the first stage, EMFSI is regressed on AEFSI, the global factors 
and EMFSI34 with one lagged value, while they also take into account advanced 
economies regions (namely US/Canada, Western Europe and Japan/Australia). The 
model representation is the following: 
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33 Here, they are the year-over-year changes in world industrial production, commodity prices and the 
3-month LIBOR. 
34 Excluding, in each regression, the country under investigation. 
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Here, AEFSI can be, as the authors state, “an aggregate of 17 major advanced 
economies or three separate aggregates, indexed by c”, for the three regions defined 
previously. Additionally, in the first brackets, dummy variables are included, in order 
to capture the effects of two (τ =1, 2) crisis episodes that could have affected the 
advanced economies35. Here, the estimation results are quite good, showing that 
financial stress transmission is strong enough (on average, 70% of it is transmitted 
from advanced to developing economies, while financial contagion from other 
emerging markets is also important. In most of the cases, it was found that only one to 
two months are needed for this transmission to happen, while the size and source of 
this spillover varies. Regarding the second stage of this analysis (examination of 
cross-country variations in these co-movements), the model used is the following: 
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in which the country-specific regional co-movement parameters are a function of the 
bank lending. Portfolio investment and direct investment to GDP ratio (FL), the total 
exports/GDP (TL), trade/financial openness (X). In this case, the financial linkages 
are proved to be more important than trade, while country-specific factors do not 
seem to be that crucial here. The final econometric exercise in this piece of research 
has to do with the potential relation of the FSI with country-specific variables. These 
estimations have been conducted in an annual frequency panel model, with the 
following form: 
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where, the only extra variable is the interaction of the AEFSI with the country-
specific variable X. The estimations results here provide evidence the β is highly 
significant, while δ is positive and larger than 1. The opposite effect is valid for the 
                                                 
35 The first one is for the period 1998-2003, covering LTCM crisis, dot-com bubble and Enron, 
Worldcom and Arthur-Andersen corporate scandals. The second episode in the sample is the sub-prime 
crisis. 
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openness variables included in X (positive for the financial ones, negative for the 
trade ones). As a consequence of all this analysis, the authors suggest that emerging 
economies with low current account and fiscal deficits are more protected from 
financial stress transferred by advanced economies although, in cases of widespread 
crises, their effect is not that important. 
Osorio et al. (2011) construct financial conditions indexes for thirteen Asian 
and Pacific Economies (namely, Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan). 
The indexes are created for the period 2001 to 2011 and are the outcome of the 
average values of two separate aggregate indices, estimated by a VAR and a dynamic 
factor model. In the first case, the VAR model is specified as: 
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where the dependent variable is a vector of the metrics36 used for the FCI 
construction. Y is a vector of exogenous variables (VIX index and US GDP growth), 
which are included to some countries estimations to improve the goodness of fit. They 
represent global factors that affect the domestic economies. The weights for the 
aggregation are taken from the model’s impulse responses that represent the 
cumulative response of GDP growth to a one unit shock to each one of the variables 
of the model. Thus, the index is 
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where w is the weight of each indicator included to the FCI and the second factor in 
the brackets is the average value of this variable x. In the case of the generalized 
dynamic factor model, the FCI comes up by, first, estimating the model and extracting 
the common component of the variables included37. Then, they regress this 
component on inflation and GDP growth at take the residuals from this. In this way, 
                                                 
36 The endogenous variables are: real GDP, equity prices, effective exchange rate, lending rate spread, 
bank credit to private sector. All series are deflated using CPI index, except lending rate for which one 
year ahead forecast is used, expressed in year over year percentage change. 
37 In this case, they are similar to the VAR model, but not exactly the same. 
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the final outcome of this process provides an index that is purged from business cycle 
fluctuations. In functional form, the model is 
 
 , , , ,( ) ( )
j j j j j j
i t i t i t i i i ty b L f L        (2.35) 
 
where ,
j
i t  is the common component driven by a small number of common factors, 
represented by ( )jif L , while ,
j
i t  are the idiosyncratic part. Thus, first, it is necessary 
to estimate ( )jif L through dynamic principal component analysis and, then, to purify 
the FCI from the effects of the business cycle. This is accomplished with the 
following regression: 
 
 ( )j jt j j tf A L Z v    (2.36) 
 
Inspecting their indices, the authors point out that export-oriented economies have an 
FCI more heavily related to REER. On the other hand, countries with an FCI more 
reliant on credit are those with important role for banking intermediation. Finally, the 
economists here proceed to an examination of their FCI properties as leading 
indicators of GDP growth for each economy. The model used here is 
 
 
4 4
1 1
1 1
t h i t i i t i t
i i
growth a growth X      
 
       (2.37) 
 
with X being the FCI’s lagged values and Growth is the y-o-y real GDP growth. The 
evaluation is conducted through the statistical significance of FCI coefficients and the 
partial R2 (for the in-sample case), while RMSE are used for the out of sample case. 
In the first case, it is found out that FCI improves model’s goodness of fit and this 
holds true for all versions of the indices. Regarding the out of sample forecasts, 
RMSE for the FCE-included model are lower, emphasizing the prevailing nature of 
the models with the aggregate stress index. 
Another paper, dealing with Asian economies, is the one by Debuque-
Gonzales et al. (2013). Here, the authors, following the previously described 
methodology by Hatzius et al. (2010), construct financial conditions indexes for five 
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Asian countries (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore). The countries 
were selected, based on the data availability, since the following methodology allows 
for a plethora of variables to be efficiently incorporated. Depending on the country, 
the sample covers a time period from early 80’s until the second quarter of 2011. 
Inspecting their indices, the authors underline the ability of these FCIs to foresee well 
known financial crises episodes, while their values were deteriorating early enough, 
before growth slumps. Finally, they proceed to a forecasting exercise, in the same 
fashion as in the NBER paper mentioned above. The variables they forecast are real 
GDP and IP index, following a recursive process for two, four and six quarters ahead. 
In general, the FCI performs well, although their success depends on the range of 
financial variables incorporated to the respective index. 
The principal components approach, followed in the previous presented paper, 
is also used for the construction of an FCI for South Africa by Gumata et al. (2012). 
Beyond that, they also employ Kalman filter as an alternative approach for the index. 
In the first case, the estimated common factor covers the period from 1999Q1 to 
2011Q4. The dataset is comprised of global factors (like VIX index, S&P 500 equity 
index, JP Morgan EMBI total return bond index, the TED spread) and domestic 
factors (loans and advances to private sector, sovereign spread, non performing loans, 
certificates of deposits, nominal effective exchange rate, the South African stock 
index and a house price index). The same variables are used in the case of the Kalman 
filter – based FCI. The comparison of the two indices reveals their strong correlation, 
which is even strong in the first half of the sample (1999 – 2006). In order to evaluate 
the FCIs’ ability to predict GDP growth, the authors perform a Granger causality test, 
as well as a forecasting exercise and comparison of the results with a South African 
leading indicator (SARB business cycle indicator). The causality test shows 
unidirectional causality from the FCIs to GDP. As usual, the forecasting procedure 
involves a benchmark, autoregressive model for GDP growth and the alternatives that 
include the previously mentioned indices. The forecast horizon is set to one, two and 
four quarters ahead, while the results evaluation is based on the sum of squared 
residuals (SSR) of the models involved. Based on this, the models with the aggregate 
indices perform better than the other with the leading indicator, with the PCA-based 
one is the best performer. The authors also compare the indices performance with the 
stand alone indicators used in their construction. Again, they find that PCA-based 
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index exhibits the lowest SSR, while the Kalman filter index outperforms only a few 
of the individual indicators. 
Other researchers have, lately, focused on the financial stress conditions and 
their relation with the real economy of transition economies. For instance, Cevik et al. 
(2013b) create financial stress indexes for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Russia based on the work of Balakrishnan et al. (2011). The variables included 
here are similar with previous works. One major difference is the incorporation of a 
trade variable (first difference of the logarithm of external short term debt as a proxy 
of trade finance) which is deemed to be important for such economies. The dataset is 
of monthly frequency, covering the period February 1995 to June 2010. The 
aggregation is achieved using PCA analysis, using the loadings of the first principal 
component as the weight for each one of the indicators included to the FSIs. For the 
evaluation of the indexes predictive ability on real economy, bivariate VAR models 
are employed. The endogenous variables are the IP index, the growth rate of foreign 
trade (sum of imports and exports) and the growth rate of the gross fixed capital 
formation of the countries in the sample. The analysis is based on impulse response 
functions. According to them, increased financial stress has important transmission to 
the real economy. Policy prescriptions are necessary, so that the potential different 
sources of systemic risk can be accommodated, through the application of different 
macroeconomic and financial policies. Based on the same approach, Cevik et al. 
(2013a) provide evidence in favor of the importance of FSI on the prediction of real 
economic conditions in Turkey38. 
Another paper, creating financial stress indices for a number of Central 
Eastern39 and South Eastern European countries is the one by Jakubik and Slacik 
(2013)40. Here, the single indicators (representing money, foreign exchange, equity 
and bond markets) are double weighted, first within the group they belong and, 
secondly, for their contribution to the aggregate stress index. The approach for the 
index aggregation is the one followed by Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013). The time 
period covered here is from the mid 90’s until 2011, depending on the data available 
                                                 
38 Work on financial conditions indices for the Turkish economy has been conducted by Kara et al. 
(2012) for the Central Bank of Turkey. 
39 Czech Central Bank is one of the most research active institutions in the development of financial 
stress indices. Economists there realized the usefulness of such measures, even before the outset of the 
Great Contraction. See Gersl and Hermanek (2006) as an example. 
40 The sample consists of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia. 
Slovakia and Ukraine. 
63 
 
for each country. The graphical inspection of the indices shows that most countries 
were affected by the current crisis, but mostly in the subsequent phase of it. Slovakia 
is an exception, with the index showing small response to global financial conditions. 
The authors also proceed to a panel regression analysis, in order to specify which 
macroprudential indicators are the most helpful in the financial stress level 
identification. They use a number of sovereign risk metrics, banking sector variables, 
contagion risk indicators and macroeconomic fundamentals, as explanatory variables 
in this panel analysis, together with interactions of them. At the end, the authors find 
that the most significant variables to identify financial stress are a number of 
interactions between public debt and fiscal deficits, credit variables interactions, as 
well as NPLs among others. 
 
 
3. Data Description and Methodology 
 
Our dataset is comprised of monthly data for three different groups of 
countries. The time span differs, not only between the groups but, sometimes, 
between the countries within the same group, due to problems of data unavailability. 
Countries’ grouping has been done by taking into account the differentiation between 
advanced and emerging economies, but mostly, based on the regional economic links 
between them. Thus, we have a group of OECD economies, representing the most 
advanced economies in the world, a group of Asian countries41 and, finally, a group of 
Latin American economies42. 
As mentioned above, for some countries, there is a lack of full data sample. In 
the case of the OECD group, data for most countries are available from January 1980 
to May 2009, with a few exceptions like Australia, Switzerland and Finland, for 
which some series are shorter and, in this way, we were able to compute shorter 
indices. For the other two groups of countries, data availability was even more 
limited, with only Japan as an exception. For the rest of the Asian countries, the data 
                                                 
41 In this group, we included Japan as well, even though this country could have been added to the 
advanced economies group. It is a matter of comparability (groups of countries from same continents, 
excluding the OECD group) and regionalism (ability to construct and discuss regional financial stress 
indices). 
42 OECD group consists of: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. Asian group: Japan, S. Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand. Latin American group: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela. 
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sample (and, as a consequence, the FSI index) covers the period from 1997 to May 
2009,  while for the South American countries the period covered starts from middle 
90’s ( Brazil from 1995, Venezuela from 1997, Peru from 1998, Argentina from 1993, 
Mexico from 1994) to May 2009. Following the work of Melvin and Taylor (2009), 
Balakrishnan et al. (2009) and the IMF WEO (2008), we used monthly observations 
for the following series: real effective exchange rates, national banking sector equity 
indices, national stock markets indices, governments’ short-term rates or Treasury bill 
rates, long-term government bond yields and long-term corporate bond yields. The 
main sources of these series were, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) website 
(for the exchange rates series), Thomson Datastream, IMF International Financial 
Statistics database, OECD Main Economic Indicators database and, in some cases, 
statistical data from national central banks’ websites. 
The methodology followed to construct the financial stress indexes presented 
in the following section, is the one proposed by IMF (2008), which was also 
implemented by Melvin and Taylor (2009), although these authors slightly 
transformed their index by using an exponentially weighted moving average model to 
compute the exchange rate and stock market volatility. In this work, we remain 
faithful to the way IMF worked out the index. 
The Financial Stress Index (FSI from now on) is a composite indicator, which, 
according to Melvin and Taylor (2009), tries to capture four essential characteristics 
of a financial crisis: large shifts in asset prices, abrupt increases in risk and 
uncertainty, shifts in liquidity and a measurable decline in banking system stability. In 
order to do this, seven variables are used to construct the subcomponents of this index 
for the following three economy sectors: the banking sector, the securities markets 
(stock and bond ones) and the foreign exchange market. The indicators for each one 
of these sectors are: 
 
Banking Sector 
1. Banking sector stocks’ beta (calculated as the ratio of the moving covariance 
of the year-over-year percentage change of each country’s banking sector 
equity index and the general equity index and the moving variance of the 
general stock index). 
2. The TED spread (the difference between the 3-month LIBOR from the 
government short-term rate or the respective treasury bill rate) 
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3. Inverted Term Spread (treasury bill rate – government long-term bond yield) 
 
Securities Market 
4. Corporate Bond Spreads (the yield difference of the long-term corporate bonds 
from the governmental ones) 
5. Stock market returns (the monthly percentage change of the general equity 
index performance) 
6. Stock return volatility (calculated as a GARCH(1,1) model of the general 
equity index, modeled as an autoregressive process with 12 lags) 
 
Foreign Exchange Market 
7. Real effective exchange rate volatility (estimated on the same way as the stock 
return volatility) 
 
It should be emphasized that this approach was materialized only for the OECD (and 
Japan) group of countries while, for the rest of them, the index was slightly reformed. 
This was deemed necessary because of data unavailability for the corporate bond 
series in Asian and Latin American countries. Thus, instead of the corporate bond 
spreads, we use the so-called sovereign debt spreads, which are the government bond 
yields minus the 10-year United States Treasury yield. In any case, this does not 
degrade the usefulness and applicability of the index, for two main reasons. First, the 
corporate bond market is quite small in emerging economies, where most of the firms 
are still based on traditional sources of financing (like bank borrowing). Then, the fact 
that a large part of the private sector financing depends on national banks (which, 
most of them used to or are still under state control or mainly being refinanced with 
state money), designates that the use of sovereign debt spreads as a credit risk 
indicator is good enough for these economies. Apart from this alteration, the financial 
stress index for all countries is constructed in the same fashion. 
If we would try to sketch the financial stress index as a mathematical equation, 
then it should be: 
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FSI  TED spread  Inverted term spread  
           Corporate Bond spread Stock market returns 
           Stock market volatility xchange rate market volatilityE
   
 

 (2.38)43 
 
Every part of the index is standardized, by subtracting the series mean and divide by 
its standard deviation. Each one of the index’s components has an equal weight to the 
formation of it. This is the most commonly used approach to the construction of 
financial stress indicators, the so-called equal-variance approach. As long as this has 
been done, the next step is the computation of the regional and global FSIs. The 
regional FSI’s are the outcome of the average of the national indices for each group of 
countries (OECD, Asia, and Latin America), while the global one is the average of the 
regional indexes. Using these indices, we can check when and by how many standard 
deviations the FSI is above or below its mean value. Episodes of financial stress are 
identified when the index is, at least, one standard deviation above its mean. Finally, 
we are able to classify each episode of financial stress (i.e. whether it can be attributed 
to banking, securities or foreign exchange-related causes) by examining the change of 
FSI value prior to the start of the episode and the maximum value of it during the 
episode periods.  
It should be noted here that the full sample information is used in the 
standardization process, presented above. As a consequence, a health warning is 
deemed necessary here. Generally, the variance-equal approach assigns a specific, 
fixed weight for each one of the indicators included in the financial stress index, for 
the whole period examined. This could have both, positive and probably some 
negative implications. On the positive side, the easiness and simplicity of the 
calculations should be underlined. Additionally, it is a standardization process that is 
efficient, fast in producing plausible and meaningful results, while it is not demanding 
in terms of econometric modeling. That is, probably, why it is the most popular 
aggregation methodology in the stress indices literature. On the other hand, this 
approach exhibits some shortcomings. The most important critique has to do with the 
nature of the weighting scheme. It is considered inflexible and, potentially, unable to 
capture and exploit the updated information that stand alone indicators provide 
through time. Another point of weakness is considered the equal value that is assigned 
                                                 
43 Remember that, for the emerging economies, the corporate bond spread component is substituted by 
the sovereign debt spread. 
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to all variables used to the creation of the systemic risk index. Sometimes, this might 
not be very realistic, given the changing nature and importance of the different 
financial markets. In any case, the variance-equal approach remains the most popular, 
for the aforementioned reasons and this also one of the reasons I decided to employ it 
here. 
It is also important to emphasize on the exact nature of these financial stress 
indexes. As a tool, it represents the current state of financial markets, based on the 
information provided by the relevant indicators included to the aggregate metric. 
Increasing values of the index do not necessarily represent a crisis outbreak. On the 
contrary, it is only arbitrary and based on experts’ judgment and markets experience 
to tell, whether a financially stressful period is indeed, or can be deployed, to a fully 
blown crisis. The benchmark used here (one and two standard deviations above the 
mean value of the index) is clearly driven from the relevant literature and the prior 
experience of the users of this financial stability tool. As it is obvious, there is some 
debate on which one is the optimal cut-off point, in order to consider a stressful period 
as a crisis period. There is no, yet, a clear answer on this. Nevertheless, it is safe to 
follow the prior research on the area and characterize as periods with excessive 
financial stress, the periods where the index value is, at least, one. Of course, not all 
these periods coincide with financial crises. The presentation of the different indices, 
along with a discussion of their accuracy in the identification of different crises 
episodes, follows. 
 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 
This section of the paper is attributed to the detailed presentation and 
discussion of the results of our investigation on financial stress periods for the 25 
countries of the sample. An analytical exposition of the global FSI is being provided, 
together with graphs and details for the regional indices computed. Additionally, 
tables are provided with an exhaustive statement of the different kind of upheavals 
each economy faced in the recent past, together with a calculation of the average 
duration of these episodes. In order to make crises periods identification and 
comparison easier, the monthly series were transformed into quarters, by simply 
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taking the average value of each three month period. Moreover, it should be notated 
that no special effort has been made to specify stress periods. We just follow the 
literature (which has, long ago, reached an agreement on which were periods of 
turmoil for most of the countries under consideration) and what the indices show us 
(and whether their indication coincides with a well-justified crisis period). 
 
4.1. Global Financial Stress Index 
 
Graph 1 depicts the composite Global Financial Stress Index. As mentioned above, it 
is nothing more than the outcome of the computation of the average of the three 
regional indices (OECD, Asia, and Latin America) constructed by the respective 
national indices of the countries of each region. Moreover, table 1 displays the 
number of stress episodes identified in each region, added up to produce the total 
number of them for the whole world, separated into three types (banking-related, 
securities-related and foreign exchange-related), according to the market each crisis 
episode was originated from. Additionally, the (average) duration of these episodes, 
measured in quarters, is being provided. The severalty of the stress periods in the 
categories was feasible by examining the behavior of the components of the FSI in 
each case, characterizing each peak period of the index according to the variables that 
present the highest values. In cases, where more than a single sector seems to 
contribute to the turmoil, adjudication is reached according to the market that has the 
highest attribution to this episode or, if this episode lasts for more than a quarter, 
according to the sector that appears to, most frequently, lead it. Stress periods are 
denoted by the grey areas in this graph as, of course, in all graphs used here. 
The time period covered by the global FSI is limited because of the lack of 
data of the same time span for the three regions under investigation. For issues of 
equality and comparability, the global index covers the period where data for all three 
indices are available. That is, the period from the fourth quarter of 1998 until the 
second quarter of 2009. Although, an interesting period where many crises outbreaks 
took place, especially in the emerging markets of Asia and South America, is 
excluded, this time period is still quite interesting, with a variety of financial 
upheavals. 
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Graph 2.1: Global Financial Stress Index 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Global and Regional FSI 
       Stress Types 
 
Countries 
Banking Securities 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Total 
OECD 54 68 25 147 
Duration 4 5 3 4 
Asia 8 10 2 20 
Duration 3 5 1 6 
Latin America 6 14 2 22 
Duration 2 4 0.5 3 
Global 68 92 29 189 
Duration 3 4.5 1.3 4 
Source: author’s calculations. Duration of stress episodes in quarters 
 
 
Inspecting graph 1, it is easy to infer that, apart from the initial phase of this 
period and the recent financial crisis (since 2007Q2), the last decade was a somehow 
tranquil period for the world economy. Of course, this does not mean that the same 
holds for the individual countries, as well. According to the special features and 
situations prevailing in each country, someone can identify country-specific 
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instabilities. But, as it has already mentioned, the global index represents the 
conditions present in the world economy. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that, in some 
cases, worsening of a country’s financial health does not, necessarily, entail a similar 
aggravation for the global economy. By and large, the two stress periods depicting in 
graph 1, seem to have had a, somehow, similar effect in the global economy. The first 
one, having lasted for two quarters (1998Q4 to the first quarter of 1999), shows that 
the index was about 3 standard deviations above the mean value of the FSI, 
decreasing quite fast, compared to the subprime crisis period. In the latter, the index 
started picking up since mid-2006, exerting the threshold of one standard deviation at 
the second quarter of 2007. The value of the index was constantly increasing until the 
fourth quarter of 2008, after which, it started to decrease. Nevertheless, it still remains 
close to the two standard deviations above the mean (at the end of the sample period), 
implying that global financial markets are still under severe strain. It will not be 
misleading if we would suggest that, the first stress period captured by the index can, 
possibly, be mostly attributed to the financial instabilities prevailing in the emerging 
markets at that time (financial crises was a common phenomenon in countries like 
Brazil and Argentina, while the Asian economies were still struggling with the serious 
problems caused by the crisis of 1997-99), while, the second one is (as it will also 
become clearer in the analysis that follows) a crisis that has, mainly, affected the 
developed economies. The period, from 1999 to late 2006, is a period of robust 
growth and prosperity in the world economy. Solitary cases of crises episodes 
occurred, but their effect was not that important, according to the global FSI44. It does 
worth mentioning here that, as it can be seen in the graph, the FSI present a 
persistently upward kinesis, since early 2004. This suggest that, although the index 
was rather low and did not provide any alerts for the forthcoming financial turmoil, it 
can be said that the increasing value of it could have worked as an early warning 
indicator of the forthcoming financial meltdown. 
The last row in table 1 provides an account of the overall number of stress 
periods identified in the world, over the last 30 years. As mentioned before, they have 
been separated, according to the main source of instability, to banking, securities or 
foreign exchange market prone types of stress. Obviously, the sample is unbalanced, 
                                                 
44 Still, we can notify a shift on the FSI behaviour in some cases, like during the dot-com bubble burst 
on 00’s or during the Argentinean and Russian/LTCM crisis (second half of 2001). Of course, these 
upward shifts on the index values were not as strong as it would be necessary, in order to register these 
period as financially stressful ones. 
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in the sense that most of the crises episodes are from the OECD countries, for which 
we have the longest time series. Still, this table is quite informative for the behavior of 
the world economy, under different kinds of financial strains. In total, 189 stress 
periods were found, with an average duration of four quarters. The episodes stemmed 
out of the securities markets are quite often, lasting more than the banking crises, 
which are the second most popular source of financial instability. Surprisingly, 
foreign exchange markets cannot be blamed for many of the stress periods in our 
sample, something attributed to the shorter time periods covered by the series 
available for the emerging markets. It is well known that, especially during the 80’s 
and early 90’s, many financial crises in such countries can be attributed to 
inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies followed by these countries, where troubles 
were first appeared in the value of their currencies. Nevertheless, these results offer an 
additional reason justifying the paradigm shift from researching for market-specific 
crises to systemic-wide ones. 
 
4.2.OECD and OECD Countries Financial Stress Indices 
 
In this section, a detailed discussion of the results obtained by the construction 
of the individual OECD countries indices and the overall OECD FSI is provided. 
Graph 2 illustrates the performance of the OECD index, with the grey columns 
underscoring the relevant stress periods, while table 2 analytically presents the kind 
and the duration of financial instabilities for each country from the sample. Graphs of 
each country’s FSI are included in this paper’s appendix. 
The OECD FSI covers the period 1983Q2 to 2009Q2. As it can be seen by the 
following graph, the index does not seem to follow a specific trend. It has a number of 
peaks and troughs, reaching various levels of excessive financial stress throughout the 
three decades covered. It is more than clear that the current crisis is the most severe 
one for this group of countries, having reached at its peak a value close to seven 
standard deviations above the average value of the FSI. Additionally, this financially 
instable period is the most prolonged one, having lasted nine quarters, until the end of 
our sample, 
while it still exhibits high levels of stress, even though it was only 4 standard 
deviations above the mean at mid-2009. Thus, it is more than obvious that the recent 
crisis brutally hit the world’s most advanced economies while, following the upward 
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trend of the index, the use of such a metric of financial strain could have been proved 
quite useful for central bankers and financial stability surveyors. 
 
 
Graph 2.2: OECD Financial Stress Index 
 
 
 
Following the uprising crises episodes observed in this OECD FSI timeline, 
interesting findings can be spotted. While the index has initiated from very low 
values, below the mean in the beginning of the sample, its first peak is defined at the 
first quarter of 1986, though not assigned as a stress period45. Nevertheless, the 
following spike of it, during the fourth quarter of 1987, captures one of the most 
famous financial crises periods, the well known “Black Monday” stock market crash, 
which affected nearly every developed country’s stock market46. Then, after a period 
of decreasing values for the index, it starts rising, breaching the threshold of one 
standard deviation from early 90’s and it remains above it (with the short-lived 
exception of the period from the end of 1991 to mid-1992) until the last months of 
1992. During these years, a number of financial upheavals took place that shook most 
of the global markets. Some of them, like the junk bond collapse at late 80’s – 
beginning of 90’s and the S&L crisis of the same period, were mainly focused on 
single country, while others (such as the Scandinavian banking crisis of early 90’s and 
                                                 
45 On 1986Q1, the FSI value is 0.92 <1. Thus, technically, it is not a registered stress period. 
46 Most of these countries (like USA, UK, Australia, Spain, Canada etc.) are part of the OECD FSI. 
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the ERM II crisis in 1992-93) had a multilateral dimension. In all these cases, the 
OECD FSI reached values of, almost, two standard deviations above its mean value. 
Then, a two-year period followed with of degrading financial stress while, afterwards, 
the index started to surge again. In 1998, it remained above the threshold of one 
standard deviation for about a year, a period characterized by a series of stress 
episodes inflicting serious turmoil to the markets, such as the Asian and Russian 
crises, the LTCM collapse and the upcoming vulnerabilities because of the crises 
followed to the emerging markets (many of which are major suppliers of raw 
materials and oil, like Brazil). Finally, graph’s 1 index underscores another period of 
financial stress, at the end of 2000- beginning of 2001, clearly related to the dot-com 
bubble burst, which created a series of abnormalities to international stock markets. 
Table 1 presents an analytical decomposition of the types of stress episodes 
that have arisen in OECD countries, together with the average duration of these 
episodes. In total, 147 periods of financial stress occurred in OECD area, with an 
average duration of 4 quarters. The most recurrent type of crises is the securities ones, 
with 68 episodes throughout the period under investigation, with duration of 5 
quarters. Stock markets are proved to be more vulnerable, compared to the rest of the 
markets. Again, as in the case of the global stress index, currency-induced type of 
stress is not that common. Only, about, 2 out of 10 episodes have been sourced from 
instabilities in this market. 
Focusing now in more detail to the country-specific indices, it can be 
supported that, for the majority of the cases, the financial stress indices computed for 
the OECD countries, are quite accurate and according to the financial history of these 
countries. As already mentioned, detailed graphs are provided in the appendix of this 
work, while table 2 offers an overview for each country’s types of upheaval and their 
respective duration. Once again, the severe effects of the current financial crises are 
more than obvious for these economies, with highly excessive stress in their financial 
markets. Countries like Germany, UK, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, Austria and, 
of course, United States are still getting through the most financially stressful period 
of their recent history, with the values of their FSI’s exceeding 8 standard deviations 
above the mean value of their indices. On the other hand, a number of countries 
(including France, Finland, Spain and Italy) face a more tranquil situation, although, 
they also experience financial stress. Focusing on United States, it can be said that this 
major economy faced 10 major episodes of financial instability during the last 28 
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years. Most of them were of banking and financial markets’ nature, while only 2 of 
them can be attributed to pressures from the foreign exchange market. On average, 
these stressful periods lasted for four quarters, with banking crises running for longer 
than that (5 quarters). Examining the US FSI graph carefully, a clear pattern on the 
movement of the index cannot be identified. Instead, especially for the first 15 years 
of the sample, there is a continuous succession of upswings and slumps in the index’s 
value. After mid-80’s, FSI exceeds the threshold values imposed, alerting for the 
existence of financial instabilities in US markets. This was a period of recurrent crises 
phenomena, like the stock market crash of 1987 and the S&L scandal of late 80’s. 
These conditions hold, with short tranquility’s interruptions until late 1993, while FSI 
again provides evidence of financial markets’ irregularities at the end of 90’s and 
beginning of 00’s to 2001. 
A similar situation, with that of United States, prevails in UK. Here, 8 periods 
of financial stress were spotted, with an average duration of 3 quarters. Again, 
banking and capital market sectors are to be blamed for most of the convulsions in 
this country. Regarding the timing of these crises episodes, it can be said that the 
period since mid-80’s until mid-90’s exhibits a series of problematic situations in 
British financial markets. 
The most intense ones arose at the beginning of the 1990’s, more precisely from the 
third 
quarter of 1989 to the second quarter of 1991 and, then on 1992Q4 that lasted for a 
year. 
A similar situation, with that of United States, prevails in UK. Here, 8 periods 
of financial stress were spotted, with an average duration of 3 quarters. Again, 
banking and capital market sectors are to be blamed for most of the convulsions in 
this country. Regarding the timing of these crises episodes, it can be said that the 
period since mid-80’s until mid-90’s exhibits a series of problematic situations in 
British financial markets. The most intense ones arose at the beginning of the 1990’s, 
more precisely from the third quarter of 1989 to the second quarter of 1991 and, then 
on 1992Q4 that lasted for a year. Of course, the most emphatic one is the current 
crisis, which is unprecedented. 
OECD’s most vulnerable countries appear to be Australia, Germany and Spain, with 
13 financially stressful periods, although, the average duration of these episodes is 
quite short (3 quarters for the first two, 2 quarters for Spain). On the contrary, France 
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seems to be the most robust market, with only 7 stress periods recorded, while the 
duration of the crises here is longer (4 quarters), especially for banking instabilities 
are even longer (6 quarters). Also, for a group of countries, consisting of Belgium, 
Netherlands and Sweden, not a single stress period sprung from the foreign exchange 
market while, in some other cases, a record duration has been notched (like the 
securities’ markets crises in Austria or the solitary foreign exchange-born financial 
instability in Canada, lasted for 23 quarters and the respective capital markets’ one in 
Finland). Interestingly enough, a number of well-documented crises periods faced by 
some of the OECD countries are captured here. The Scandinavian banking crisis, 
mainly affected Sweden and Finland in our sample, is clearly depicted on the 
extremely high values of these countries’ indexes at the beginning of the 90’s, until 
1993-beginning of 1994 (having picked in 1993). Additionally, the events related to 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis, during 1992-93, are depicted on the 
participating countries’ indices performance, especially on UK, Denmark’s and 
Finland’s, Austria’s, Italy’s and the Belgian ones. 
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Table 2.2: OECD: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type 
       Stress Types 
 
Countries 
Banking Securities 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Total 
Australia 5 6 2 13 
Duration 2 3 1 2 
Austria 2 2 4 8 
Duration 1 13 2 6 
Belgium 3 9 0 12 
Duration 5 3 0 3 
Canada 3 4 1 8 
Duration 5 1.5 23 6 
Denmark 3 6 1 10 
Duration 1 4 3 3 
Finland 5 1 3 9 
Duration 2 18 1 3 
France 3 2 2 7 
Duration 6 4 2.5 4 
Germany 4 6 3 13 
Duration 3 3 1 3 
Italy 4 4 1 9 
Duration 7 4 1 5 
Netherlands 4 6 0 10 
Duration 3 3 0 3 
Spain 3 8 2 13 
Duration 4 2 1.5 3 
Sweden 2 6 0 8 
Duration 4.5 4 0 4 
UK 4 2 2 8 
Duration 3.5 4 2.5 3 
USA 5 3 2 10 
Duration 5 3 4 4 
Source: author’s calculations. Duration of stress episodes in quarters 
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4.3.Asian and Asian Countries’ Financial Stress Indices 
 
Turning to Asia now, we start by examining the behavior of the Asian FSI. 
Here, contrary to the available sample for the OECD countries, the index is confided 
to the period beginning in the second quarter of 1998, until the second quarter of 
2009. In any case, it is a reasonably long period, in order to offer us a good insight in 
the performance of this indicator. Here, it should be mentioned that data availability 
for Japan is much longer, compared to the other four countries comprising the group 
of Asian countries under investigation. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Asian FSI. It starts with quite high values, around 
four standard deviations above the mean value, something totally expected, 
considering that the legendary Asian financial crisis was still unfolding at that period 
(mid 1998). From the end of 1998, the index has started decreasing while, during the 
second semester of 1999, it reached values below the threshold of one standard 
deviation. At the beginning of the next decade (middle to end of 2000), it exhibited a 
sudden surge, which did not blossom into another stress period. Until the end of 2005, 
the Asian FSI remained below its mean value, having initiated to mount in 2006, until 
it breached the value indicating the existence of financial stress on the third quarter of 
2007. Thus, Asian continent seems to be influenced by the current financial crisis, 
with the Asian index picking on the fourth quarter of 2008, with an index equal to, 
almost, 3 and a half standard deviations above the average value. Beyond that date, 
the index has degraded, indicating the end of the stressful period with the end of our 
sample. 
The number of financially instable periods for these five Asian countries was 
twenty, with an average duration of six quarters. Most of these episodes are identified 
as securities-related, which also present the longest stoutness. The most vulnerable 
country, according to the data, is Japan, with nine stress episodes in total. Of course, 
this can be ascribed to the longest time period covered by Japan’s sample. On the 
other hand, Thailand exhibits only one, banking-sourced, financial stress, lasting for 
five quarters. 
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Graph 2.3: Asian Financial Stress Index 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Asia: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type 
       Stress Types 
 
Countries 
Banking Securities 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Total 
Japan 3 4 2 9 
Duration 2 7.5 3 5 
Korea 1 2 0 3 
Duration 2 6 0 5 
Malaysia 2 2 0 4 
Duration 1 5 0 3 
Philippines 1 2 0 3 
Duration 6 7.5 0 10.5 
Thailand 1 0 0 1 
Duration 5 0 0 5 
Source: author’s calculations. Duration of stress episodes in quarters 
 
 
The other three countries of the sample (Korea, Malaysia and Philippines) were 
mostly affected by capital market abnormalities, while, it is distinctive the fact that 
only Japan faced problems on its foreign exchange market. Once again, as in the case 
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of the OECD countries, the most troublesome and long-lasting stress periods are the 
ones having emanated from the stock markets. 
 
4.4.South American and South American Countries’ Financial Stress Indices 
 
Turning to the Latin American group of countries (these are Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), we firstly observe that the corresponding FSI is the 
shortest one, covering the period from the fourth quarter of 1998 until the common 
end of the sample (second quarter of 2009). Again, even though this lack of data 
excludes the very interesting, in terms of financial irregularities, period of the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, it can still offer a good insight on whether this index can perform 
adequately as a timely indicator of financial stress. It should be emphasized that, for 
the individual FSI’s, the data time span is longer, initiating for most of the countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) from 1995 and, since 1997, for Peru and Venezuela. 
As in the case of the Asian FSI, the South American one shows a clustering of 
financially stressful periods, at the beginning and the end of the sample period. More 
precisely, the end of 1998 and early 1999 have been proved quite volatile for Latin 
America, with the financial stress index having reached a value of 2.5 standard 
deviations above the mean. This is, clearly, the spillover outcome of the financial 
crisis in Asia which, later on, contributed to the emergence of financial crises in 
Brazil, at first, and then, in most of the countries in South America. Nonetheless, the 
index followed a de-escalating course, reaching its lowest value of 2.4 standard 
deviations below the mean (showing a, below the average, financial stability) in the 
second quarter of 2002. After that, a consistent increase followed, reaching values 
indicating financial stress since 2007. The FSI clearly exposes that, until the end of 
our sample, this region of the world remains in a financially instable period, with a 
tendency for rising stress in the future. 
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Graph 2.4: Latin American Financial Stress Index 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Latin America: Numbers of Episodes & Duration per Stress Type 
       Stress Types 
 
Countries 
Banking Securities 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Total 
Argentina 0 2 1 3 
Duration 0 3.5 1 3 
Brazil 1 4 1 6 
Duration 2 2 1 2.3 
Mexico 3 3 0 6 
Duration 1 3.3 0 2 
Peru 1 2 0 3 
Duration 3 6 0 5 
Venezuela 1 3 0 4 
Duration 1 4.3 0 3.5 
Source: author’s calculations. Duration of stress episodes in quarters 
 
 
Focusing now on the types of financial stress and their duration, Latin 
America faced, in total, 22 such episodes, with an average duration of three quarters47. 
Again, the most frequent provenance of such crises is the stock and, in more general 
                                                 
47 As it can be seen from table 1. 
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terms, the securities markets. Brazil and Mexico are the most vulnerable economies, 
both having experienced severe financial stress in two cases: the former during the 
famous Real crisis outbreak (1998-99), the latter during the Mexican Peso crisis in 
1994-95. In general, late 90’s were proved quite volatile for four of the countries of 
our sample, with the exception of Venezuela. Additionally, the financial crisis of the 
last four years has a remarkable effect on this bunch of countries, especially to Peru 
(where the FSI is persistently high), Venezuela (although, at the end of the sample, the 
index was rather low) and Argentina. On the contrary, Mexico and Brazil dealt with 
moderate increases on their markets’ stress, having ended up to periods of non-stress 
in their economies (here, it should be noted that Mexican FSI has become to rise 
again, indicating a reversal to this situation). Table 4 summarizes this discussion on 
the number and types of financial stress exerted on these economies. 
 
 
5. Predicting Economic Conditions with Financial Conditions 
 
In this section, the main concern is the establishment of a clear relationship 
between the prevailing financial conditions and the respective economic situation. In 
order to do this, a number of forecast evaluations are conducted with models 
containing both variables of real economic activity and the financial stress indices 
constructed and analyzed in the previous sections of this paper. The main question 
here is, whether the prevailing financial markets conditions (as depicted by the 
financial stress indices) can offer some insights on the evolution of the real economy’s 
conditions. In other words: whether the utilization of financial distress indicators can 
be useful as predictors of the forthcoming macroeconomics conditions. As it has 
become apparent from the literature review in section two, this is an ongoing part of 
the economic literature. Until recently, most of the research effort has focused on the 
tools and techniques that can be implemented in the construction of these composite 
financial indicators. Very few papers move one step further, providing evidence on 
the usefulness of these FSIs as tools able to predict the course of the economy. 
Relevant literature, like the work by Claessens et al. (2011), empirically supports the 
interweaving nature of real economy and financial conditions. Additionally, some of 
the papers mentioned in the review of the literature have established a relationship, 
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with rather mixed results, between indices like the ones computed here and their 
predictive power for important macroeconomic variables, like GDP growth, 
unemployment and so on. A couple of them have also tried to forecast the index itself. 
The restrictive feature of these studies is that they, almost, entirely focus on US, 
especially those that deal with the predictive power of financial distress on the real 
economy. Additionally, Eurozone has been treated as a whole, for instance in the 
papers by Grimaldi (2010) and Mallick and Sousa (2011), while, in our knowledge, 
there are no studies for the prediction of the economic conditions from the financial 
conditions for the emerging markets yet48. Hence, this paper is among the first ones to 
provide evidence for the real economy – financial stress nexus in country level and for 
such a diverse group of countries (both advanced and emerging economies). In the 
following subsection, a discussion of the model specification and the estimation 
methodologies used for the forecasting applications that follow is provided, together 
with a short description of the data series in use. Then, the unit root test results are 
presented and discussed, followed by a section where the out of sample forecasting 
results are tabulated and commented. 
 
5.1. Model Specification and Methodologies Used for the Forecasting 
Exercise 
 
In order to evaluate how well financial conditions anticipate shifts in real 
economic activity, a model similar to the one used by Hatzius et al. (2010) is 
employed. As it has been analyzed in the review section, that paper’s authors 
investigated whether both single and composite financial indicators improve the 
predictive performance of a number of macroeconomic variables49, in in-sample and 
out-of-sample forecasts. Here, we focus on out-of-sample predictions, since this is the 
crucial aspect and essence of using these financial stress indexes as predictors of 
future economic developments. Thus, the model’s specification, in this case, is the 
following: 
 
                                                 
48 The paper by Chortareas et al. (2011) implements static and dynamic probit analysis, but for 
predicting the financial distress for 17 developing economies. 
49 These were real GDP, payroll employment, industrial production index, civilian unemployment rate. 
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Here, ty  denotes the real economy’s variables and FSI  is the financial stress indices 
constructed here. So, the main objective here is to check whether the inclusion of 
lagged values of each country’s FSI can improve the predictive performance of a 
simple autoregressive model of ty . It is not by chance that the baseline model is a 
simple AR one, since it is well justified that most of the macroeconomic variables 
follow such autoregressive behavior50. If equation (2.39) is superior in predicting ty , 
strong evidence in favor of using FSIs as predictors of economic activity is provided. 
In the aforementioned model, subscript h represents the time horizons for which 
forecasts were estimated. That is one, three and six months ahead forecasts, with the 
exception of Switzerland, for which only quarterly data for the series under 
investigation exist. As a proxy of real economic activity, industrial production index 
for each country has been used. 
Two, similar, approaches were followed in the estimation of equation (2.39). 
First, a simple dynamic forecasting procedure was followed. According to this, the 
regression is estimated with data up to date t and, then, we use these initial estimations 
to obtain the forecast values for the first value in the forecast sample. Then, for period 
t+2 in the forecast sample, we use the forecasted values of the previous period and so 
on until the end of the sample period (that is, May 2009). The second approach 
implements rolling regression estimations. In this approach, we consider a constant 
window sample, different for each group of countries because of the time coverage 
limitations. So, for the forecast sample period, a recursive procedure is followed, 
where the window sample size “rolls” over the entire forecast period, by moving the 
window by one observation in each estimation (and, on the same time, dropping the 
initial observation of the previous sample period). In this way, more accurate forecasts 
can be obtained, exactly because of the sample renewal and the use of the most recent 
information in the estimation procedure. In both cases, the forecast evaluations were 
based on the root mean squared forecast errors of the models, compared to the 
baseline AR model. That is, the roots mean squared forecast error ratios. Whenever 
the values of these ratios are lower than one, this implies an improvement on the 
                                                 
50 Hence, previous values of the variable itself can be used to predict future ones. 
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forecast accuracy, when the FSI model is implemented. Finally, we should mention 
that the lag length selection for both AR and the FSI model has been done by the AIC 
criterion. In the next section, unit root testing results are presented. The forecast 
evaluation period cover different time periods, for the different group of countries. 
For instance, for the case of OECD economies, most forecast evaluations cover the 
period from the beginning of 1990 until the end of the sample size. For Austria, 
Finland and France, this period starts from January 1991 (April for France, 
specifically), while for Switzerland begins on the second quarter of 1992. For the case 
of South American economies, January 2001 is the start date of the evaluation period 
(for Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico), while the Brazilian and Peruvian case is slightly 
different (August 200 for the former, beginning of 2002 for latter). Finally, for the 
case of the Asian economies, Thailand’s forecast evaluation starts on May 2002 and 
for Korea at January 2002. 
 
5.2. Testing for Unit Roots 
 
Before proceeding to the forecasting estimations, it is necessary to check 
whether our series are stationary or not. As it is well know, the existence of a unit root 
can render the whole analysis obsolete, due to spurious regression problems. Thus, 
using the well established augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, all series that are 
used in the following forecasts have been examined for the existence of unit roots. 
The general regression form for the ADF test is 
 
 0 1 2 1
2
p
t t i t i t
i
y y t y      

         (2.40) 
 
where 0  is an intercept, 2t  represents time trend, while lagged values of the 
dependent variables are also included in the equation. The crucial coefficient for 
stationarity is , and the hypothesis tested is whether it is zero (meaning the series has 
a unit root) against the alternative of being smaller than zero (series is stationary). The 
following tables present the ADF test results for, both, the industrial production and 
the FSI series for the countries in our sample. For each country, we provide the t-
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statistics for the levels and the first differences of the two series (industrial production 
and the financial stress index) under consideration. 
 
 
Table 2.5: Unit Root Tests for OECD Countries 
ADF Unit Root Tests (null hypothesis: series has a unit root) 
Countries 
IP 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
IP 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
Australia 0 -2.613 1 -9.08*** 0 -2.472 1 -9.11*** 
Austria 0 -1.77 1 -20.25*** 0 -2.60* 1 -18.87*** 
Belgium 0 -1.199 1 -4.959*** 0 -5.208*** 1 -12.42*** 
Canada 0 -2.951 1 -4.858*** 0 -5.222*** 1 -22.37*** 
Denmark 0 -1.263 1 -8.044*** 0 -5.963*** 1 -31.91*** 
Finland 0 -0.807 1 -2.93** 0 -5.032*** 1 -12.72*** 
France 0 -0.342 1 -8.835*** 0 -4.98*** 1 -21.23*** 
Germany 0 -2.517 1 -24.67*** 0 -3.469*** 1 -19.37*** 
Italy 0 0.809 1 -28.23*** 0 -3.725*** 1 -23.02*** 
Netherlands 0 -1.983 1 -6.607*** 0 -3.879*** 1 -20.66*** 
Spain 0 1.752 1 -4.203*** 0 -6.913*** 1 -21.36*** 
Sweden 0 -0.881 1 -26.97*** 0 -5.31*** 1 -16.92*** 
Switzerland 0 -2.513 1 -9.946*** 0 -4.589*** 1 -9.55*** 
UK 0 0.18 1 -21.75*** 0 -4.243*** 1 -15.63*** 
US 0 -0.158 1 -5.961*** 0 -2.705* 1 -14.90*** 
Note: Series level: 0 – level; 1 – 1st difference. Number of lags was chosen based on Schwartz 
Information Criterion, with maximum number considered = 12. *, ** and *** denote rejection of null 
hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the unit root test results for the OECD countries. As it is 
easily observable, industrial production series, for all countries, are stationary on first 
differences. This is not unusual, given the nature of most macroeconomic series. 
Regarding the financial stress indices, their stationarity in levels is verified. The only 
exception is the Australian FSI, which index is stationary in first level. In this way, it 
is insensible to use it for forecasting the evolution of the industrial production. Thus, 
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excluding Australia, we can proceed to the necessary estimations for this group of 
countries, in order to obtain the respective forecasting results. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Unit Root Tests for Asian Countries 
ADF Unit Root Tests (null hypothesis: series has a unit root) 
Country 
IP 
Lev.
t-stat. 
IP 
Lev.
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev.
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
Japan 0 -1.677 1 
-
9.664*** 
0 
-
4.206*** 
1 
-
19.8*** 
Korea 0 -1.857 1 
-
10.95*** 
0 
-
7.342*** 
1 
-
16.7*** 
Malaysia 0 -2.659 1 -2.641 0 -3.071** 1 
-
8.95*** 
Philippines 0 
-
5.528*** 
1 
-
4.349*** 
0 -1.953** 1 
-
9.85*** 
Thailand 0 -2.461 1 
-
14.14*** 
0 -3.775** 1 
-
13.1*** 
Note: Series level: 0 – level; 1 – 1st difference. Number of lags was chosen based on Schwartz 
Information Criterion, with maximum number considered = 12. *, ** and *** denote rejection of null 
hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Results are, somehow, different, in table 2.6. Here, the results for the Asian 
countries’ series are presented. As it can be seen, only three out of the five countries’ 
series have the desirable results. In particular, Malaysian industrial production is an 
I(1) process, both in levels and first differences51, rendering it improper for our 
analysis. On the other hand, Philippines industrial production is stationary in levels, 
again excluding this country from further econometric investigation52. Finally, Latin 
American countries’ ADF tests results are summarized in table 2.7. Thankfully, all 
FSI series are stationary in levels, while IP series are I(0) in first differences. 
                                                 
51 This series was stationary in 2nd differences. 
52 According to the specification of the model we use here for prediction, we need to use the first 
difference of industrial production (i.e. the rate of change or growth rate of the variable) as regressand. 
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To sum up, after the ADF tests, we proceeded to the forecasting estimations 
for twenty one out of the initial twenty five countries of our sample53. Following the 
estimation procedures discussed in section 5.1, the obtained results are presented and 
discussed in the following subsection. 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Unit Root Tests for Latin American Countries 
ADF Unit Root Tests (null hypothesis: series has a unit root) 
Country 
IP 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
IP 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
FSI 
Lev. 
t-stat. 
Argentina 0 -2.147 1 -4.727*** 0 -4.612*** 1 -15.33*** 
Brazil 0 -2.896 1 -12.40*** 0 -5.475*** 1 -12*** 
Mexico 0 -0.51 1 -13.94*** 0 -6.459*** 1 -17.95*** 
Peru 0 -1.777 1 -4.812*** 0 -4.008** 1 -10.26*** 
Venezuela 0 -2.847 1 -13.22*** 0 -3.600*** 1 -7.33*** 
Note: Series level: 0 – level; 1 – 1st difference. Number of lags was chosen based on Schwartz 
Information Criterion, with maximum number considered = 12. *, ** and *** denote rejection of null 
hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
5.3. Forecasting Results 
 
The following four tables present the outcome of the forecast estimations 
conducted with the simple dynamic and the rolling window approach. The first two 
tables depict OECD countries and the performance of their FSIs as predictors of their 
respective industrial production, while the last two focus to the other two regions 
studied in this paper (Asia and Latin America). As mentioned above, one, three and 
six periods ahead predictions were computed, with the third, fourth and fifth column 
in each table representing the RMSFE for the AR, Dynamic and Rolling estimations 
respectively. Then, the important results are the ones depicted in the last two columns 
of the tables, where the RMSFE ratios are provided. Just to remind, that when the 
                                                 
53 Spain is also excluded from the forecasts, not because of stationarity issues, but because the results 
obtained from the estimations did not offer any kind of statistical and economic intuition. 
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RMSFE ratio is below one, this is a clear indication that the model where the FSI is 
included performs better, in terms of forecasting accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8.A: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for OECD Countries - 1 
 RMSFE RMSFE Ratios 
Countries h (a) AR (b) Dynamic (c) Rolling (b)/(a) (c)/(a) 
Austria 
1 
3 
6 
0.0197 
0.0198 
0.0198 
0.0198 
0.0195 
0.0196 
0.0153 
0.0161 
0.0157 
1.0062 
0.9837 
0.9926 
0.7750 
0.8128 
0.7929 
Belgium 
1 
3 
6 
0.1031 
0.1032 
0.1030 
0.1020 
0.1020 
0.0806 
0.0644 
0.0779 
0.0656 
0.9895 
0.9886 
0.7824 
0.6244 
0.7548 
0.6366 
Canada 
1 
3 
6 
0.0060 
0.0059 
0.0060 
0.0072 
0.0066 
0.0065 
0.0048 
0.0049 
0.0048 
1.1987 
1.1056 
1.0778 
0.8083 
0.8240 
0.7986 
Denmark 
1 
3 
6 
0.0655 
0.0655 
0.0655 
0.0656 
0.0655 
0.0647 
0.0388 
0.0477 
0.0493 
1.0016 
0.9996 
0.9871 
0.5923 
0.7284 
0.7525 
Finland 
1 
3 
6 
0.1099 
0.1102 
0.1103 
0.1093 
0.1098 
0.1095 
0.0659 
0.0749 
0.0805 
0.9944 
0.9966 
0.9930 
0.5994 
0.6799 
0.7299 
France 
1 
3 
6 
0.0121 
0.0121 
0.0122 
0.0123 
0.0122 
0.0121 
0.0101 
0.0103 
0.0097 
1.0138 
1.0014 
0.9915 
0.8280 
0.8516 
0.7983 
Germany 
1 
3 
6 
0.0157 
0.0157 
0.0157 
0.0154 
0.0153 
0.0156 
0.0131 
0.0125 
0.0133 
0.9829 
0.9740 
0.9948 
0.8351 
0.7941 
0.8472 
Note: Column h represents the time horizons for which forecasts are provided. These are 1, 3 and 6 
months ahead forecasts. (a), (b) and (c) columns report the root mean squared forecast errors (RMSFE) 
for the AR, dynamic and rolling window models respectively. 
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Table 2.8.B: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for OECD Countries – 2 
 RMSFE RMSFE Ratios 
Countries h (a) AR (b) Dynamic (c) Rolling (b)/(a) (c)/(a) 
Italy 
1 
3 
6 
0.0139 
0.0144 
0.0145 
0.0152 
0.0145 
0.0145 
0.0126 
0.0119 
0.0123 
1.0913 
1.0107 
1.0035 
0.9063 
0.8280 
0.8478 
Netherlands 
1 
3 
6 
0.0758 
0.0758 
0.0757 
0.0762 
0.0751 
0.0762 
0.0609 
0.0568 
0.0600 
1.0044 
0.9909 
1.0071 
0.8024 
0.7495 
0.7923 
Sweden 
1 
3 
6 
0.0199 
0.0198 
0.0198 
0.0197 
0.0198 
0.0197 
0.0163 
0.0162 
0.0161 
0.9946 
0.9996 
0.9948 
0.8196 
0.8184 
0.8105 
Switzerland 
2 
4 
0.0231 
0.0230 
0.0223 
0.0223 
0.0187 
0.0177 
0.9619 
0.9682 
0.8072 
0.7688 
UK 
1 
3 
6 
0.0092 
0.0092 
0.0092 
0.0097 
0.0099 
0.0098 
0.0078 
0.0078 
0.0076 
1.0595 
1.0835 
1.0701 
0.8540 
0.8538 
0.8298 
US 
1 
3 
6 
0.0070 
0.0070 
0.0070 
0.0075 
0.0085 
0.0081 
0.0050 
0.0053 
0.0055 
1.0767 
1.2204 
1.1639 
0.7181 
0.7576 
0.7812 
Note: Column h represents the time horizons for which forecasts are provided. These are 1, 3 and 6 
months ahead forecasts (except Switzerland where the horizons are 2 and 4 quarters, because of the 
data frequency). (a), (b) and (c) columns report the root mean squared forecast errors (RMSFE) for the 
AR, dynamic and rolling window models respectively. 
 
 
As a first general comment, we can say that the results are quite promising. In 
all cases, the forecast error when rolling window approach is employed is lower for 
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the FSI model. In some cases, especially for some of the OECD countries, there is an 
improvement even with the simple dynamic forecasting approach, even though it is a 
rather negligible one. For instance, for table 2.8.A, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Germany are countries with RMSFE lower than one, in the case of 
dynamic forecasting. The same holds for Sweden and Switzerland in table 2.8.B. In 
any case, the striking improvement is the one with the rolling window approach. Even 
for the countries that exhibit lower forecast errors with the first approach in the FSI 
model, the improvement is even bigger with the rolling window estimations. The 
cases of Denmark, Belgium are impressive, in terms of forecast error decline between 
the two approaches used, while the same holds for UK and, especially, US forecasts. 
On average, it can be said that forecast errors are smaller by around 31 percent, when 
rolling window methodology is implemented. Regarding forecasting horizons, the 
improvement is impressive in all three cases, with somehow better results in the case 
of short and medium term forecasts (one and three months ahead, which are improve, 
on average, by thirty to thirty five percent when the second methodology was 
followed). Focusing on the Euro zone member countries included in our sample54, the 
predictive performance of both models is quite good, especially for the rolling 
regression forecasts. Even with the simple dynamic approach, the FSI model 
performance, even if it is worse than the AR forecasts in general, for some of them 
there is an improvement in the index-augmented model in case like Germany or 
Finland55. But again, with the second approach, the declines in forecast errors provide 
strong evidence in favor of using financial distress indicators as predictors of future 
economic activity. 
Turning to the other two groups of countries, Asian and Latin American ones, 
the effect of the financial stress indexes on the prediction of industrial production 
growth rate is, again, important. As it can be observed from tables 9 and 10, the 
forecast errors when the rolling window approach was adopted, are decreased in an 
important extent. Again, there are two countries (Korea and Brazil), for which even 
the first forecasting methodology gave, marginally, better results with the FSI model. 
But, in broad terms, this approach does not offer satisfactory results. On the other 
hand, it is easily verifiable that the FSI model here is not that effective, as in the case 
of OECD countries. Even if there are more favorable results, in terms of higher 
                                                 
54 These are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,  
55 Even if this improvement cannot justify the FSI usefulness as predictor. 
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forecasting accuracy with the implementation of the FSI model, the change is not that 
big, especially for the countries that FSI model showed promising results with the 
simple dynamic approach as well (Korea, Brazil). Another distinctive feature of these 
groups of countries is the thing that, the lower RMSFE ratios are mostly observable in 
the three-month and six-month forecast horizon, in contrary to the OECD countries 
where the short and medium term forecasts exhibited the greatest improvement. It is 
also noteworthy that, for countries like Thailand (from the Asian group), Brazil and, 
especially, Venezuela (from South American cluster) the short term forecasts are on 
the verge of proclaiming the FSI-augmented model as the appropriate one for real 
economy’s conditions forecast. Particularly, Venezuela’s results are, by far, the worst 
ones for the countries under scrutiny. 
 
 
Table 2.9: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for Asian Countries  
 RMSFE RMSFE Ratios 
Countries h (a) AR (b) Dynamic (c) Rolling (b)/(a) (c)/(a) 
Japan 
1 
3 
6 
0.0179 
0.0179 
0.0179 
0.0180 
0.0182 
0.0187 
0.0149 
0.0148 
0.0150 
1.0042 
1.0167 
1.0474 
0.8315 
0.8296 
0.8393 
Korea 
1 
3 
6 
0.0283 
0.0282 
0.0282 
0.0281 
0.0281 
0.0280 
0.0249 
0.0236 
0.0235 
0.9924 
0.9946 
0.9907 
0.8796 
0.8358 
0.8344 
Thailand 
1 
3 
6 
0.0306 
0.0339 
0.0316 
0.0379 
0.0388 
0.0339 
0.0298 
0.0286 
0.0263 
1.2356 
1.1433 
1.0736 
0.9717 
0.8431 
0.8322 
Note: Column h represents the time horizons for which forecasts are provided. These are 1, 3 and 6 
months ahead forecasts. (a), (b) and (c) columns report the root mean squared forecast errors (RMSFE) 
for the AR, dynamic and rolling window models respectively. 
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Table 2.10: Out of Sample Forecasting Performance for Latin American 
Countries 
 RMSFE RMSFE Ratios 
Countries h (a) AR (b) Dynamic (c) Rolling (b)/(a) (c)/(a) 
Argentina 
1 
3 
6 
0.0185 
0.0187 
0.0185 
0.0193 
0.0188 
0.0185 
0.0158 
0.0147 
0.0149 
1.0407 
1.0058 
1.0003 
0.8537 
0.7824 
0.8044 
Brazil 
1 
3 
6 
0.0217 
0.0217 
0.0217 
0.0214 
0.0216 
0.0217 
0.0195 
0.0176 
0.0178 
0.9881 
0.9988 
0.9988 
0.9014 
0.8114 
0.8212 
Mexico 
1 
3 
6 
0.0111 
0.0110 
0.0111 
0.0121 
0.0119 
0.0118 
0.0093 
0.0092 
0.0091 
1.0941 
1.0750 
1.0705 
0.8454 
0.8358 
0.8190 
Peru 
1 
3 
6 
0.0457 
0.0461 
0.0461 
0.0484 
0.0467 
0.4438 
0.0367 
0.0385 
0.0429 
1.0600 
1.0134 
9.6286 
0.8023 
0.8359 
0.9299 
Venezuela 
1 
3 
6 
0.1763 
0.1763 
0.1755 
0.1861 
0.1846 
0.1621 
0.1625 
0.1732 
0.1616 
1.0559 
1.0475 
0.9237 
0.9219 
0.9829 
0.9208 
Note: Column h represents the time horizons for which forecasts are provided. These are 1, 3 and 6 
months ahead forecasts. (a), (b) and (c) columns report the root mean squared forecast errors (RMSFE) 
for the AR, dynamic and rolling window models respectively. 
 
 
To sum up, there is evidence that financial conditions can offer a clear 
indication of forthcoming changes in real economic activity. Especially for OECD 
countries, the results are quite promising, while the same hold for emerging markets 
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in Asia and South American, to a similar extent. Of course, as it has been emphasized 
before, this is the first main effort to empirically investigate this interrelation of 
financial stress indices and macroeconomic variables in such a big and divergent 
group of countries. Many more can be done, from implementing alternative forecast 
techniques to trying to get deeper in to the nature of this interrelation. For instance, it 
would be interested to study whether excessive financial stress in linked with periods 
of recession and, if this is the case, if the continuous nature of these aggregate 
indicators can offer useful insights in the duration and the magnitude of the 
recessionary periods. Also, the study of the several financial stress transmission 
channels seems promising, as a research avenue, given the fact that modern 
economies are quite interconnected. Thus, the contagion of financial stress from one 
country to another, or from a region to another one is crucially important, due to the 
established relation between financial stress and changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. This kind of questions is left for future research. 
 
5.4. Forecast Evaluations 
 
In order to support the results of the previous forecasting exercise, we proceed 
to the evaluation of our forecasting results, using two relevant statistical tests. The 
first is the Diebold-Mariano (1995) test, which offers the chance to compare whether 
the forecasts of two models are different. In other words, it checks the forecast 
accuracy of the two models and offers a statistical test for the significance of their 
forecast error difference. In general terms, if we assume that the series forecasted is 
noted as yt, then the forecasts from the two different models are represented as 1t hy   
and 2t hy   respectively. It is customary that model 2 should be the model with the 
smaller RMSE. Given the above, we construct the forecast errors of the two models, 
which are the difference between the actual and forecasted values of the series under 
consideration. In functional form, it is 
 
 
1 1
2 2
t h t h t h
t h t h t h
e y y
e y y
  
  
 
    (2.41) 
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Each function in (1.41) represents a loss function for the models under consideration. 
That is, the inability of the models to offer accurate enough forecasts of future values 
of the series under investigation. Diebold and Mariano (1995) exhibit that their 
statistic can test whether one of the models predicts better than the other based on the 
following null hypothesis 
 
 0
1
:  0
:  0
t
t
H d
H d

   (2.42) 
 
where 1 2t t h t hd e e    is the loss differential between the two models under 
examination56. The Diebold-Mariano test statistic is 
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is the sample mean of the loss differential and 0 1
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n
        , with k  
being the kth autocovariance of dt. The examined series is autocorrelated and the 
authors show that the statistic follows an asymptotically standard normal distribution. 
It is documented that the Diebold-Mariano test may not be justified, in cases 
of nested competing models. The problem lies on that the forecasts of the two models 
are asymptotically perfectly correlated and, thus, the DM statistic is not reliable at the 
population level. In order to overcome such complexities and be able to provide clear 
evidence in favor or not of the FSI-enhanced forecast model, we provide additional 
evidence on the forecasting ability of our models. This is done through the use of the 
statistic suggested by Clark and West (2007). This test is robust to the type of models 
(nested and non-nested). The authors follow similar terminology with the case of DM 
test, where the baseline model (model 2) is the one nesting model 1 (the smaller 
model). Apart from the already mentioned forecast errors of models 1 and 2, Clark 
and West (2007) introduce an “adjustment” term as they call it. This is nothing more 
than the sample average of the squared differences of the forecasted series from the 
two models. In functional form, 1 21 , 2 ,ˆ ˆ( )t t t tadj P y y     . The hypothesis tested is 
similar to (1.42), but this time the loss differential includes the adjustment term as 
well. This means that 1 2 .t t h t hd e e adj    . The authors describe the estimation 
procedure, in order to obtain the relevant t-statistic, which includes the regression of 
                                                 
56 Diebold-Mariano test can be applied for several different types of loss functions. In our case, we use 
the most popular one. That is, the quadratic loss function. 
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the aforementioned loss differential on a constant, using an OLS estimator with 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of equal predictive 
ability can be rejected if the statistic is greater than 1.282 or 1.645 (for 10% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively). 
The following tables present the outcome of the DM and CW tests. We first 
report the results from the case of the FSI-enhanced model (based on the rolling 
regression approach) used as the benchmark model, while the other two tables refer to 
the dynamic forecasting case. Our focus is on the first case, since the rolling 
forecasting offers the lowest forecast errors and it is the best predictor, based on the 
RMSEs. 
The most striking result from table 11 is the limited ability of the DM test to 
provide clear cut evidence in favor of the FSI-enhanced model. Out of thirteen 
countries, it only provides such evidence in six OECD countries. In some cases, like 
US, Italy and Netherlands, the evidence is partial, offering justification for using FSI 
as predictor of real economic activity for limited forecasting horizon cases (for one 
month ahead for Italy and US, for three and six months in case of US again and 
Netherlands). Very strong evidence in favor of the model with the FSI is provided for 
the case of Belgium, Denmark and Finland. In these three countries, the DM test 
strongly rejects the null of equal predictive ability. Since, as we discussed earlier, DM 
test is not that suitable for the case of competing nested models, we also provide the 
results of the CW test, where the nesting effect does not falsify the statistical results. 
In this case, the results are too strong in favor of our model with the financial stress 
index. In all countries and in all different forecast horizons, the leading indicator 
properties of our aggregate systemic risk index are profoundly verified. There is only 
one exception, namely Switzerland. In this case, there is no statistical evidence 
whatsoever that a simple AR model can be beaten for the industrial production 
forecast. Additionally, in the case of Italy and UK, it is evident that FSI can be useful 
only in case of very short horizon forecasting. In both countries, the FSI-enhanced 
model is better in predicting real activity on one month time window. 
The situation is very different in the case of table 12, where the results for the 
developing economies are presented. Here, both tests fail to provide strong evidence 
in favor of the model including the systemic risk index. In case of the DM test, only 
Mexico has favorable results for the aforementioned model, while Venezuela and 
Thailand have such evidence in the cases of the three month and one month ahead 
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forecasts, respectively. The Clark and West (2007) test provides more evidence in 
favor of our baseline model. Nevertheless, only in two Latin American countries 
(Peru and Venezuela), the “equal predictive power” hypothesis is rejected in all three 
forecast windows. Mexican case is rather weak this time, with only the three month 
case in favor of FSI model. Finally, in the case of Asian countries, the results are 
extremely poor, rendering the ability of FSI to work as real economy’s predictor in 
serious doubt. 
 
Table 2.11: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for OECD Countries – Rolling 
Forecasting Case 
 
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 1.205 4.557 ** 1 4.374 *** 6.457 ** 1 0.840 4.698 **
3 -0.396 1.876 ** 3 2.581 *** 5.533 ** 3 -0.357 3.882 **
6 0.901 3.065 ** 6 4.337 *** 6.198 ** 6 0.725 4.286 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 5.204 *** 7.065 ** 1 4.971 *** 7.860 ** 1 -0.385 2.500 **
3 2.701 *** 5.153 ** 3 7.779 *** 9.585 ** 3 -0.843 1.375 *
6 2.209 ** 5.481 ** 6 5.794 *** 8.203 ** 6 0.599 2.135 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -0.400 2.986 ** 1 -1.684 * 1.273 * 1 1.322 4.610 **
3 0.962 1.930 ** 3 -0.150 1.069 3 4.305 *** 8.282 **
6 -0.929 -0.127 6 -1.030 0.460 6 1.608 ** 5.040 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -0.111 2.649 ** 1 -0.838 1.794 ** 1 1.997 ** 2.454 **
3 -0.003 1.490 * 3 -1.028 0.952 3 1.653 * 2.472 **
6 0.428 2.086 ** 6 -0.312 0.970 6 1.350 2.660 **
h D-M test C-W test
2 -0.165 -0.143
4 0.453 0.468
Sweden UK US
Switzerland Notes: The tests are performed for all forecast horizons 
h (which are 1, 3 and 6 months ahead). *, **, *** 
denote rejection of null hypothesis at  10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.
Note: The table presents the Diebold-Mariano and 
Clark-West statist ics for the null hypothesis of equal 
predictive ability of two forecasting models.. These 
are the FSI-enhanced model (estimated using rolling 
regression approach) and a simple AR model.
Austria
Germany
H0: equal predictive ability (forecast errors are equal from the two competing models)
Forecasting Results Evaluation using Diebold ‐ Mariano and Clark ‐ West tests
Belgium Canada
Denmark Finland France
Italy Netherlands
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Table 2.12: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for Developing Economies – Rolling 
Forecasting Case 
 
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -1.535 1.119 1 -1.042 -0.831
3 -0.254 1.900 ** 3 -0.696 0.148
6 -1.528 -0.395 6 -0.975 -0.300
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -1.721 * 0.074 1 0.765 4.259 **
3 -1.651 * 1.481 * 3 0.399 3.727 **
6 -1.676 * 0.081 6 -0.605 2.845 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -0.755 1.944 ** 1 -0.074 1.910 **
3 -1.818 * 2.014 ** 3 -0.208 0.980
6 -0.913 1.593 * 6 -0.427 0.282
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 -0.961 -0.115 1 -1.847 * 1.160
3 -1.057 0.245 3 -1.118 1.275
6 -0.672 1.185 6 -1.432 0.581
H0: equal predictive ability (forecast errors are equal from the two competing models)
Forecasting Results Evaluation using Diebold - Mariano and Clark - West tests
Note: The table presents the Diebold-Mariano and Clark-west statistics for the null hypothesis of equal 
predictive ability of two forecasting models. These are the FSI-enhanced model (estimated using rolling 
regression approach) and a simple AR model. The tests are performed for all forecast horizons h (which are 
1, 3 and 6 months ahead). *, **, *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.
Argentina Brazil
Mexico Peru
Venezuela Japan
Korea Thailand
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We now turn to the case of dynamic forecasting models, depicted in tables 13 
and 14. As there are only some cases where the expanded, with the financial stress 
index, model has lower forecast error from the AR model, we applied the two tests in 
these cases only. Regarding the OECD countries, the results are tantamount to the 
previous case. The DM test fails to provide any strong evidence in favor of FSI ability 
to predict real economy. The most notable case is the Belgian and Danish one, where 
the DM test in the rolling forecast case provided very strong results in favor of the FSI 
model. On the other hand, the CW test offers more convincing results in favor of the 
latter model. With a few exceptions, it verdicts for the models that incorporates FSI 
index as a predictor. 
 
 
Table 2.13: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for OECD Countries – Dynamic 
Forecasting Case 
 
 
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 − − 1 1.151 1.923 ** 1 -0.128 0.578
3 2.282 ** 4.227 ** 3 0.199 2.093 ** 3 0.253 0.927
6 0.945 2.658 ** 6 4.344 *** 6.048 ** 6 1.096 1.898 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 1.023 1.384 * 1 − − 1 0.668 2.108 **
3 0.943 1.090 3 − − 3 1.974 ** 2.689 **
6 1.482 1.725 ** 6 0.728 1.898 ** 6 0.824 2.118 **
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 − − 1 0.926 1.682 ** 2 1.101 2.966 **
3 1.301 1.801 ** 3 0.036 0.624 4 0.877 2.777 **
6 − − 6 1.372 2.045 **
Austria Belgium Denmark
Finland France Germany
Netherlands Sweden Switzerland
H0: equal predictive ability (forecast errors are equal from the two competing models)
Forecasting Results Evaluation using Diebold ‐ Mariano and Clark ‐ West tests
Note: The table presents the Diebold-Mariano and Clark-West statistics for the null hypothesis of equal predictive ability of two forecasting models. These are the 
FSI-enhance model (recursivelly estimated) and a simple AR model. The tests are performed for all forecast horizons h (which are 1, 3 and 6 months ahead). *, **, 
*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at  10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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The case of the developing economies is, again, similar to the previous 
discussion. Here, the forecasting results tested are even less than in the OECD 
countries case. For once more, the FSI-enhanced model is shown to be better in 
predicting real economic activity in only half of the cases examined. Korean case has 
the strongest evidence in favor or the latter, while the evidence in the case of Latin 
American countries is, again, limited. Of course, this does not mean that FSI is not 
useful altogether, as a measure of financial stress and the forthcoming effects of 
adverse financial conditions on the economy, since there is evidence in favor of this 
feature of the latter. 
 
 
Table 2.14: Tests of Equal Predictive Ability for Developing Economies – 
Dynamic Forecasting Case 
 
 
 
 
 
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 0.230 1.420 * 1 1.099 2.154 **
3 0.146 1.515 * 3 0.112 0.648
6 0.398 0.988 6 0.141 0.824
h D-M test C-W test h D-M test C-W test
1 − − 1 − −
3 − − 3 − −
6 -2.256 ** 0.239 6 0.625 1.501 *
Korea Brazil
Peru Venezuela
H0: equal predictive ability (forecast errors are equal from the two competing models)
Forecasting Results Evaluation using Diebold ‐ Mariano and Clark ‐ West tests
Note: The table present the Diebold-Mariano and Clark-West statistics for the null hypothesis of equal 
predictive ability of two competing models. These are the FSI-enhanced model (recursively estimated) and 
a simple AR model. The tests are performed for all forecast horizons h (which are 1, 3 and 6 months 
ahead). *, **, ***, denote rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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6. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
 
Financial crises are recurrent and catastrophic phenomena for the world 
economies. It affects both developed and emerging economies, with severe 
repercussions on their economic growth and welfare. Previously, research on crises 
was mainly focused on solitary kind of crises, either balance of payments, currency or 
banking crises and, in this way, the authors were trying to offer type-specific 
proposals for overcoming each kind of financial turmoil. Today, it is well justified and 
established the view that modern economies face systemic-wide financial upheavals 
which, as it is commonly agreed, require special attention and monitoring modeling. 
On the other hand, previous econometric approaches do not seem to adequately cover 
the need for timely and accurate representation of the degree of (in-) stability of the 
financial markets. Additionally, there is a lack of empirical investigation on whether 
financial conditions and, particularly, excessive financial stress can offer some 
insights and work as a kind of predictor for changes in future economic activity, as 
represented in several macroeconomic variables and indicators. Hence, there is a need 
for the development of new tools, able to satisfy these policymakers’ needs. 
This paper contributes towards the aforementioned targets. It does so by, first, 
constructing a number of financial stress indices, following the approach proposed by 
Lall et al. (2008) and propagated by Melvin and Taylor (2009), slightly transformed 
for a number of emerging economies, for which we faced a lack of suitable data. The 
advantage and distinctive features of our work can be traced into several points: the 
extended number of countries for which this kind of research is applied to, the first-
ever analytical exposition of the performance of the FSI for each country, together 
with an exhaustive account of the types of stress periods and the duration of these 
episodes and, finally, the computation and discussion of the performance of three 
regional financial stability measures, one for each region under examination (OECD, 
Asia, Latin America), together with a global FSI. 
The examination of the performance of our financial stress indices is 
promising, indicating their ability to accurately capture well-known past financial 
distresses. Another important feature of these macroprudential measures is the ability 
to provide early warning signal of such forthcoming financial meltdowns. The 
changes of FSIs’ values through time can be a strong indication for the monetary 
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authorities, in order to adjust their policies and face forthcoming financial strains with 
confidence. On the same time, the FSI offers an evaluation of the severity of these 
stress periods, allowing to count the duration of each episode, together with the 
identification of the main source of instability in the markets (be it banking, securities 
of foreign exchange related). From this empirical work, it can be confirmed the fact 
that, for most of the countries and for each region, securities-prone financial 
abnormalities are the most frequent one, also lasting longer than any other type of 
crises, while banking turmoils are, also, quite frequent. Moreover, the recent financial 
crisis, initiated in 2007 is, by far, the most strenuous one, causing huge losses, in 
financial and economic terms, to the world’s markets, especially those of the most 
advanced economies. Then, depending on the country-specific or regional case, there 
are other periods of distress that had a significant impact on the world economies, like 
the ERM crisis in European countries, the Asian crisis in late 90’s to the Asian 
economies and the currency and financial crises of late 90’s again in South American 
countries. Hence, this kind of financial stress index performs quite well, efficiently 
capturing past stress episodes and it is promising as a predictor of future financial 
instabilities. 
We also moved one step further by providing empirical evidence on the 
interrelation of financial and economic conditions. In doing so, we employ an 
autoregressive model of each country’s industrial production, where lagged values of 
the respective financial stress index were included. Using this model, we compared 
it’s out of sample forecasting performance with a baseline AR model. In our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically test FSI functionality as a predictor 
of a macroeconomic variable in such a diverse group of (developed and emerging) 
economies. Using the RMSFE ratios, it was shown that financial conditions can be 
used from the monetary authorities as trustworthy indicators of forthcoming changes 
in real economy, especially for short and medium term periods (in the case of OECD 
countries) and longer period for Asian and Latin American economies. It is also the 
very first time that the predictive performance of models incorporating financial stress 
indexes is evaluated, using tests of equal predictive performance. Such tests are those 
we implemented, based on the work of Diebold and Mariano (1995) and Clark and 
West (2007). These tests provide additional evidence in favor of the FSI as a predictor 
of real economic activity, especially for the case of OECD countries and the rolling 
window model. 
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Of course, many more should be done, in order to improve these tools and 
render them efficacious forecasting tools. First of all, it is important to work towards 
the improvement of the accuracy of such financial stability measures, through the 
implementation of better weighting schemes. The equal-variance approach is a good 
initial approach, offering simple and quick indexes’ calculations, although it might not 
be the most proper one, due to the fact that it assumes normality in the series 
distributions (something rarely happened in financial data). Additionally, as was 
mentioned before, the importance of each of the three financial sectors incorporated in 
the indices, changes through time. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a weighting 
scheme of a time-varying nature should be more appropriate. It is also noteworthy, for 
the case of the regional and global indexes, to take into account the relevant 
importance of each economy to the total effect exerting to its region. Thus, the 
relevant contribution of each country’s financial markets to the overall performance of 
the regional indices should, somehow, be measured. In the same line of thought, 
contagion issues, not included in this piece of research, would be interesting to be 
embodied (through the use of relevant variables of interest). 
Financial stability issues are quite crucial nowadays. After the shock of the 
subprime crisis, policymakers around the world are more than interested in the 
development of relevant tools, able to provide clear and on time evidence of the 
financial system health. It is an uncharted territory, yet to (and should) be discovered. 
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Chapter 3 
 
An Investigation of Systemic Stress and Interdependencies 
within the Eurozone and Euro Area Countries 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Eurozone is getting through its most serious financial crisis, putting at stake the whole 
European integration project and set a number of crucial questions for the viability of 
the Eurozone as an economic and political entity and of the euro as a common 
currency. One of the most interesting aspects of this financial turmoil is the 
identification of the sources of this instability. More precisely, it is important for 
policymakers and market participants to be able to spot the channels through which 
the crisis has affected European markets. Such a work can contribute to the creation of 
an appropriate policy framework, in order to establish an adequate framework for 
financial markets’ regulation and supervision, along with the necessary macro-
prudential policies. Moreover, the detection of possible financial risk transmission 
channels is very significant for these aforementioned policies. For all the above 
reasons, we focus on the main source of this financial crisis, that is, the financial and 
banking markets. Here, instead of focusing to single indicators of financial instability, 
we move one step forward, by using financial stress indices, in order to have a clear-
cut idea of the size and the severity of the financial turmoil through time. Using a 
wide number of series, we first proceed to the construction of financial stress 
indicators for the money market, bond market, banking sector and the stock market of 
each Eurozone country, while an overall index for each country is also provided. By 
employing these indices, it is possible to have a clear narrative of the evolution of the 
current crisis for the whole Eurozone, as well as for each country and, even more 
important, for the markets that drove the crisis in each country. It is the first time such 
detailed, in the number of countries as well as in the decomposed nature of the 
indices, financial stress analysis is offered for the Euro Area. Then, VAR models are 
employed, both for each country, as well as for each (money, banking, bond, equity) 
group of markets for the examination of excessive financial risk transmission. A 
number of innovative conclusions are reached, such that: 1) not all peripheral 
countries (and especially Greece and Portugal) should be blamed for the crisis 
exacerbation 2) there is clear evidence of stronger interdependencies between banking 
and bond markets and 3) a degree of segregation (in terms of financial stress 
contagion) between peripheral and core Eurozone economies. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: C43, C58, G01, G15 
 
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Financial Stress Index, VAR, Impulse Responses 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2007, the global economy is getting through one of the most unstable 
periods in modern history. The problems that were raised in the sub-prime mortgage 
market in United States quickly spread to the global financial system and created an 
unprecedented financial crisis, which greatly affected the growth prospects of the 
world economy for many years. The interconnectedness of the various markets and 
national economies are so tight, that monetary authorities were forced to proceed to 
economic policies never applied before to such a wide scale and number of developed 
countries. It is not by accident that the current period is now known as the Great 
Recession. 
The fundamental reason for reaching such levels of recession is the strong and 
perplexed interrelation of the financial system with the real economy. Moreover, the 
fact that financial markets consist of a number of different markets, like the banking 
market, the bond market, money market and so on, each one driven by its own 
distinctive forces, makes things even more complex and difficult for assessing the 
underlying causes of financial turmoils and deciding on the optimal policies for the 
alleviation of market instabilities. Central bank authorities employ monetary policy 
measures, in order to intervene and stabilize the economy, while the financial stability 
and financial stress assessment was a recent addition to their mandate. Even the so-
called monetary policy transmission channel is not, yet, thoroughly evaluated and 
tracked down the different ways through which it can affect the aforementioned. In 
order to perform such an evaluation, a measure able to identify financial system 
impairments is necessary. Hence, there is a need for using financial stress indices, 
able to clearly depict systemic risk. 
Another reason, rendering the employment of such financial stress measures 
necessary, is the fact that the same nature of financial crises has been multifaceted. As 
it has been evident in the last few years, during Great Recession, the sources and 
causes of a financial crisis can significantly vary, in accordance to changes taking 
place in the financial market conditions and investors sentiment. For instance, the 
current financial crisis begun from a, relatively small, uninteresting, financial sector, 
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States. Soon, it has infected several 
markets and economies around the world, with this crisis reaching its peak with the 
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Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008. This situation brought a major 
disruption in money markets, as well as the interbank funding market, leading to a 
drying up of liquidity in a global level. In turn, this had major repercussions on capital 
struggling companies, households and countries, brining up more transformation of 
this crisis into a banking one and, lately, a sovereign debt crisis. Thus, it is evident, as 
it is also emphasized by Sandahl et al. (2011), that the thorough study of each market, 
that is part of what economists call financial system, is of utmost importance and can 
easier be done using financial stress measures. In this way, a clear and timely 
depiction of the prevailing conditions in each financial market is possible, while it is 
also an efficient way to assess the market-wide systemic risk for the economy. 
Finally, as it was previously implied, these indices can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the monetary policies followed by central banks, since tools used by 
the aforementioned are integral parts of the aggregate financial stress indexes. 
As it is clear from the previous discussion, there is great scope for the 
implementation of financial stress indices, especially in the present situation, where 
the need for accurate and timely indicators of systemic-wide financial instabilities is 
extremely important. In this chapter, we are going to construct a series of financial 
stress indicators, in order to analyze the current Eurozone crisis. This is an important 
motivation for this piece of research, since the unprecedented level of financial and 
sovereign turmoil in the Euro Area should be investigated and scrutinized. In order to 
do it, we employ a wide number of indicators, originated from the most important 
financial markets. These are the banking sector, the money, equity and bond market of 
each one of the eleven original Eurozone countries57. In this way, we construct five 
stress indices for each country (four sectoral, one country-wide), while an index for 
the whole union is also provided. Three different approaches are used to aggregate the 
individual indexes, namely the equally weighted, the first principal component from a 
principal components (PCA) analysis and, finally, the weighted loadings approach, 
again stemming from a PCA analysis. 
In the second stage of this empirical assessment of the Eurozone crisis, we 
provide initial evidence on the implied interrelation between the markets and the 
countries financial (in)-stability. The existence of trade and tight financial connections 
                                                 
57 Luxembourg is not included, since it is a small economy, without major interactions with the other 
core Eurozone countries. Also, even though Greece joined the common currency a bit later (2001), its 
alleged contribution to the current crisis renders its inclusion to the analysis quite important. 
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between euro currency countries, along with the existence of a unified monetary 
authority (the European Central Bank), deciding on the kind of monetary policies 
followed by all these countries, justifies and strengthens the necessity of such an 
econometric investigation. The provision of such empirical evidence leads to the 
establishment of interactions among the markets and the countries under exploration, 
providing further evidence in one of the hottest debates of concurrent financial 
literature. That is, the existence of channels of interdependence and contagion of the 
financial crisis from one country to another. With our work here, we expand the 
literature in many ways. First, it is possible to examine channels of crisis transmission 
using aggregate indexes of systemic risk, both in country level, as well as in 
individual markets. Thus, a more detailed analysis of potential stress sources and 
markets interactions is possible. Additionally, such an empirical evaluation of intra-
Euro area interdependencies is useful for policy purposes, since the detailed and 
exhaustive indagation of the aforementioned indices and interrelations prove the 
necessity of different kind of policies in different markets, countries and cases of 
financial upheavals. Moreover, these stress indexes are ideal as early warning 
indicators of forthcoming financial abnormalities, since their advantage is the timely 
information they provide for the current state of the financial markets. 
The empirical work involves the usage of vector autoregressive (VAR, 
hereafter) models, in order to examine the interrelations of the aforementioned 
economies, through the financial stress indices. The analysis is based on the impulse 
response functions, with which the effects of financial stress shocks of each country 
and market to the level of systemic risk of the rest of them in the system are 
examined. This type of work is conducted in the Euro Area level, as well as for each 
country separately. It is also repeated for each one of the three versions of the 
financial stress indices created. On top of these, the robustness of our findings is 
checked, first by estimating alternative impulse response functions (the generalized 
impulse response functions), while we also control for any causal relationship 
between our indices using block exogeneity tests. In brief, the results are surprisingly 
illuminating, emphasizing the fact that it is too simplistic to focus to the most heavily 
indebted Euro Area countries as the sole propagators of the current crisis. Depending 
on the market, the sources of financial stress dissemination varies. Additionally, there 
is a degree of segregation on the countries interrelations and financial stress 
comovement. Here, the core Eurozone countries seem to be more financially 
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interconnected, while the same holds (up to a certain degree) for the peripheral 
economies. This is strong evidence against the necessity to follow common type of 
policies in the whole union. In terms of policy making, there is a clear call for 
adaptation, based on the specific features and market peculiarities in each country or 
group of countries, in order to tame the crisis effects sooner. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section two, a discussion of the most 
important papers, dealing with the measurement of European countries financial stress 
is provided. Then, in the third section, the dataset employed is presented, emphasizing 
the usefulness and importance of the indicators included in the systemic stress 
indexes. Also, the econometric methodology adopted is presented. In section four, the 
constructed indices are discussed, together with their features, their effectiveness as 
tools of financial system safeguarding and the potential implications stemming from 
each country index’s decomposition to its constituents. Then, the next sub-chapter 
provides an exposition and justification of the econometric results, while the last one 
recaps and concludes. 
 
 
2. Financial Stress Measures for Eurozone and European Countries: 
An account of the relevant literature 
 
This literature overview is focused on the discussion of the literature of 
aggregate systemic risk indicators, with a special interest on Euro Area applications. It 
is not an exhaustive survey, since part of this literature is covered in the previous 
chapter. Also, a more specialized account on issues of contagion and spillover effects 
is provided in the next chapter (but, in this case, it is not solely concentrated to Euro 
Area economies). Here, we present some interesting work that, mostly, has to do with 
Eurozone financial stress indices development and some applications of them, with 
special interest on potential policy making implications. Finally, some important 
papers on the Euro Area crisis analysis and its escalation are also discussed since they 
are directly linked to the topic of this chapter. 
A first attempt to construct an FSI for the Euro area has been made by 
Grimaldi (2010). Based on the indicators proposed by Nelson and Perli (2007), the 
author has a threefold intention: to specify the actual stress period for the Euro zone 
markets, to compute relevantly accurate indices and test whether her index can work 
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as a leading indicator of stressful events. For the first goal, the author employs 
information contained in European Central Bank’s communication (using ECB’s 
Monthly Bulletins) to help her measuring financial market stress. In this way, she 
indicates periods that seem to reflect periods of financial upheaval58. In order to verify 
these findings, a financial fragility index is built, using sixteen variables from the 
bond, banking, equity and money markets. Specifically, the difference between each 
Euro zone’s country long term bond yields from the German one represents the 
sovereign bond spreads. Then, for the banking sector, bank equity prices index and 
the AA-rated corporate bond spreads are used as proxies of the conditions prevailing 
in this sector. General equity index, actual earnings per share and equities risk 
premium were chosen for the equity market component of the indicator. Finally, 
regarding money markets, one and three month Euribor-EONIA rates spreads, 
together with the spread of the main refinancing rate and the two year bond yield were 
utilized. Moreover, a string of risk aversion measures have been included, like implied 
bond, stock and futures volatility. All these variables were then integrated into two 
indices, the first being the weighted (by the inverse of each variable’s variance) 
average of them, while the second one is the rate of change. Finally, these two indexes 
were combined into a single indicator, with the help of a logit model, so that 
extraction of information on stressful periods to be more effective. The logit model is 
of the following form: 
 
  0 1 2 ,t h t tS L h            (3.43) 
 
where λt and δt are the weighted and the rate of change indices respectively, L is the 
logit probability distribution function, β’s are the model’s coefficients and t hS   is a 
binary (0,1) variable, representing stress or tranquil periods. As it is obvious, 
whenever h is equal to zero, the model exhibit the contingent FSI, otherwise, the 
estimated model provides a forward indicator. Using weekly data for the period July 
1999 to October 2009, the contingent financial stress index works well and captures 
crises periods of the last 10 years. Grimaldi confirms the good functionality of her 
FSI, comparing its performance with the VSTOXX index59 and the signaling 
                                                 
58 This has been done by counting how many times specific words appear in the bank’s bulletin. 
59 It is an implied volatility index, based on equity option prices. 
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methodology, popularized by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). The last of the 
previously mentioned goals of this research (testing whether this index can be a 
leading indicator for stressful events) was accomplished by using the forward 
indicator version of the logit model, together with a slight transformation of its 
dependent variable. Now, the regressand has the following form: 
  
 
1 if 1,...  . . 1
0 otherwise
t h
t h
h k s t S
S 
      
 (3.44) 
 
stating that the occurrence of a stress event can be at any point within a specific time 
frame. The author uses this model for a time window of 24 periods and figures out 
that it performs efficiently in this task as well. 
Beyond the construction of aggregate Eurozone- wide financial stress indices, 
some economists have proceeded to the creation of country – specific indices. 
Especially for countries that are in the centre of the current debt crisis, the interest in 
examining their financial conditions is quite intensive. For instance, Louzis and 
Vouldis (2012) compute an FSI for Greece, using both market and balance sheet data, 
which is the novel feature of their index. According to the authors, such an index is 
useful for, both, policy design (through the identification of the state of the financial 
system), as well as for the dating and prediction of financial stress. Additionally, such 
measures offer a unique chance to study the potential propagation channels of a crisis, 
mainly by inspecting the stress index components. In more details, they follow the 
framework proposed by Hollo et al. (2012), who use the components’ correlation, in 
order to assess systemic stress. Moreover, they extend this approach, by using 
multivariate GARCH modeling, so that they can be able to capture time-varying 
correlations of the index components. In this way, it is expected to improve the index 
performance, in terms of identifying financial crises episodes. The choice of the 
variables that are included in their analysis is based on their relevance to economic 
theory and the respective empirical literature. Thus, they focus on series capturing 
systemic stress, increased uncertainty and chancing expectations in the financial 
markets. Their set of variables consists of the following segments. First, they include 
variables related to the fundamentals of the Greek economy. These are, the sovereign 
bond spread (the yield difference of the long-term Greek governmental bond from the 
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German one), the realized volatility of the Greek government bond and the correlation 
of the Greek stocks returns with the German Bund. These are indicators, able to 
capture liquidity risk, uncertainty in the assets prices, together with potential flight to 
quality phenomena. Then, these economists include variables from the Greek banking 
sector, such as the banks stock index from the Greek stock exchange (a series, 
indicative of the investors’ expectations on banks performance and health). 
Additionally, the realized volatility of the banks index is included, as well as the 
idiosyncratic risk of bank stock prices (modeled as the bank equities’ beta). Another 
interest rate spread that is included here, is the bank bond spreads (that is, the spread 
of the bond yields issued by Greek banks from the German governmental bond). This 
is considered as an indicator of the risk in the banking sector, while it is also a good 
proxy for the funding cost of the banks. Regarding balance sheet data, the so-called 
deposit and loan gaps are incorporated in the analysis. These are the cyclical 
component of the total deposits (loans, respectively), estimated by the usage of the 
Hodrick – Prescott filter. Finally, the bank profitability is depicted by the interest rate 
margin of banks (that is, the difference between loans interest from the deposit one). 
Turning now to the equities market, the authors choose to use the stock market 
general index, decreasing prices of which indicate potential market stress. Also, the 
general stock index realized volatility is taken into account, in the same fashion as the 
banking index volatility. The final variable in use is the one for the money market. 
Specifically, the authors include the well known TED spread (the difference between 
the three month Euribor from the similar German treasury bill, an important measure 
for the representation of the liquidity and counterparty risk). Of course, it is 
questionable how useful the inclusion of such a variable is, since the intention of the 
authors is the creation of a systemic stress index for Greece. In our view, it seems 
more appropriate to create such a spread, using the Greek Treasury bill rate. 
Turning to the authors’ construction methodology for their index, they first use 
principal components analysis to construct sub-indices for the aforementioned groups 
of variables. They do this, using the first principal component in each case, which 
they rescale to range from zero to one, through a logistic transformation. Then, as it 
was mentioned above, the framework by Hollo et al. (2012) is followed. The authors 
consider portfolio based approach to aggregate the sub-indices into a common FSI. 
The rationale is that, whenever correlation among the different markets increases, 
financial upheaval increases as well. Thus, their stress index is of the following form 
111 
 
   
 't t t tFSSI s C s  (3.45) 
 
where tt yws   is the vector of the weighted stress variables, with w being the 
weights and y the five sectoral stress indicators, while tC is the time-varying 
correlation matrix. Hence, according to this empirical approach, there are two things 
that need to be estimated: the weighting vector (w) and the correlation matrix, in order 
to get the FSI. The former is estimated, according to each sub-index relative 
importance on the industrial production growth rate. In this way, an effort is made to 
link the evolution in the financial conditions with the real economy. According to the 
authors’ calculations, the biggest effect comes from the fundamentals sector, while the 
smallest weight is ascribed to the banks’ balance sheet data. Then, regarding the 
correlation matrix, two approaches were followed. First, the correlation structure of 
the stress sub-indices is derived from an exponential weighted moving average model, 
an approach with limitations60. Then, the well established BEKK model was used, 
especially a diagonal representation of it, so that to avoid any dimensionality issues. 
The model’s representation is 
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where C is a lower triangular matrix, A and B are n*n parameter matrices, k specifies 
the generality of the process and p and q are the number of lags in the specification 
used. 
In order to evaluate the usefulness of their FSI, the authors graphically inspect 
its behavior. There is evidence that the index can accurately capture periods of 
financial turmoil, while the sub-indices inspection reveals the relevant importance of 
the different market segments. According to this decomposition, the money market 
seems to be the most important contributor to the present crisis, while economic 
fundamentals are also quite important. It is interesting that the banks’ balance sheet 
index minimally affect the level of financial risk, probably because of the limited 
                                                 
60 In this approach, the decay parameter choice is arbitrary, while a random shock in the model can be 
proved quite persistent. 
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exposure of Greek banks to “toxic assets” effects. A final evaluation of the index is 
provided from a survey that was conducted among financial experts of the Greek 
financial market. In this way, a number of international financial crises episodes were 
evaluated, for their importance to the conditions prevailing in Greek markets. From 
this survey, a binary variable was constructed, which represents periods of financial 
turmoil and tranquility. Thus, this variable is used in a probit model, in order to assess 
the FSI usefulness as a leading indicator of such events: 
 
 
1
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
          (3.47) 
 
In (2.5), the dependent variable is the aforementioned binary one, tx is the FSSI and, 
respectively, the lagged growth rate of the FSSI61. According to these estimations, all 
versions of the FSI provide some evidence of predictability, with the time-varying 
correlation modelling one to be the most accurate. 
A similar effort to the previous one is made by Angelopoulou et al. (2012). 
Again, the authors try to construct financial conditions indexes for the Euro area as a 
whole, together with indices for some Eurozone countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain). In their case, three different types of indices are formulated, one 
including monetary variables (so that the monetary policy effect can be evaluated), 
one without the aforementioned variables and, finally, one which is the difference 
between the previous one and an index computed through a principal components 
analysis, where the monetary policy loading are set to zero by the authors. It should be 
emphasized here that this family of indices, the so called financial conditions indices 
are similar, but not exactly the same, with the financial stress indices we study in this 
piece of research. It is argued that financial stress indices are more useful acting as 
early warning indicators of forthcoming stress, while the financial conditions indexes 
are better in the analysis of the macro-financial linkages in an economy. In any case, 
this distinction is still blurred and many researchers use these terms interchangeably62. 
Proceeding to their data selection, the authors choose twenty four variables, for the 
Eurozone aggregate index, while twenty are those included in the country specific 
                                                 
61 Here, all three versions of the FSI are used, namely the weighted-average one, the multivariate 
GARCH one and the exponentially weighted moving average modelled one. 
62 An interesting methodological discussion on this issue is provided by Carlson et. al (2012). 
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ones. The choice is driven from, both, data availability, as well as based on the 
previous literature on this research topic. In this line of thought, the researchers 
incorporate several types of interest rate spreads (such as spreads between different 
types of loans and deposits), together with spreads from the interbank market (for 
instance, the three-month Euribor from the EONIA rate). Moreover, a number of 
quantity indicators are also included, like the value of debt securities issued by non-
financial corporations and monetary institutions. Finally, a number of survey series 
(related to banks’ liquidity position and consumer creditworthiness), along with series 
representing the volatility risk of stock and bond prices are also included in their 
stress indices. In order to create their aggregate indexes, these authors proceed to their 
analysis based on principal components methodology. According to this empirical 
approach, the variables under consideration are linearly combined, in such an order 
that the newly produced variables capture as much as possible of the variability of the 
initial set of variables. As it is emphasized by the writers, it is a way to compress the 
data, without losing much information. The process of acquiring the principal 
components of a dataset is by calculating the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the 
variance – covariance matrix of the variables. Beginning from the highest eigenvalue, 
the eigenvectors are set in an ascending order, with the elements of each one of these 
eigenvectors representing the so called loading of each variable for the specific vector. 
Based on this kind of analysis, it is assured that each component is orthogonal to the 
rest. In their work, Angelopoulou et al. (2012) use the first three principal components 
for the Euro Area, while for the country specific indices the first four. The decision 
criterion is that the components included in the analysis to explain, about, 70% of the 
total variance. Then, the contribution of each one of the series in the final index is 
calculating, based on the loading of them in each component, weighted according to 
the level of variance explained by each one of these principal components. The final 
step is to weight the computed indices by the exact share of variance that the 
components which are included in the analysis explain. 
Based on the loading weights, the authors suggest that each principal 
component represent different kind of influence in the financial conditions. For 
instance, it is evident that the most important variables in the first principal 
component are the survey variables, while interbank market spreads and bond 
volatility are also important. On the other hand, bank credit variables and securities 
issuance ones seem to be more important in the second component, while the third 
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component emphasizes the role of the spreads between loans and deposits. In the 
weighted loading case, the magnitude of the variables is, in general terms, as it is 
expected to be. By inspecting the FCIs graphs, useful comments can be made. 
Beginning with the Euro-wide index, there seems to be a tendency to loosen financial 
conditions, since the beginning of the sample (2003, with end of 2011 to be the end of 
the sample here)63. This situation prevailed until early 2007, when the financial 
conditions began to worsen. Several incidents rendered the conditions gloomier, like 
the liquidity shock induced by Bear Stearns failure in March 2008, as well as the 
Lehman Brothers default in September 2008. Since late 2009 and until 2011, financial 
conditions are improved, whereas the situation worsens in the second half of this year, 
given the increasing uncertainty, due to the outbreak of the debt crisis in Greece and 
Portugal. In the case of the countries FCIs, it is evident the existence of asymmetric 
responses of the different economies to the varying financial conditions. The situation 
in Germany diverges from the other countries under investigation (which are the ones 
most seriously hit by the debt crisis), both in the pre-crisis period (where the financial 
conditions were tighter to the other countries but Germany) and in the post-crisis 
period. In the last two years of the sample (since 2010), situation worsens in Greece 
and Portugal mainly, while in Germany are improved. Generally, it is shown that 
monetary policy effects are not unanimous in the whole Eurozone, something that 
indicates the need for particular attention on the kind of policies prescriptions 
proposed by ECB. 
The interest on these aggregate systemic risk indices is strong from the 
financial market participants, as it is evident from the development of financial stress 
indices from private financial institutions as well. For instance, the most systemically 
important Greek bank has developed its own FSI, in order to monitor the evolution of 
financial conditions in the Greek economy (Lekkos et al., 2010). Their main interest, 
as it is described in their technical report, is tracing the funding needs for, both, the 
governmental sector, as well as the banking sector, non-financial institutions and the 
households. In more details, their index contains a 12-month moving average of 
government bond issues (capturing the funding needs of the government), the 
sovereign bond spread (against the German 10-year government bond) and the 
volatility of this spread as indications of the bond market fluctuations. Then, the 
                                                 
63 in the case of Financial Conditions Index, loosening conditions are captured by increasing level of 
the index, while tighter conditions by decreasing level of it. 
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current account balance is included, as indication of the financing needs of the private 
sector, due to mismatches between savings and investments. Regarding banks 
financing gap, they authors propose the use of two variables, namely the difference of 
loans and deposits of domestic (non-financial) firms and households and the 
wholesale deposits from abroad. Finally, the ability of the private sector to cover its 
debt obligations is represented by unpaid bank checks. The aggregation into a single 
index is the outcome of a principal components analysis, where the weight for each 
one of the stand alone indicator is the relevant loading from the first principal 
component. Based on the latter, the stress index increases whenever the governmental 
funding needs increase, along with the spreads and their fluctuation. Additionally, the 
volume of unpaid checks is important in this respect. The index covers the period 
from January 2002 until November 2009, with the index skyrocketing right after the 
third quarter of 2008. Comparing the index performance with an economic sentiment 
index for the Greek economy, the authors find a consistently negative relation 
between them. 
Following previous literature on the strong link between monetary policy 
reactions and the asset prices fluctuation, Montagnoli and Napolitano (2006) attempt 
to further examine the aforementioned relation, based on the development of financial 
stress indices for a number of countries (US, Canada, UK and Euro Area). Their FCI 
is an extension of the monetary conditions indices used by central bank. Apart from 
the usual real effective exchange rate and the short term interest rate, they also include 
stock prices and house prices as well. The aggregation of the aforementioned entails 
the use of Kalman filter methodology, in order to capture potential time varying 
behaviour of the chosen indicators. Finally, the importance of the aggregate indices in 
the conduct of monetary policy is evaluated with the implementation of Taylor rules 
that incorporate these FCIs. In the case of Eurozone, the index is not statistically 
significant, while the opposite holds for the rest of the countries in the sample. Similar 
results are obtained from Baxa et al. (2013). Here, for a similar group of countries 
(US, UK, Australia, Canada and Sweden), it is found that monetary policy reaction 
functions that are enriched with a financial stress index can efficiently capture the 
central banks’ policies in periods of financial stress, as well as the interaction of 
monetary policy with financial stability. In their analysis, the author find out that 
central bankers change their policies depending on the level of financial stress, with 
loosening conditions in times of excessive financial stress. Additionally, their 
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response is stronger in cases of stock market and banking stress, while exchange rate 
stress is more important in open economies. As it is expected, in all cases examined, 
the response of central banks in the recent period was, predominantly, driven by the 
current financial crisis. 
Hansen (2006) has developed a risk index, very similar to the financial stress 
indices, in order to assess the risk exposure of euro-denominated assets. His index is 
focused on Euro Area and it emphasizes another useful feature of such aggregate 
metrics. That is, the ability of such systemic risk indicators to act as risk assessment 
tools for financial markets’ investors and help them formulating their investment 
strategies. Here, the index is based on variables, covering credit spreads, implied 
volatilities of government bonds and of equity markets, as well as the performance of 
the stock markets. The chosen aggregation method is the variance-equal one, where 
each one of the index components is demeaned and divided by its standard deviation. 
In this way, it is ensured that none of the previously mentioned indicators would 
prevail in the formation of the aggregate risk measurement. Based on this approach, 
the risk index here represents higher risk premium for euro denominated assets, 
whenever the value of the aggregate index is higher (which implies riskier 
investments on euro denominated assets). The period covered here lies from 1999 to 
October 2005 (daily observations). Based on the graphical inspection of the index, it 
can be said that it is successful on capturing the most important shocks that have 
affected investors’ risk perception in the markets. The same holds for the monetary 
policy decisions by ECB, where all case of policy rate and refinancing rate changes 
are foreseen by the index. This is in accordance with the previous work discussed, 
where the aggregate systemic risk index is empirically shown to be directly linked 
with monetary policy stance. A simple regression analysis verifies the importance of 
the aforementioned factors on the formulation of risk premiums for euro denominated 
assets (except euro volatility and ECB surprise decisions). Additionally, PCA analysis 
provides evidence on the existence of a common risk factor, affecting the whole 
spectrum of financial markets representing in the aggregate risk index. A final 
important observation here has to do with the relevance of such an aggregate risk 
index with financial stability. The author provides evidence of increasing covariation 
between the risk index and the correlation of its sub-components, indicating the 
increasing degree of markets integration and interconnection. Also, the effects of 
higher risk premiums (i.e. higher values of risk index) are more pronounced compared 
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to smaller risk exposure, indicating the potential serious repercussions of excessive 
financial risks. Finally, it is pinpointed that the risk index tends to be mean reverting, 
probably due to the cyclical nature of most variables incorporated in the risk index. 
The development of a stress index for the Swiss banking sector and the study 
of its forecasting determinants is the aim of Hanschel and Monnin (2005). Their 
argument, in favour of using such aggregate risk indices is the inappropriateness of 
binary choice models for developed economies, since banking crises episodes are too 
rare in this case. Additionally, such models do not offer any insight for near-crisis 
events, when the conditions in the banking sector are grim but do not deploy to a fully 
blown crisis. For their index, the authors use four types of data: market price 
(comprised of bank stock prices, bank bonds yield spreads vis-à-vis governmental 
bonds), balance sheet data (total interbank deposits, returns on assets, variation in 
bank capital measured as y-o-y differences in banks’ capital and banks’ provision 
rate64) and, finally, non-publishable data (total assets of banks under scrutiny from 
banking supervisory authorities) and the variation in bank branches (as indicator of 
any restructuring taken place at the banking sector). Once again, the stress index is 
constructed with the variance-equal approach being the relevant aggregate method. 
The FSI here identifies three periods of increasing stress for Swiss banks in the early 
90’s, 1998 and during 2001 – 2002. In order to forecast the level of stress, the authors 
use the gaps of the following variables as explanatory variables: share price index, 
housing price index, credit ratio (coinciding with the claims on private sector over 
GDP), investment ratio (similar definition as the latter) and the Swiss and Euro Area 
GDP65. The model used for this forecasting exercise is the following: 
 
 
1 21 1, 2 2, ,
...
kt t z t z k k t z t
y x x x            (3.48) 
 
The model’s regressands are the previously discussed variables, with the lags included 
according to the specification used. The criteria imposed for choosing the most 
appropriate model have to do with the statistical significance of the coefficients (at 
least 10%), the number of lags (no more than four years) and the existence of, at least, 
                                                 
64 It is the ratio of new provisions and amortizations over the aggregated assets of the Swiss banks. 
According to the authors’  view, it represents banks’ own perception of current financial stress, since, 
whenever more strain is expected, the aforementioned ratio should increase. 
65 Gaps are defined as the difference between the actual series and the trend of it, estimating using a 
rolling Hodrick – Prescott filter. This difference is standardized before incorporating to the models. 
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three explanatory variables. Based on these, the model used has a good forecasting 
performance, indicating both tranquil and turmoil periods. It only fails to foresee the 
1998 financial stress episode. 
A recent work that offers a composite systemic risk index for Euro Area is the 
one by Islami and Kurz-Kim (2013). Focusing on indicators that are highly correlated 
with the real economy and are parsimonious, the authors end up with the inclusion of 
six series in their analysis. These are two CDS spreads (on iTraxx Europe Crossover 
and iTraxx non-financial index respectively), the implied volatility of the EUR/USD 
exchange rate, the volatility of the future oil price, the difference of earnings-to-price 
ratio from the 10-year euro interest rate66 and the spread between the 3-month Euribor 
from the 3-month EONIA index. The aggregation is achieved through the 
standardization process, while the index is rescaled to range from zero to one. The 
data are of daily frequency, covering the period from January 1, 2007 up until April 
30, 2013. Their empirical application, using cointegration analysis, provides evidence 
in favour of the Euro Area FSI as predictor of financially stressful periods, as well as 
of the real economy. 
Van den End (2006) praises the comparative advantage of aggregate systemic 
risk indicators as measures of financial stability, in contrast to previous stand alone 
macroprudential indicators or early warning systems. Using an approach similar to 
Van den End and Tabbae (2005), he proceeds to the construction of a financial 
stability conditions index for Netherlands (initially) and a number of other countries 
(US, Japan, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden). Based on previous work on 
monetary conditions indexes and financial conditions indexes, the author creates his 
own, by including a solvency buffer and a financial institutions equity price index 
volatility term in an, otherwise, well known specification of financial conditions index 
(short term interest rates, real effective exchange rate, house price index, stock price 
index). The weights for the aggregate index are the outcome of a structural model, 
comprising of an IS curve and, alternatively a VAR model, while a variance-equal 
index is also calculated. All versions are estimated in levels, as well as on changes. In 
the subsequent correlation analysis with previous period of increasing risks in Dutch 
financial system, the author finds that the equally weighted index is the most 
                                                 
66 This interest rate is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of the long-term interest rates of highly 
rated Euro Area sovereigns (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Slovakia). 
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representative of the risk prevailing to the financial markets of Netherlands. Similar 
situation prevails for the rest of the countries in the sample. 
A, somehow, divergent piece of research is the one produced by Kappler and 
Schleer (2013). In this paper, the authors support that, even though the use of financial 
stress indices is a useful addition to the examination of systemic risk and financial 
stability, it is not complete. The financial system complexities and idiosyncratic 
features of the markets comprising the aforementioned dictates the study of more than 
one potential “dimensions” of the shocks and the respective propagation mechanisms 
of financial instability. For this reason, they proceed to a dynamic factor analysis of a 
number of Euro Area countries, based on 21 single indicators. These indicators cover 
the banking systems, the securities markets and the foreign exchange market of eleven 
Eurozone countries. Their approximate dynamic factor modelling provides evidence 
for four factors that seem to have distinctive role in the explanation of the markets 
behaviour during the period examined (monthly data from 2002 until 2012 for the 
same countries as those included in our work here). In order to achieve this, the 
authors estimate regressions of each one of the financial indicators of their sample 
against the four factors produced from the previous dynamic factor model. In this 
way, using the produced R2’s, they ascend the importance of each factor for these 
indicators. In this way, they support that the first factor has greater explanatory power 
on the banking sector variables, especially of the debt ridden countries. That is why 
they name it “peripheral banking crisis” factor. The second factor, called “stress” 
factor, is more important for the cases of equity price volatility, while the third one 
(the “yield curve” factor) is crucial for the inverted term spread, as well as for banks’ 
balance sheet data (like the ratio of total assets to liabilities). The most interesting 
thing here has to do with the fact that the explanatory power of this factor is much 
bigger for the core Eurozone countries and the Nordics. Finally, the fourth factor, 
although with lower R2’s, seems to be more important for the exchange rate variables. 
Hence, it is called the “foreign exchange rate volatility” factor. The main contribution 
of this work lies on the interpretation and the importance of standalone indicators on 
the background information that can be extracted by them. It can be an informative 
guidance on the process of choosing the most important variables to be included to an 
early warning system for financial crises or an aggregate systemic risk index. As it 
will be evident from our empirical work, their findings, especially in terms of the 
effects of different factors to different types of variables, are similar with our 
120 
 
investigation to the individual markets (money, equity, banking, and bond) financial 
stress indices. 
Since the focus of this and the subsequent chapter is on the multifaceted 
Eurozone crisis, we complete this section by discussing two important additions to the 
literature that examines the roots and underlying causes of this crisis. They do not 
involve any aggregate systemic risk index in their analysis. Nevertheless, these papers 
set a theoretical, as well as empirical, foundation that is useful for, both, the necessity 
for the creation of financial stress indices and their involvement in empirical work. It 
is of utmost importance to further enhance empirical evidence that can shed light on 
one of the most serious crises even hit the world economy. 
Drawing from the literature on the second and third generation currency crises 
models, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) suggest that the current crisis is the outcome 
of systemic and macroeconomic risks, which together would normally result to a 
currency appreciation for the crisis hit economies. Since, in the Euro Area case, this is 
impossible, the whole situation is perfused to the sovereign bond market. This effect 
is reinforced by the existence of default risk for the weaker economies. Their 
modelling framework focuses on the development of a rational exit model from EMU. 
Here, a government should decide whether it is on its interest to remain or abandon 
the common currency. This is the control variable of this model. EMU participation is 
considered as a commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime. According on this 
structure, a country should decide on its actions, based on the costs of the two 
alternative options. If C represents the cost of exiting euro (which is perceived as 
constant for analytical purposes), the cost of staying in Eurozone is defined as a 
positive quadratic function, of the deviation of the exchange rate with which a country 
has joined EMU, from the PPP-consistent one. According to the authors, this 
difference is adequately represented by the real exchange rate, a rate able to capture 
the costs associated with overvaluations of the currency. On the side of the private 
sector, there are two control variables, namely the determination of the government to 
remain or not in EMU (being credible or non-credible) and the existence or lack of 
guarantees of fiscal liabilities from other members of the monetary union. 
Considering that governmental decisions are dependent on the private sector 
expectations, the model ends up with three67 possible regimes. In the first case 
                                                 
67 Actually, they are four, but the fourth one has similar intuition with the first regime. 
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(credible EMU participation and guaranteed fiscal liabilities), the government’s loss 
function is 
 
 
2*
1 1( )L s s      (3.49) 
 
with γ being zero or positive. The intuition here is that, when this coefficient is zero, 
markets believe that (given full commitment to remain in Eurozone) government will 
do whatever necessary to fix any macroeconomic imbalances. A positive γ is a signal 
(in the form of increasing debt servicing costs) of the private sector to take measures 
for these imbalances, while it is certain that the authorities will proceed to such ones. 
The second regime represents the case where markets perceive fiscal liabilities as 
guaranteed but the EMU commitment is not credible. This could be due to the costs of 
the economically painful measures that a government might need to implement, 
compared to the cost of exiting the currency union. In this case, the loss function 
would be 
 
 
2*
2 1 2( )( )L s s        (3.50) 
 
Now, an extra coefficient, representing the effect of non-zero probability of EMU exit 
is added. Here, an exchange rate risk premium is present to bonds’ yields. In the last 
regime, (non credible EMU commitment and non guaranteed fiscal liabilities), a 
default premium is also incorporated to bond yields. Hence, the cost of remaining in 
the union is given by the following loss function 
 
    2*3 1 2 3L s s          (3.51) 
 
As a result, the model implies that the decision a country should make depends on the 
associated costs: the one related with the abandonment of the common currency and 
the other of staying in. The outcome is greatly affected by the markets’ expectations. 
Inspired by the previous theoretical outlay, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
try to answer a number of testable hypotheses for the EMU bond spreads movements. 
First, prior to the credit crunch crisis (before July 2007), the real exchange rate (used 
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as a metric of the overall macroeconomic performance) should not be important in 
explaining spreads movements. Then, the opposite should hold for the following 
period, while Greek spread should be significant for the rest of Eurozone countries’ 
spreads. This hypothesis represents the case of sovereign risk contagion, even if real 
appreciation and a global risk aversion (due to the Great Recession) is taken into 
consideration. This empirical work uses a monthly dataset, covering the period 
January 1999 to April 2010. The data used are the sovereign bond yield spreads (vis-
à-vis the German Bund), the real effective exchange rates, the VIX index ( as a proxy 
of international risk aversion), the bond market liquidity (proxied by the ratio of each 
country’s outstanding public debt to euro-area-wide total), the expected fiscal 
position68, the industrial production index (business cycle proxy) and, finally, the 
CDS spreads for the long-term governmental bonds. As implied before, the 
econometric investigation is divided into three distinctive periods: pre-crisis (1999.1 – 
2007.7), crisis period (2007.8 – 2010.4) and Greek debt crisis period. In the first case, 
the model used is 
 
 1 1 2 3t t t t tspread spread q vix u          (3.52) 
 
with the sovereign spread as dependent variables. The explanatory ones are the lagged 
dependent variable, the logarithm of the exchange rate and the VIX index. The 
regressions results show a strong and persistent effect from the lagged dependent 
variable, while the other regressands being not significant69. The inclusion of the other 
proxies (IP growth, liquidity, expected fiscal position) does not improve the results. 
The use of fixed effects panel estimation, still, does not affect the empirical outcome. 
Hence, the authors suggest that the econometrics approve the so-called “convergence 
hypothesis”, in the sense that the bond yields and investors’ perception are not based 
on macro-fundamentals or relevant sovereign risk. 
The crisis period inquiry is achieved using the following model 
 
                                                 
68 It is defined as the one-year-ahead net lending or borrowing (% of GDP) and one-year-ahead 
expected gross debt of the general government (% of GDP). It is assumed to represent the credit quality 
and risk associated with sovereign default. 
69 Using SUR estimator, the results are slightly different, with a stronger international risk aversion 
effect. This would imply that financial markets’ volatility is a non-negligible determinant of sovereign 
spreads. 
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GR
t t t t t tspread spread q vix spread             (3.53) 
 
This time, the effect of the Greek sovereign spread is explicitly taken into account. 
The results now are quite different, with the country specific fundamentals and the 
global risk aversion being important determinants of the sovereign spreads. Greek 
contagion effect is significant for almost all countries. For the other specifications 
(with the additional proxies presented before), liquidity is significant for some 
countries, but IP growth is not. Hence, in this case, it is evident the investors’ 
differentiation, depending on sovereign bonds and the relevant macroeconomic risks. 
The last case examined (called “Greek debt crisis”), the model implemented is the 
same as (2.11), while the authors estimate it for the whole time period. Here, the 
initial estimations do not provide the expected results, since the VIX index and the 
effective exchange rate are not significant, while the liquidity variables has the 
opposite than expected sign. Even after the addition of the business cycle variables 
and the exclusion of liquidity, the results remain similar. Since the theoretical model 
presented before, dictates that an expectations regime shift took place during the latest 
period of the current crisis, the authors re-estimate their model, but this time they 
exclude the months on which these shifts were supposedly took place. In this case, 
their results were improved, with the expected signs for the exchange rate and the risk 
aversion factor. The inclusion of a dummy variable (taking a value of one right after 
2009.11), the results are in favour of the states hypothesis. That is, the Greek spreads 
are more responsive to changing fundamentals. The analysis is repeated, using CDS 
spreads as the dependent variable. In relation to the Greek case, the authors find that 
CDS spread reflects country-specific fundamentals as well (as opposed to the other 
periphery countries, where the fundamentals effect is not that important). 
The previous discussion reveals some interesting aspects of the Eurozone 
crisis. First, it is evident that, prior to 2007, markets were pricing macro-fundamentals 
and sovereign risks in the sovereigns’ ratings. There was no uncertainty on the Euro 
Area members’ ability and commitment to strongly support their union membership. 
This situation changed dramatically after the crisis outbreak. For the case of the Greek 
debt crisis, there was a significant deterioration of the country’s fundamentals, while 
there was also an abrupt shift to investors’ expectations towards this economy. This is 
a reason for the significant difference between the Greek spreads and the spreads of 
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the other debt distressed countries. Moreover, it seems that the Greek problem was 
contagious to the rest of the Eurozone countries, especially to Portugal and Spain. The 
authors believe that the Greek bond yields can be considered as an EMU-specific 
systemic risk proxy, since this country’s situation renders it more difficult to borrow 
for the whole union. Finally, there was no evidence of speculation to the CDS market, 
whatsoever. The pricing of these financial assets was based on fundamentals and 
markets expectations. A number of policy implications are stated by the authors. Most 
of them have to do with the need for Eurozone’s peripheral countries to achieve fiscal 
sustainability, external competitiveness and full commitment to improving their 
macro-fundamentals. Additionally, the need for EU wide institutional reforms for 
effective fiscal supervision, policy co-ordination and mechanisms for timely 
detection, prevention and confinement of future crises is emphasized. Even though 
this research is indirectly linked to the methodological and econometric approach 
applied in this chapter, it does provide useful insights to the Eurozone crisis and its 
potential underlying causes. The necessity of studying multiple contagion effects in 
Eurozone is crucial, according to the authors, as well as the measurement of their 
potential size and combined effect on European sovereign bond yields. This is exactly 
what takes place in this and the subsequent chapter of this thesis and not only, since 
our modelling framework involves the examination of many more financial markets 
and relevant risks than just the sovereign bond market. Given the nature of the 
financial stress indices, the disaggregated study of them (based on the indices for each 
one of the relevant markets of each one of the Euro Area countries), we can extend 
and improve the relevant empirical literature, on the systemic risk and contagion 
transmission channels from different countries and different markets, within the 
Eurozone area. 
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
Having completed the brief account of the literature on financial stress indices 
and the relevant research conducted for Eurozone and European countries, we now 
proceed to a discussion of the dataset used in this piece of research, along with a 
description of the methodological approach adopted for the indexes calculation and 
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their incorporation to econometric analysis. Our aim is the construction of financial 
stress indices, able to accurately capture periods of increasing abnormality in the 
markets, as well as indices that can act as indicators of heightening systemic risk. In 
this way, an evaluation of the systemic financial stability can be conducted, while the 
relevant sub-indices can perform in the same fashion, for each one of the market 
sector examined. 
 
3.1 Dataset Description 
 
In order to depict the effects of a financial turmoil in a systemic wide level, we 
employ data from four markets, for each one of the initial Eurozone members70: the 
banking sector, money market, equity market and bond market. In all cases, we use 
monthly data, ranging from January 2004 until August 2011. The selection of 
variables is based, partly, on previous work done on systemic risk issues, as well as on 
variables that are important on the formulation of the state of the financial systems. In 
the following table, we provide an overview of the series used. As it is evident, a 
plethora of variables has been employed, in order to represent as accurately as 
possible the prevailing conditions in the financial markets of Eurozone countries. An 
important innovation here, compared to the previous literature in this area is the 
inclusion of an extensive number of balance sheet data, for a wide number of 
European banks. The multifaceted nature of the current crisis that hit hard many major 
banks around Europe, in many cases without obvious underlying reasons, stated the 
examination of balance sheet indicators very crucial. Depending on data availability, 
the number of banks for each country that has been incorporated to the construction of 
the bank and the aggregate index varies (from one bank to Belgium and Netherlands 
to eight for Greece). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 These are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (since 2001), Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 3.1: Indicators of Financial Stress 
 
 
 
As a result, our sample consists of 41 banks, covering major banks from all 
countries and banks with big market capitalization, size and market power. The 
limitation on the number of the financial institutions is dictated by the fact that many 
of them are not listed to a stock exchange and, as a consequence, there is a lack of 
data on their market performance. There are five groups of variables for each one of 
the bank, while the last one, called “overall market conditions”, represent the general 
conditions prevailing in the banking sector of each country (here, the series are market 
wide, not bank specific ones). So, the number of the indicators included for the 
banking stress index of each country varies from 27 variables (in cases where only 
one bank for a country is used) to 181 variables (in the case of Greek banks). The data 
are retrieved from various sources, but most of the balance sheet ones are from 
Operational/ Profitability Liquidity Assets Quality
ROA Interbank Ratio NPL/Gross Loans
ROE Net Loans/Total Assets Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans
EPS Loans/Deposits Loan Loss Reserves/Impaired Loans
P/E Total Liabilities/Liquid Assets Size
Inefficiency Interbank Funds/Liquid Assets Market Power
Net Interest Margin
Capital Adequacy Volatility Risk Overall Market Conditions
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Stock Returns Deposit Gap
Total Capital Ratio Dividend Yield Loan Gap
Market Value Bank Equities Realized Volatility
Turnover by Volume Banking Sector Beta
Bank Equities Returns
TED Spread M2 Growth
Inverted Term Spread M2/Foreign Exchange Reserves
Treasury Bill Realized Volatility Intermediation Rate
Main Refinancing Rate - 2yr 
Government Bond Yield Main Refinancing Rate - 5yr Government Bond Yield
Equity Market Bond Market
Stock Returns Sovereign Spread
EPS Government Bond Realized Volatility
Dividend Yield Corporate Spread
P/E Government Bond Duration
Stocks Realized Volatility Stock Returns/German Bund Realized Correlation
Variables Used in Financial Stress Indices
Banking Sector
Money Market
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Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database. Since most of these series are provided in 
yearly or quarterly basis, they are interpolated into monthly frequency. The 
interpolation was performed, using the Matlab function interpft. Using this function, 
the quarterly (or yearly) data are interpolated, using a fast Fourier transformation 
(FFT) algorithm. Such types of algorithms decompose the values of a series into 
different frequencies, in order to compute the discrete fourier transform. The FFT 
algorithms are efficient and fast in these computations and the most popular one is the 
Cooley-Tukey algorithm. I also experimented with other types of interpolation (using 
polynomials of second and fourth order). The results remained quantitatively similar. 
In the first category, there are series representing the operational 
characteristics and banks’ profitability determinants. Here, returns on assets (ROA), 
as well as returns on equity (ROE) are crucial ratios for the evaluation of the smooth 
performance of a bank. As indicated by Morales and Estrada (2010), these two 
variables depict the efficiency of the banks on employing their available funds, while 
on the same time are accurate representations of the level of profits they produce. 
Thus, it is evident the importance of their inclusion in this fragility index, since banks 
with low level of profitability are more susceptible to default. Additionally, regarding 
ROE, Louzis et al. (2012) emphasize its importance as a measure of the cost 
efficiency and of the efficacy with which banks use their internal and external 
financing. On the other hand, earning per share (EPS) ratio and P/E ratio are also 
indicative of the financial health of these institutions. The former is a well known 
metric of profitability, the behavior of which is indicative of the banks’ ability to cope 
with strenuous financial conditions71. Price-to-earnings ratio works in the same 
fashion. Since a decline of the P/E ratio would represent decreasing profitability for a 
financial institution, it is reasonable to include this variable with a negative sign in the 
following empirical work. Inefficiency, which is the ratio of operating expenses with 
operating income, is a very efficient proxy for how prudent a bank is. In their work 
for the determinants of non-performing loans, Louzis et al. (2012) propose the use of 
inefficiency as a measure of banks management quality, in terms of their ability to 
monitor and avoid excessive funding to default – like investments. Thus, it is natural 
to include this indicator to our dataset. Finally, net interest margin, defined as the 
                                                 
71 Grimaldi (2010) and Louzis and Vouldis (2012) pinpoint the negative relation of EPS ratio with 
cases of increasing financial stress. Thus, we incorporate it with negative sign in the stress indexes 
construction. 
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bank’s income from its intermediation activities, is also included in the set of 
indicators as an important contributor to the banks financial robustness. 
The second group of variables consists of liquidity indicators. The interbank 
ratio represents the value of funds a bank lent to other banks over the money it has 
borrowed by others. In this way, interbank ratio is a good proxy for financial 
instability transmission, since it represents the exposure of each bank to funds from 
other banks. The ratio of net loans to total assets is a ratio of dual nature, in the sense 
that it, concurrently, depicts the degree of liquidity of an economy (since the higher 
the financial leverage of a banking system, the higher should be this ratio), but on the 
same time it is a variable mirrored the banks portfolio quality and sustainability. Thus, 
it is a metric with ambiguous sign, regarding its contribution to excessive systemic 
risk or not. On the other hand, the loans-to-deposits ratio is another important variate. 
A higher value of this testifies lower liquidity available for banks, while the exposure 
to default risk is, also, greater. It can be considered as a good funding proxy, as well, 
if its usefulness as a measure is viewed from the economy’s aspect. This set of 
indicators concludes with two liquidity risk ratios, namely the total liabilities to liquid 
assets and the interbank funds – liquid assets one72. The reason behind the inclusion of 
these two indicators has, mostly, to do with their importance for the capability of a 
bank to cope with situations of increasing default rates and deepening recession of the 
economy. In this sense, the higher these ratios are, the more vulnerable the banks 
become. 
Moreover, the quality of the assets a bank has to its portfolio is of utmost 
importance for its survival in an uncertain financial environment. As it is well known, 
credit risk is the main type or risk that banks must manage and be cautious towards it. 
Thus, the reserves of such a financial institution, which are capital provisions for 
cases of bad loans writing offs, compared to its loans portfolio (both total and the 
impaired ones) is crucial. As Puddu (2008) indicates, these measures are proxies of 
the quality deterioration in banks’ balance sheets73. Thus, a positive contribution on 
the crisis index should be expected. On the same time, the credit risk they face is 
                                                 
72 Morales, M. and Estrada D. (2010), “A Financial Stability Index for Colombia”, Annals of Finance, 
6:555-581 
73 The tendency to increase loan loss reserves is indication of worsening balance sheets, since banks in 
this way admit their concern on losses on their loans portfolio. On the same time, it can be considered 
as a sign of prudence from their side. In any case, in the literature, the first case is considered as more 
important and effective on the role of this indicator. 
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negatively related their size and market power74. Finally, the analogy of non-
performing loans to total loans is, clearly, evident of the quality of loans in a bank’s 
portfolio and a positive sign is expected for its contribution to the financial stress 
index. 
The capital adequacy indicators are those dictated by the Basel Accord, related 
to the minimum capital needed for the default risk coverage by the banks75. In the 
group of volatility risk variables, we include those series which abnormal behavior 
renders the bank vulnerable to market risks and instabilities. For instance, higher 
stock returns indicate heightened uncertainty among investors, something that can 
have serious effects on the bank’s operation and viability. Moreover, dividend yield 
can, potentially, give negative signal for a bank, since it is negatively related to the 
robustness of a financial institution’s fundamentals. Market value and turnover by 
volume are, also, closely related to market sentiment, with a feedback loop existing 
between their level and market uncertainty (and, of course, with the level of financial 
stress). Turnover by volume is defined as the number of a bank’s equities traded on 
any particular date, usually given in thousands of stocks. Thus, increasing turnover for 
a bank’s equity provides signals against this institution’s viability and vigor. 
General conditions of the banking sector of each Euro Area economy are 
sketched out by the last bunch of variables used for this market. In the same fashion as 
Louzis and Vouldis (2012), we employ the so called deposit and loan gaps. These are 
produced, using the Hodrick – Prescott filter, proposed by the aforementioned 
economists in 1997, in order to extract the cyclical component of the deposits and 
loans of each bank from the trend element of them. This is a useful approach, 
indicating the cumulative dynamics of these two important elements of banks balance 
sheets. Increasing deposit gap is indication of deposit shortage, while a loan gap can 
be interpreted as higher market uncertainty and, thus, reluctance from the banks to 
provide loans. The level of investors’ uncertainty is depicted by the realized volatility 
of the bank equities index for each country. Increasing values of this volatility 
measure represent increasing financial upheaval. A very common component for 
                                                 
74 Size is the value of each bank’s assets, compared to market’s total, while market power is related to 
loans given, to total value of them. For details, consult Louzis et al. (2012). 
75 The necessity of monitoring capital adequacy indicators, as well as asset quality ones is emphasized 
from the earlier work of Evans et al. (2000). 
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stress indices is the beta coefficient of the banking sector index76. High beta values are 
an indication of banking sector equities to be considered as riskier and, thus, 
investors’ sentiment is against them. Finally, we also include the bank sector index 
returns, in the same logic as the stock price returns of the individual banks. 
Proceeding with the discussion of the variables included in the other three 
markets investigated here, we begin with the money market. Here, eight variables are 
included in the dataset. One of the most frequently used series for financial stress 
indices construction is the so called TED spread. It is the difference of the uncovered 
interbank short term lending towards a short term treasury bill (usually the 90-days 
treasury bill). For the case of Eurozone, the former is the well known 3-month 
Euribor, which is the benchmark and basic rate based on what European banks offer 
funds in the interbank market. The use of this indicator is popular, since it represents 
both, counterparty risk and liquidity risk in the markets. In times of increasing 
uncertainty and financial instability, problems of adverse selection can rise, since 
lending banks would be unable to identify the most financially reliable banks while 
the need for funds can be excessively high. Thus, increasing TED spread is expected 
for times of heightening financial fragility. Additionally, the slope of the yield curve 
is used, sometimes called inverted term spread. It is nothing more than the difference 
of the yield of short –term governmental securities from the long term ones (here, the 
3 month treasury bill from the 10 year government bond yield is used). The reason for 
including this variable has to do with the well justified, from the literature, ability of 
the yield curve to work as leading indicator of the real economic activity77. Hence, a 
forthcoming recession greatly affects the financial position of many debt ridden firms 
and the default risk is highly exacerbated. Additionally, it is a good indicator of the 
investors’ expectations on future short term interest rates. Since, during period of 
financial turmoil, the need for liquidity is higher and more intensive, investors turn to 
more easily liquidated securities, like the treasury bills. In turn, this affects their 
returns, expanding the spread between the aforementioned securities. The next two 
indicators, namely the spread of the main European refinancing rate from the two and 
three – year government bond yields are also strong indicators of monetary liquidity. 
As it is emphasized by Grimaldi (2010), the decrease of these spreads represents 
                                                 
76 It is used in most cases of FSI construction. For instance in Louzis and Vouldis (2012), and Melvin 
and Taylor (2009) among others. 
77 Mishkin, F. S. and Estrella, A. (1998), “Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial Variables as Leading 
Indicators”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80(1): pp. 45-61 
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liquidity worsening situation. For this reason, we incorporate these two indicators 
with negative signs in the analysis, so that their deterioration can indicate increasing 
level of financial suffocation. Growth of money supply and the ratio of money stock 
to the economy’s foreign exchange reserves are two series, coming from the prior 
literature on early warning indicators of currency and banking crises. As it is evident 
from Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), the 
previously mentioned variables are among the successful leading indicators for 
forthcoming currency and banking crises. Since both can produce signals, long before 
the actual outbreak of a crisis event, and since they both represent values of utmost 
importance for the economy’s growth rate and the total credit available, their 
inclusion to this dataset is advantageous. The realized volatility of the Treasury bill 
rate is incorporated here, representing the uncertainty and excessive abnormality of 
the money market, since treasury bills are those securities with the highest value of 
transactions in short term borrowing markets. Finally, the intermediation spread is the 
difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Even though, it is a variable that is, 
partly, reflects the level of profitability of financial intermediaries, it is contained in 
this group of variables, since it is also a strong indication of the available sources of 
credit and its supply level into the economy. 
In the equity market group, we include five variables. Firstly, the stock returns 
are incorporated, with negative signs since the large negative returns are those that 
create the greatest uncertainty for investors. Then, the earnings to price ratio (with a 
negative signs in the formation of the stress indices, because of the reasons stated in 
the banking sector analysis) and the P/E ratio are chosen, as major variables 
representing the profitability and health of the market participants. Moreover, 
dividend yield is another series, reflecting the robustness of the stock market. Thus, its 
inclusion is important, since its behavior is a sign of listed companies’ ability to cope 
with financial strain. This set of indexes is concluded with the realized volatility of the 
stock markets’ general indexes. As in all previous cases, the realized volatility is 
computed, using daily data, as the sum of squared logarithmic returns, adjusted by the 
trading days of each year in the sample. 
The last set of series has to do with the bond markets of Euro Area countries. 
An important contributor in this group is the sovereign bond spread, calculated as the 
difference between each country’s long term government bond yields from the 
German long term bond yield. It is reasonable to follow this convention, since the 
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German economy is considered as the strongest, most prudent economy of the 
union78. This indicator represents the sovereign risk each country faces. Then, the 
realized volatility of each country’s long term bond is used, again using daily data on 
their yields. Increasing uncertainty and flight-to-quality phenomena, sprung by 
excessive systemic stress level, would lead to higher volatility. The corporate bond 
spread, defined as the spread between the corporate bond yield from the governmental 
one. In this way, the default risk and inability of firms in times of financial strain to 
acquire the necessary capital for their operation, is depicted. An innovative feature of 
the dataset is the use of government bond duration. It is an interesting variable, since 
it represents the sensitivity of bonds prices to changes in interest rates. In general, it is 
expected to have a negative relation between bond duration and interest rates. Based 
on the volatile behavior of interest rates in periods of financial uncertainty, there not 
seems to be a consensus on the kind of effects a financially instable period have on 
bonds duration. On the other hand, recent research by Lee et al. (2012) and Lee et al. 
(2011), indicates the strong effect that excessive sovereign risk has on governmental 
bonds. According to these authors, the duration decreases, especially for bond with 
lower ratings. As a result, the heightening investors’ concerns on possible default of 
debt strangled countries with low rated bonds, should lead to lower duration for the 
bonds of these troubled countries. The last indicator here is the so called realized 
correlation of each country’s stock returns with the German Bund. With this variate, 
we aim to include the effects of the financial instability on the investors’ decision to 
withdraw their invested funds from a troubled economy to one that is perceived as 
safe (in Eurozone’s case, Germany). Again, this indicator is computed using daily 
data on our sample’s general stock indices and the German long term government 
bond yield. 
 
3.2 Methodological Approach 
 
This section is attributed to the presentation and discussion of the 
methodologies employed for, first, the calculation of the sectoral, national and Euro 
Area wide financial stress indices and, second, the econometric modelling. In the first 
                                                 
78 For the case of the Germany itself, we just include the yield of its 10 year governmental bond. 
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case, we decide to use three alternative approaches on the aggregation of the financial 
indicators in each market, into a single systemic stress index. For the examination of 
the interdependencies of European markets, we are going to use the very popular 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR, hereafter) model. 
 
 
3.2.1 Financial Stress Indexes Construction 
 
Our decision, regarding the construction methodology of our financial stress 
indices, follows the literature. We intend to calculate the FSIs in three different ways. 
First of all, we are going to aggregate our series, based on the equally – weighted 
approach. According to this approach, an equal weight is attributed to all variables in 
each of the markets. In this way, the market - level indices are computed, while the 
same approach is followed for the country – wide one. It should be emphasized here 
the fact that each series is demeaned and divided by its standard deviation. This is 
useful for two reasons: it helps avoiding problems of mis-measurement in the series, 
while it is also a necessary transformation, before proceeding to a principal 
component analysis (PCA, hereafter). In general, the equally – weighted approach is 
quite popular, since it is very easy to implement, but also it provides qualitatively 
similar result to more advanced aggregation methods, like some reduced form 
econometric models or dynamic factor modelling79. 
In order to be able to evaluate and verify the well functioning of the indices 
produced with the aforementioned approach, we also proceed with the computation of 
financial stress indexes, based on PCA analysis. As it is well known, PCA analysis is 
a multivariate statistical approach for reconstructing a large dataset, through obtaining 
linear combinations of the variables included in it. It is a useful technique, since it 
does not use any reduced form model and, on the same time, it decomposes the series 
variability, according to their importance in the dataset correlations. In this way, 
alternative combinations of the series can be obtained, which can have more interest 
for the researcher, in terms of the data patterns indicated, the economic and financial 
phenomena that can interpret and, of course, the relevant policy recommendations (or 
                                                 
79 Carlson et. al (2012) provide an interesting summary of the methodologies used to construct FSIs and 
FCIs, together with empirical evidence on their identical performance in forecasting real economic 
activity. 
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portfolio design guidance) that this analysis can provide. PCA deals with the 
covariance matrix of the dataset, which is decomposed, according to its eigevalues, to 
the principal components that are orthogonal to each other. In this way, the 
independence of each linear combination of the original variables (i.e. the principal 
components) from the rest is secured, while they also provide the loading (weight – 
coefficient) of each one of the original variables that contribute to the new dataset 
combinations. It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned principal 
component are ascended according to the eigenvalues, from the highest to lowest. 
Thus, the eigenvectors, interpreting most of the co-movement of the initial series are 
ranked first. That is why this statistical methodology was named principal 
components. 
As it has been underlined above, we initially use the first principal component 
for the index of each market. The rationale is that this principal component captures a 
significant share, the greatest from all components, of the dataset co-movement. Thus, 
using the implied loadings from the first principal component, we aggregate our series 
into the financial stress index. In the third version of our indicators, we use an 
approach similar to Angelopoulou et. al (2012), which we call weighted loadings 
approach. Here, we use some of the principal components (in the case of banking 
sector the first four, in the other three markets the first three), each one weighted 
according to the share of variance explained. On top of that, in the case of the banking 
sector, since there is a cross-sectional dimension in our dataset (each variable in this 
sector, excluding the common ones, is extracted for more than one bank), we used an 
extra weight level, based on the size of each bank (so that, the used banking balance 
sheet dataset to be more balanced and according to the systemic importance of each 
financial institution). After we produce the national level indexes, the Euro Area wide 
one is prepared, again by aggregating, with equal weight attributed to each country, 
the national financial stress indices. 
 
3.2.2 Vector Autoregressive Empirical Analysis 
 
In the second stage of our analysis, we intend to explore potential existence of 
interactions and interrelations of the stress indices, both in country level as well as 
between the different markets. In order to do this, we are going to employ unrestricted 
VAR models, one of the most popular empirical approaches for analysing causal 
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relationships between macroeconomic and financial variables. Since this model was 
proposed by Sims (1980), it became something like a workhorse for macroeconomic 
and macro-financial empirical investigation. Especially, in cases where prior 
economic theorizing or established causal relations between some economic or 
financial measures do not exist, the use of such a data driven econometric approach is 
considered sufficient. 
In general, a VAR model consists of a number of equations, where all 
variables are considered as endogenous. Each equation consists of lagged values of 
the dependent variable, in addition to lagged values of the rest of the variables. In the 
case of our model, denoting as ktfsi  the financial stress index of country k at time t, 
and assuming the existence of k variables and k error terms, the VAR(p) model is of 
the following form: 
 
 1 1 2 2t t t t tFSI FSI FSI FSI           (3.54) 
 
where 
'
1, 2,  ,  t t t k tFSI fsi fsi fsi    is a vector of all the endogenous variables of our 
model and 
'
1, 2, ,   t t t k t        is the vector of the error terms of the model, which 
are usually considered to be white errors, with a zero mean and constant variance. 
Finally,  ( 1,   , )i i     are the kxk matrices of the coefficients that need to be 
estimated. For this chapter’s case, we first employ a VAR model with eleven 
equations80, while the examination of the country confined models consists of four 
equations (one for each market a stress index has been compiled for). 
In the case of an unrestricted VAR model, the estimation can be done, using 
the usual OLS estimator. In order to have stable and robust results, it is necessary to 
test our series for their order of integration. Thus, before proceeding to our models’ 
specification, we proceed with the performance of stationarity testing for the original 
series. The main test used is the augmented Dickey – Fuller (1979) test, while in case 
where the results were dubious, Phillips – Perron (1988) and KPSS (1992) test were 
also performed to verify whether or not a specified variable is stationary or not. The 
next step is the models’ specification selection. The optimum number of lags for the 
                                                 
80 This is the case of country wide models, where we estimate models for financial stress index in 
national level and, then, for the European bank, money, equity and bond markets. 
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equations is chosen based on a number of lag selection criteria. These are the Akaike 
information criterion, the Schwarz criterion and the Hannan – Quinn one. As it is 
reasonable, not all of these criteria should indicate the same number of lags for a 
model. Luetkepohl (2011) comments that Akaike criterion is usually the most tolerant 
(provides evidence for higher lag order), while Schwarz criterion chooses the shorter 
order. The general idea is to begin modelling with a moderate lag structure, which is 
what we do, given the time span covered and the number of equations involved in the 
estimations. Models’ adequacy is examined through the inspection of the residuals 
behaviour81, even though, as indicated by Luetkepohl (2011), residuals non-normality 
is not a problematic situation for the validity of the inference conducted with these 
models. 
In any case, the importance of this empirical investigation lies on the detection 
of channels of financial stress propagation from country to country and from one 
European market to another. Canova (2007) mentions that inference through the 
estimated VAR coefficients is not an efficient approach to use these models. Instead, 
he suggests the use of impulse responses, as the appropriate way to study the 
interrelations and transmission channels of the endogenous variables included in a 
VAR model. Impulse response analysis traces the responsiveness of the dependent 
variables to innovations to system’s variables. The innovations or shocks enter the 
system of equations through the residuals vector. Due to the model’s structure and the 
endogenous nature of the variables, it is expected that a shock on one of the variables 
will have effects on the rest of them in the VAR model. The crucial element is to trace 
the effect of these shocks on the dependent variables through time. In order to do it, 
the VAR should be re-parameterized to its vector moving average (VMA) form. That 
is: 
 
 
0
t i t i
i
FSI u



   (3.55) 
 
where, the left hand side of this equation is as defined to the previous equation, u are 
the reduced form residuals and i is a coefficients matrix. The elements of this matrix 
determine the cumulative effect on the dependent variables (in our case the financial 
                                                 
81 That is, whether they are normally distributed, heteroskedastic or autocorrelated. 
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stress indexes). Assuming that our variables are stationary, we should expect the 
effect from the shock on the indices to gradually die out. Otherwise, the system would 
face stability issues. On the other hand, it is reasonable the model’s residuals to be 
contemporaneously correlated. This means that an innovation to the residuals of one 
of the variables has an effect on the other variables’ residuals and, on the same time, 
affects the other endogenous variables of the system. In order to overcome this 
problem and offer an economic intuition in the impulse response analysis, extra 
restrictions should be applied on the model. Cholesky decomposition is the most 
commonly used approach here, setting a minimum number of restrictions in the 
model. Here, the researcher decides which variables have no contemporaneous effects 
on the rest (so that their relevant coefficients in the i matrix are set equal to zero) 
and, in this way, set an ordering on the sequence of the shocks that hit the VAR 
system. As it is evident, the choice of the variables sequence is somehow arbitrary. If 
there is no solid theory justifying a specific ordering, economists have to apply 
different ones and verify the results robustness. In the case of our work, we try 
different orderings, based on the relevant concepts and ideas behind the possible 
sources of financial instability in Eurozone. This means that we first try the variables 
ordering, by setting first the countries mostly blamed for excessive financial distress 
in the EMU. These are Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Gradually, we tried most 
of the countries, so that our results can be conclusive. The impulse responses results 
are discussed in section five. In general, this approach is really useful on pointing and 
analysing the effect of a abrupt change to any of the included financial stress 
indicators to the level of financial stress in the Euro Area countries and markets82. 
Moreover, we perform a series of multivariate Granger causality tests, in order 
to provide further evidence concerning the interconnection of the financial stress 
indices. As it is well known, Granger (1969) examines whether a variable x is better 
explained from an equation including, both past values of x itself, along with lagged 
values of another variable, say y. In equational form, for the case of two variables (x 
and y) it should be: 
 
 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
t t i t i t i t i t
t t i t i t i t i t
y c y y x x
x c x x y y u
    
   
   
   
       
       
 
   (3.56) 
                                                 
82 An additional robustness check is the estimation of generalized impulse responses, as proposed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1998). More details are presented in the relevant section. 
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where the number of lags included in each equation is determined from the usual 
information criteria. Using F-type statistics, they null hypothesis examined is whether 
y does not Granger cause x (and vice versa). In case of a VAR model, with more than 
two endogenous variables, the Granger causality testing procedure remains similar. In 
our case, since we use a VAR model, a generalized version of the Granger causality 
test is performed. The block-exogeneity test is useful for testing whether the lagged 
values of a variable do not Granger cause the dependent variable. It is very similar to 
the aforementioned Granger causality test, adapted for the case where more than one 
lagged variables are included in the model’s equations. In order to perform this test, 
the coefficients of the lagged values of the variable to be tested, are set equal to zero 
and a likelihood ratio statistic is used to evaluate the potential causality relationship of 
this variable with the regressand. Using this test, extra evidence is provided, regarding 
the existence of potential financial risk transmission channels between the Eurozone 
economies and their respective markets. As it is emphasized elsewhere in this work, 
this is one of the very first attempts to provide solid and clear picture of such 
interconnections for Eurozone in such a detailed and disaggregated level. 
As already emphasized, the core of this research is the investigation of crisis 
transmission channels between the Euro Area economies and financial markets. In 
this respect, the decision was to limit the empirical analysis in these economies and 
markets only. I did not include US, which might seem puzzling, given the importance 
of this economy in the initial exacerbation of the global financial crisis. This might 
put in doubt the empirical results, since a potentially major effect and channel of crisis 
transmission is not taken into account. On the other hand, I support that, given the 
specific research question here, the shifted interest and the size and magnitude of the 
Eurozone financial and sovereign crisis, the negligence of the US economy should not 
be a problem. In any case, the time period covered here is longer, compared to the 
period where the US subprime crisis initiated and propagated in the global economy. 
Finally, the robustness of our results, under different specifications and types of 
indices, indicates that the exclusion of US from the analysis should not be an 
important threat to the reliability of the results. 
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4. Eurozone Financial Stress Narrative 
 
In the present section, a discussion of the three Eurozone financial stress 
indices is provided. They are analyzed and evaluated, in terms of their ability to 
represent financially instable periods and the financial conditions of the Euro Area in 
general. As it has been already emphasized, using the different market sub-indices, we 
are able to conjecture for the markets that are the main proponents of the financial 
instability. This markets’ decomposition provides valuable extra information for, 
both, policymakers as well as the investors’ community. Moreover, besides the Euro 
Area indices, we present the results of the PCA analysis, the relevant loadings and 
common variability explanatory power of the aforementioned approach. Moreover, 
the distress indicators of the eleven countries under considerations are also presented 
and discussed. 
 
4.1 Eurozone Financial Stress Indices 
 
Graph 3.1 depicts the aggregate Euro Area- wide Financial Stress Indexes. As 
it is previously noted, the period covered is from January 2004 to August 2011. In this 
sense, there is a wide coverage of, both, the initiation of the global financial crisis, its 
evolution and transformation to the current situation faced by the most indebted 
members of the monetary union. In general, the indices indicate some minor 
fluctuations to their value, prior to 2007, without any of those presenting a serious 
threat for the stability of the markets. On the other hand, it is evident a slow but 
steady, gradual increase in the level of financial stress, which reached its climax in the 
third quarter of 2008. The reason cannot be other than the Lehman Brothers collapse 
that took place in September 2008, with a number of major repercussions to the global 
financial system. In this case, the index reached its maximum value of 0.84 (in the 
case of the equally weighted FSI, FSI -2 value is 3.64 and 1.85 for FSI -3, 
respectively) on October 2008, while it remained in high level until the end of the first 
quarter of 2009. 
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Graph 3.1: Euro Area Financial Stress Indexes 
 
   Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
In the meantime, the European Central Bank, through a number of unconventional 
monetary policies initiatives, tried to stabilize the increased systemic risk and 
uncertainty in the markets. For instance, right after the Lehman Brothers collapse and 
the consecutive drying up of the interbank money market, the Eurozone’s monetary 
authority proceeded to the acceptance of more  financial assets, as collateral for the 
emergency funding, while on 2009 the covered bonds program was populated. 
Together with the decrease of the main refinancing rate by ECB, all these policies led 
to an abatement of the financial stress level. But this would not last for long, since the 
evolving crisis in Greece led to another outbreak of financial stress, on April and May 
2010. The agreement on a rescue program seemed to tranquil the European economy, 
for a while, until another spike in the index came out as a consequence of the need for 
financial assistance and fiscal austerity measures, this time for Ireland (towards the 
end of 2010) and Portugal in early 2011. The financial stress remained excessively 
high, until the end of our sample, which includes the decision for the haircut on the 
Greek public debt. 
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4.2 Euro Area Countries Financial Stress Indices 
 
Turning now to the national indices of financial distress, it is interesting to 
notice the usefulness of the aforementioned indexes. In all cases, irrespective of the 
country or the type of index under investigation, these metrics are proved to be 
accurate representations of the financial conditions prevailing in each country and, of 
course, are indicative of the heightened financial bottlenecks they faced in times of 
financial hardship. The thirty three figures at the appendix provide an exhaustive, 
detailed and disaggregating analysis of the effects each financial market have on the 
total financial stress. For each country, there are three graphs, one for each financial 
distress index, together with the relevant disaggregated contribution of each market 
(namely, bond, stock, money and banking) to the economy’s financial risk. Each 
graph has two vertical axes. The right hand-side axis represents the size of the total 
financial stress index, while the left axis depicts the scale for the components. Each 
market has its own coloured bar, so that the graphs’ examination is easier. Finally, we 
should note that, by construction, the left y-axis represents the cumulative value of the 
four components, which does not necessarily coincide with the reflecting value of the 
stress index to the right vertical axis (since the aggregate index is a product of the 
weighted values of the markets’ indices). 
We start by analysing the case of equally weighted financial distress indexes. 
Before the details of each country’s case are discussed, some general comments 
should be made. In a nutshell, these indexes are proved to provide more balanced 
results, in the sense that their values are smoother, without always an easy distinction 
of the real forces driving the financial conditions. Additionally, the indices values are 
the lowest, compared to the other two aggregation methodologies. This, probably, has 
to do with the fact that the contribution of each one of the markets to the total stress 
index is deemed to be equal. This assumption might not be always realistic, especially 
in cases where a specific market or markets are the main roots of financing the 
national economy or the actual propagator of the prevailing financial instability. 
Turning into country specific analysis, the first thing to observe is that the 
highest values are spotted to Belgium, Finland and Italy. Nevertheless, the de-
escalation of these countries indices is fast, without remaining to excessive levels, 
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compared to other countries. For the rest of the sample’s economies, we detect 
seasonal outbreaks of the stress indices, most of them in 2008 and afterwards. This 
situation is prevalent to France and the countries under serious financial strain 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The study of the indexes’ components is 
enlightening for the major contributors to the stress level in each case. In Austria, the 
equity market, along with the bond sub-index is the most important channel of 
financial stress. The same holds for Belgium and Finland, as well as for France. On 
the other hand, the German equity and bond components are crucial only until the 
second quarter of 2008 and towards the end of the sample. In the meantime, the index 
value is quite low, indicating the safe haven role of the German financial markets. 
Sovereign risk is proved to be the major stress components in Greece, throughout the 
sample, with its top values reached before and on the bail-out decision period. 
Additionally, it is important to underline the growing importance of the banking 
sector in the overall stress index, especially from the beginning of 2010. The 
evolution and the transformation of the nature of the crisis are evident in Greece. The 
Irish case is similar to Greece, while money market contribution is also important 
here. This emphasizes the fact that Irish crisis evolved mainly as a banking crisis, 
since money market stress index represents, mostly, interbank market stress 
conditions. The stock and bond components are the major players in the case of Italy, 
while Dutch index does not provide any strong evidence of excessive financial stress 
whatsoever. Finally, the Portuguese financial stress is mostly shaped through 
excessive sovereign risk and equity market stress, while liquidity issues (expressed 
through the money market component) are more important since August 2010. 
Excessive stress from the bond market is the major effect, in the case of Spain, 
whereas the situation changes during the time of Eurozone crisis. In this particular 
period, Spanish financial instability is expressed with deteriorating financial 
conditions in all sectors studied here. 
The lower two graphs in each set of countries’ FSI graphs, represent those 
indices and the subsequent decomposition, calculated using the PCA analysis 
approach. As already stated, the second graph in each case is the FSI, where the first 
principal component’s loadings are used as the weights of the individual indicators for 
the aggregate systemic risk index. The last plot is the index produced from the 
weighted loadings approach. Here, the investigation of the graphs is conducted with 
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the additional use of tables A.1 to A.5, where the respective loadings are presented in 
details. 
The first two tables of the appendix present the factor loadings for the banking 
sectors of the economies under scrutiny. As it is obvious, there is a great variety of 
indicators and wealth of information provided here. Six panels group the variables 
into their respective category, with the size and the magnitude of each one of them. In 
the case of the first principal component, the percentage of the common variability 
explained ranges from, about, 32% in Netherlands to 49.5% in Spain. In the case of 
the weighted loadings, the number of principal components used for the construction 
of the aforementioned is five. Here, the commonality explained is quite high, 
beginning from 74% in the case of Finland and reaches 85% in the Spanish economy. 
Focusing now to the loadings, a general observation is that the majority of them 
demonstrate the expected signs, while there is some variation on the importance of 
each group of variables to the different banking markets. In all cases, the market-level 
indicators have prominent role. This is reasonable, given the feature of these 
indicators, as these affect the conditions prevailing in the whole market during the 
period examined. The Dutch case is rather peculiar, in the case of the first principal 
component, since all but the bank equities index returns loadings have a negative sign. 
Nevertheless, the size of these indicators for the case of Netherlands, as well as for the 
Belgian case, is negligible. On the contrary, the market level indicators carry large 
loadings for the rest of the Euro Area countries. Especially, the deposit and loan gaps, 
along with the realized volatility of the bank equity index are the most prominent 
factors in the financial stress index synthesis. Their largest loadings can be found in 
the cases of France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Moreover, major role in the 
formation of the banking stress conditions have the liquidity indicators, along with the 
operational/profitability ones. Assets quality and capital adequacy ratios moderately 
contribute to the banking stress level, with the exception of Greece (with very low 
loadings) and Finland (where the relevant weights are stronger than the average 
values in the rest of the monetary union). Volatility risk proportion is relatively low 
for the hardest hit economies, indicating the stable and potentially positive 
expectations of investors, towards the systemic risk issues in this financial sector. 
These results, as discussed already, hold for the case of the weighted loadings, 
presented at table A.2. The only slight modification is in the different signs of some of 
the loadings, although they do not considerably affect the rationale and effects of the 
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results. From the above, it is evident the importance of a number of crucial indicators, 
shaping the financial stability conditions in the banking sectors of Euro Area. Crucial 
elements are the level of bank profitability, along with the liquidity conditions 
prevailing. On top of them the overall, market-wide, indicators are very important, 
especially the deposit and loan gaps. Again, these two represent indicators 
emphasizing the importance of liquidity and the importance of excessive funding 
needs in the creation of unhealthy financial institutions. 
The next table in the appendix reports the PCA-based weights for the money 
market index. In the first principal component case, the common factor explains about 
44% of the indicators’ variance (on average), with Italy presenting the lowest and 
Spain the highest percentage respectively. In the weighted loadings case, Italy has 
again the lowest level of explanatory power from these loadings (70.8%), while 
Greece’s money market situation is explained by 87.3% from the first three principal 
components this time. Signs, in most cases, are the expected ones with a special 
interest pointed to the negative signs of the Euribor-short term governmental bonds 
for the financially safest countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany and Netherlands). 
Only exception here is Italy. TED spread and the yield curve positively contribute to 
the formation of the money market indices, for most of the countries under 
consideration (both core Eurozone and peripheral ones). The larger size for the 
interbank leverage conditions is observed to Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, 
indicating the importance of sovereign and credit risk in these economies. The same 
holds for France as well, which is the only large Euro Area country with this feature. 
As it should be expected, the results are qualitatively similar for the weighted loading 
case as well. The only notable difference is the importance of credit growth, through 
the M2 growth, for the financially healthier economies of our sample (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland and Germany). Once again, the critical effect of monetary and credit 
conditions are emphasized, together with the important role monetary policy can 
exercise in controlling the development of such conditions (since many of the most 
important indicators in this category can be directly affected by central bank policies). 
In the case of equity markets, it is clear cut the importance of stock returns, as 
a very important indicator of the financial stress there. In both cases of PCA analysis, 
they have some of the highest weights. Additionally, realized volatility is also 
important, in both cases. It is an interesting finding, since both indicators underline 
the volatile nature of equity markets, which usually work as instant propagators of 
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financial distress news and adverse expectations of the investors. On top of that, 
dividend yield has a significant contribution to the aggregate risk index. Once more, 
this is indication of the importance of firms’ fundamentals in shaping the level of 
financial stress in stock markets. EPS does not carry the expected positive sign, in the 
case of the first principal component. Nevertheless, this does not bear any serious 
concerns, since the weight attribute to this indicator is smaller, while such a sign issue 
is not existent in the case of weighted loadings. 
The last table of PCA loadings deals with the European bond markets. The 
common variability explained, in the first case, ranges from 37.3% for Spain to 53.8% 
in Finland, while the weighted loadings explain much more of it (on average 86%). In 
this market, we do not spot any unexpected signs, while the most important 
contributors to the stress indices are the sovereign bond spread, the realized volatility 
of the government bond yield and the corporate bond spread. The highest infliction to 
sovereign risk is found to Greece and Ireland, while most countries (with the 
exception of Germany and the surprising low value of Spain) sovereign spread 
heavily increases the relevant stress indices. Especially for the Spanish case, the 
puzzling sovereign spread result is offset by the government bond duration weight, 
which is another strong evidence of excessive uncertainty, investors’ negative outlook 
for the country’s sovereign prudence and an indication of flight to quality (the same 
holds for Greece as well, where the relevant weight is also big). A similar behaviour 
can be detected in the case of weighted loadings and the weights of the realized 
correlation with the German governmental bond. Especially for the Greek case, the 
importance of this factor is strong in both cases of PCA analysis, while for other 
countries is not. 
The inspection of the rest of the FSI graphs in the appendix verifies the 
previous discussion on the weights ascribed to each one of the single indicators. As 
already mentioned, the second and third FSI graph for each country represent the 
stress indices calculated, using the first principal component and the weighted 
loadings approach, respectively. Beginning from Austria, the only notable period of 
high financial stress is the period of Lehman Brothers collapse, during the third 
quarter of 2008. This is the peak for the financial stress in most Eurozone countries, 
with the exception of the economies under austerity programmes. The Austrian case is 
rather tranquil, with the financial stress decreasing fast after the aforementioned 
incident. The following period is characterized by mild financial conditions, with only 
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an upward trend towards the end of the sample period. Regarding the stress 
composition, all sectors contribute to the level of financial stress, with bond, equity 
and banking sector being the most prolific ones before 2010. Later on, only bond-born 
stress leads to the relevant peaks of the Austrian systemic risk. Belgium’s case is 
similar to Austria, only this time the banking sector stress is much stronger during the 
whole period examined. Nevertheless, the overall stress index for the case of this 
country is relevant lower than Austria’s, especially in the last two years of our sample. 
A somehow different picture is the one for Finland, where money market was the 
major contributor to country’s stress index, until the index’s climax in 2008. Since 
then, the role of the banking sector, along with the equity (initially) and the bond 
market lately is underlined. In the case of weighted loading index, the banks’ effect 
remains throughout the end of the sample period. In this case, as well as the French 
case, there is another strong peak of the level of stress index on May 2010, date where 
the decision of the Greek government for filing a bail out application was taken. It is 
also interesting to note the culmination of sovereign risk in France, both in the latter 
case as well as at the second quarter of 2011 (with gradual financial stress increase 
since late 2010, when the Irish crisis reached its peak). Here, banks’ stress prevails in 
the formation of the overall systemic risk index, while there is strong evidence of the 
French economy’s vulnerability due to the events taking place in the peripheral 
countries. The German case is rather different, with level of financial stress remaining 
in low level, except the cases previously discussed. In the peak of the index, the 
banking sector contribution and the liquidity conditions (as expressed from the money 
market index) are the major sectors leading the economy’s systemic risk. Greek and 
Irish stress indices perform similarly, with both having very low values up until 2008. 
As expected, both are very responsive to the global crisis apogee in September 2008 
(with their indices climbing up from the beginning of that year). For the Greek 
economy, the most important event is, of course, the adoption of the austerity measure 
package, while the index remains elevated for the whole period thereafter. It is a fully-
blown crisis, stemming from all financial sectors of the economy with the sovereign 
risk leading the stress index in the case of May 2010 peak of the index. Subsequently, 
the sovereign risk remains a crucial issue, while the liquidity and credit conditions, as 
propagated through the money market index, is also important. Surprisingly, while the 
banking sector has a significant effect on the systemic risk, it gradually fades away 
into negative values for this sector index. This holds, up to a certain degree, for 
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Ireland as well, where the money market index is very important as well. Based on the 
previous discussion, we can infer that the liquidity shortages and heightening credit 
risk are among the main driver of the crisis in these countries. These are mostly 
captured by the money market indices (representing interbank conditions and the 
overall credit creation and funding conditions for Euro Area banks). The banking 
indexes predominantly include bank specific and bank balance sheet data, depicting 
the conditions within the banks of the sample. The situation is rather opposite, in the 
case of Italy. Here, the banking sector dominates in the modulation of financial stress. 
It is mainly a banking led crisis, with the bond market risk to be very important as 
well. The Dutch stress index remained low during the Eurozone crisis, with only 
minor shafts in the periods where the Greek, Irish and Portuguese crisis accentuated. 
Then, Portugal stress index has an evolution, similar to Greece and Ireland. The 
effects on the systemic risk of this economy from the Greek and Irish bail outs are 
evident from the graphs, with the indexes reaching their top values at the end of the 
sample, which is the period where Portugal requested financial assistance. Again, it is 
a multifaceted crisis, mostly driven by sovereign risk concerns, along with money and 
equity markets excessive distress levels. The Spanish case is, as the Italian one, 
considered as a major banking led crisis, since the banking sector index and the 
money market index formulate the aggregate financial stress. While the bond market 
importance is strong enough during the whole crisis period, it is more important in the 
first two years of the crisis outbreak (from 2008 until 2010). 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
 
In this section, we proceed to a more systematic analysis of the 
interconnections and the level of transmission of systemic stress from one country of 
the Eurozone to the others. In order to do this, a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
is employed, which includes the financial stress indexes of the eleven Euro Area 
countries under examination. As a result, a model with eleven equations is used, the 
lags of which were chosen according to the usual well-known criteria83. Based on the 
different specifications, the residuals normality and autocorrelation tests, the model 
                                                 
83 AIC, SIC, HQ criteria. 
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chosen to be presented is a VAR(1) model84. In what follows, the discussion is based 
on the impulse responses estimated from these Euro-wide models for, both, the 
aggregate financial stress indices, as well as those for the banking sector, the money, 
equity and bond markets. Moreover, a country-specific analysis is provided, where we 
examine the effects of financial stress shocks taken place within each one of the 
eleven economies studies here. Finally, extra empirical evidence is provided in the 
last subsection of this subchapter, in order to strengthen the validity of our inference. 
The additional evidence is based on an alternative specification for the estimation of 
the impulse response functions, the so-called generalized impulse response functions. 
Additionally, a number of block exogeneity tests are performed, while additional 
VAR models are estimated and their impulse responses reported. The latter use the 
financial stress indexes, produced with the PCA analysis.  
As it is clear, the main block of analysis is built upon the equally weighted 
stress indices. This is partly dictated by the stationarity tests conducted to the series of 
our sample. Table 3.2 present the results of the augmented Dickey – Fuller test. The 
results clearly show that the equally weighted stress indices are all stationary, while 
there is a mixture of I(0) and I(1) series in the other two sets of indexes. Hence, we 
proceed in our empirical investigation, using the variance-equal financial stress 
indices in our baseline model. On the other hand, the PCA-based stress indices are 
used in additional VAR models, where the first differences for all the financial stress 
indicators are used. This transformation is necessary, in order to avoid any stationarity 
issues, while on the same time all series are uniform (both in terms of non-existence 
of unit roots, as well as the transformation applied to all of them). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 In the case of money market, a VAR(2) specification is used. 
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Table 3.2: ADF Test Results 
 
 
 
5.1 Euro – Wide VARS 
 
The following graphs represent the impulse responses of the baseline model, 
where the effects of a financial shock in each one of the countries we examine are 
depicted. In the first set of impulse response plots, the aggregate country financial 
stress indices shocks are discussed, while the other four examine the cases of banking 
sector, money, equity and bond markets respectively. Since these are large systems of 
equations and the ensuing produced graphs are 121 in each case, we provide tables 
that succinctly summarize the effects of each one of the financial stress shocks to the 
Euro Area countries and markets respectively. 
We begin our analysis with the country level financial stress indices. The 
impulse responses results are depicted in graph 3.2 and tables 3.3.A and 3.3.B. In all 
Stress Indicator Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Bank -2.46** -2.71*** -2.37** -1.53* -3.92*** -3.66** -3.06*** -1.52* -2.18** -3.49*** -2.35**
Money -3.18*** -4.94*** -1.67* -5.02*** -4.39*** -2.68*** -2.31** -2.54** -5.04*** -1.92* -6.72***
Equity -2.13** -4.73*** -3.11*** -2.02** -1.75* -3.41*** -3.07*** -6.37*** -3.52*** -1.95** -5.33***
Bond -3.54** -2.38** -3.59** -4.65*** -4.66*** -5.95*** -7.53*** -3.86*** -3.81** -5.76*** -1.75*
Country -4.13*** -1.67* -2.47** -3.96** -1.96** -5.69*** -4.27*** -4.02*** -3.6*** -4.43*** -3.45***
Bank -2.22** -1.26 -1.34* -1.49 -2.01** -2.29** -3.12* -1.45 -0.72 -4.51*** -1.62*
Money -1.80* -1.12 -1.65* -1.93* -1.75* -3.52** 0.76 0.14 -1.84* 2.09 -0.47
Equity -2.02** -2.71*** -2.75*** -3.24*** -4.07*** -1.91* -3.049*** -2.76*** -3.73*** -3.29*** -4.05**
Bond -1.90* -2.24** -1.41* -1.93** -2.24** -1.49 -3.78** -3.16* -1.85* -1.42 -0.44
Country -2.09** -1.84* -2.05** -1.70* -2.03** -1.41 -1.70* -1.98** -2.13** -1.25 -1.34
Bank -2.84*** -1.31 -4.45*** -1.15 -1.81* -2.96*** -2.53** -3.46** -0.77 -4.34*** -1.74*
Money -1.5 -1.86* -1.73* -1.79* -1.7* -2.07** 0.19 -0.43 -1.61* 0.48 -0.67
Equity -2.31** -4.51*** -1.91** -3.12*** -2.93** -3.23*** -2.95*** -4.18*** -3.79*** -4.71*** -5.12***
Bond -2.25** -2.39** -4.28*** -4.13*** -5.29*** -4.05*** -6.60*** -1.14 -2.29** -4.64*** -2.00**
Country -2.36** -2.51** -1.13* -1.55 -2.37** -2.61*** -2.69*** -3.80** -2.74*** -3.86** -3.28**
Note: Series in levels. Number of lags was chosen based on Schwartz Information Criterion, with maximu number considered = 12.  *, ** and *** denote rejection of null
hypothesis of unit root existence at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. For Finland's FSI in panel C, stationarity is confirmed by Phillips - Perron test.
Unit Root Testing for Financial Stress Indexes
Panel A: Equally Weighted
Panel B: First Component
Panel C: Weighted Loadings
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cases, we first present the impulse responses for the most heavily hit economies from 
the current crisis, in order to assess their potential effects on the rest of the Euro Area 
countries and markets. For the sake of clarity, we use specific narrative terminology 
for characterizing the financial stress shocks effects between the examining variables. 
In cases where there is no substantial effect, we put the word “negligible” in the 
tables. Whenever there is a minor response that does not have a lasting effect, we call 
it “slightly positive” or “slightly negative”, depending on the magnitude of the 
relevant reaction. Finally, “negative” or “positive” are the outcomes of a persistent 
negative or positive reaction to a specific shock in the VAR system, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.3.A: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
The results offer some quite interesting and intriguing illustrations for the 
Eurozone crisis. First of all, it seems that, in all cases, countries are mostly responsive 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
‐‐‐
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
‐‐‐
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
positive slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
Effects of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 1 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
negative
negative ‐ minor
negative
negative
negligible
negative
negative ‐ minor
negligible negligible negative ‐ minor
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
‐‐‐ slightly positive ‐ minornegligible
‐‐‐
slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
negligible
negligible
Greece Portugal
negligible
negative ‐ minor
‐‐‐
ItalySpain Ireland
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
Note: This  is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible
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to their own financial shocks. With the exceptions of Finland, Belgium, Italy and 
Greece, the excessive financial stress soon returns to its prior levels. In case of 
Greece, the effect lasts for almost a year after the initial shock, while Finland’s one is 
even more persistent. Additionally, some degree of regionalism is apparent in the 
results. According to the impulse responses, the peripheral debt-ridden countries are 
more responsive to the increasing financial stress of the same countries, while the 
similar effect is sketched for the major Euro Area countries, notably Germany, 
France, Netherlands and Finland. This implies the existence of disparities in the way 
that financial shocks reflect on the union’s member countries, while it can be also an 
indication to ECB for adoption of different policies in countries that face divergent 
financial and economic deterioration. 
 
 
Table 3.3.B: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
Another important finding, which appears to contradict the mainstream view 
on the current crisis, is the minor effect that increasing financial stress in Greece and 
Portugal seem to have to the rest of the Eurozone countries. According to the impulse 
response graphs above, there is no evidence of transmission of heightening financial 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
negligible negligible positive negative
negligible negligiblenegligible
France
‐‐‐ negligible positive negligible
negative
negligible negligible ‐‐‐
negligible
Austria Belgium NetherlandsFinland
negligiblepositive
negligible
Germany
negligible
‐‐‐
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible negligible
negligiblenegativenegligible
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
negligiblenegligible
negligible negligible negligible negative
negligible
negligible positive
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible ‐‐‐
Note: This  is  a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
Effects of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 2 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
negligible
negligiblepositivenegligiblenegligible
positive
negligible
negative
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
‐‐‐positive
‐‐‐
153 
 
risk from these troubled countries to the rest. On the other hand, the Italian financial 
upheaval has some effect on most countries, although not always in the expected way 
(negative effect on the level of financial stress). In any case, the previously mentioned 
finding, for the minor role of Greece and Portugal in the crisis transmission is 
concurrent to a recent piece of research by Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Johnson 
(forthcoming). In this work, the authors emphasize the fact that, according to their 
stochastic volatility model, most of the sovereign risk associated with the current 
Eurozone countries is country specific, while they could not provide any hard 
evidence to blame Greece or Portugal as major channels of crisis contagion to the rest 
of the Euro Area. In the same line of thought, Giordano et al. (2013) examine whether 
the excessive sovereign spreads of Euro Area countries with respect to Germany can 
be attributed to country-specific deteriorating fundamentals (wake-up call contagion) 
or to irrational and herding behaviour by the markets (pure contagion). Again, the 
authors find no evidence of pure contagion between the Eurozone economies. In fact, 
the Greek crisis outbreak turned the investors’ interest towards the existence or not of 
sound macroeconomic fundamentals, which they did not take into account prior to 
2009. These are very interesting results, validating the outcome of our empirical 
investigation. On the other hand, their work is confined to the study of sovereign risk 
channels, while our framework incorporate multiple potential channels of risk 
transmission. 
The following two tables and the respective impulse responses figure describe 
the situation prevailing in the banking sectors of EMU countries. Some interesting 
findings can be underlined here. Once again, there is no strong evidence in favour of 
stress transmission from the periphery to the core economies. In fact, Greece and 
Portugal negatively affect German banking stress index, while only the Italian case 
aggravate the financial stress in Belgian and French banking sectors. On top of that, 
Italy has a clear positive effect on the stress level for some of the peripheral 
economies, namely Ireland and Portugal. On the other hand, the stress transmission 
between the core Euro Area banks are much stronger, as it can be seen from table 
3.4.B. France is the weakest link here, since its banking stress leads to deteriorating 
banking conditions in Germany, Belgium and Netherlands. Germany has also some 
negative repercussions to Finland and Belgium. Finally, Italy is also a risk channel for 
Portugal and Ireland. 
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Table 3.4.A: Summary of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
Table 3.4.B: Summary of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Greece Portugal Spain Ireland Italy
Effects of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 1 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
negligible negligible negligible
negligible
negligible negligible
negative
negligible negligible negligible negative
negligible negligible positivenegligible
negligible negligible
slightly negative ‐ minor negligible positive
negligible
‐‐‐ negative
negligible negative ‐‐‐ positive
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negative
negative
negligible negligible
negative
negligible
negligible negligible ‐‐‐negligible slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor
Note: This  is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
negligible negligible
slightly negative ‐ minor negligible positive
negligible
negligible ‐‐‐
negative ‐‐‐
negligible negativenegligible
negligible
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
NetherlandsAustria Belgium Finland France Germany
negligible‐‐‐ negligible negligible negative slightly positive ‐ minor
negative ‐‐‐ negligible positive positive ‐ negative negligible
negligible negligible ‐‐‐ negligible positive negligible
negligible negligible ‐‐‐
negligible negligible negligible positive ‐‐‐ negligible
slightly negative ‐ minor negligible
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible positive negligible
negligible negligiblenegligible negligible negligible negligible
Note: This  is  a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible
negligible negligible
Effects of Banking Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 2 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
‐‐‐
negligible negligible negligible negligible
slightly positive ‐ minor negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible
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The situation does not differ, in the case of the money market VAR model. 
Even though the evidence is not as strong as in the latter cases, again there is no link 
established between crisis-wiped economies and the others. Greece, as well as Spain 
and Portugal do not have any excessive risk effect to the rest of the EMU countries. In 
general, only minor segregated effects can be traced between the money markets of 
the monetary union. With this term, we mean transmission effects between the 
peripheral countries and between the major Euro economies. 
 
 
Table 3.5.A: Summary of Money Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Ireland ItalyGreece Portugal Spain
Effects of Money Market Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 1 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor ‐‐‐
negligible ‐‐‐ negligible
‐‐‐
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
‐‐‐ negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negligible
‐‐‐ slightly positive ‐ minor negligible
negligible negligiblenegligible negligible
negligible positive
Note: This  is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
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Table 3.5.B: Summary of Money Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
Turning now to the case of equity markets stress, we see that Ireland has a 
more significant role, compared to the rest of the PIIGS group of countries. The 
stronger link appears to be the one towards Greece and Germany, while more weak 
transmission of financial stress exists towards another group of core countries 
(Austria, Belgium and Finland). On the other hand, Italy exhibits a slightly negative 
effect on the stress level for most of the countries in the sample. Nevertheless, it is not 
a sustainable or strong enough channel of negative financial stress evolution. In the 
case of the group of the robust Euro economies, Belgium’s increasing financial stress 
empowers systemic risk into Austria, Finland and Germany. Greece seems also to be 
affected, while France equity market stress positively leads the Greek and Irish 
markets as well. This is another strong evidence of the interconnections and the 
vulnerability of French markets with the crisis hit economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Germany Netherlands
Effects of Money Market Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 2 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
Austria Belgium Finland France
negligible negligible‐‐‐ negligible negligible negligible
negligible ‐‐‐ negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible negligible ‐‐‐ negligible
negligible positive negligible ‐‐‐ negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negligible negligible
negligible negligible
negligible
‐‐‐ positive
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible slightly negative ‐ minor negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible ‐‐‐negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligiblenegligible negligible
Note: This  is  a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
negligible negligible
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Table 3.6.A: Summary of Equity Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
Table 3.6.B: Summary of Equity Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Effects of Equity Markets Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 1 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
Spain Ireland ItalyGreece Portugal
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negative
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negative
negligible negligible positive slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible positive slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor ‐‐‐
negligible ‐‐‐ slightly negative ‐ minor
‐‐‐
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
‐‐‐ negligible slightly positive ‐ minor slightly negative ‐ minor
‐‐‐ negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor slightly negative ‐ minornegligible negligible
negligible negligible
Note: This  is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Finland France
Effects of Equity Markets Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 2 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
Germany NetherlandsAustria Belgium
negligible negligible‐‐‐ positive negligible negligible
negligible ‐‐‐ negligible negligible negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible
negligible
negligible positive ‐‐‐ negligible
negligible negligible negligible ‐‐‐ negligible
negligible positive negligible negligible
negligible positive negligible positive negative
negligible negligible
negligible
‐‐‐ negligible
negligible negligible negligible positive
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible ‐‐‐negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligiblenegligible negligible
Note: This  is  a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
negligible negligible
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Table 3.7.A: Summary of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
The last financial market we empirically examine is the most debated one in 
the current financial crisis. It is the bond market, where most economists have focused 
into the examination of the ensuing sovereign risks emanated in the last four years. 
Figure 3.6, along with tables 3.7.A and 3.7.B depict the financial stress conditions of 
these markets. As emphasized in the initial discussion of the country-level systemic 
risk indexes, there is clear cut evidence of sovereign risk transmission from specific 
peripheral countries and not all of them. In more details, Spain’s excessive bond stress 
is positively transmitted to most of the EMU countries (Greece is an exception, while 
Ireland’s market stress decreases). Additionally, Portugal has only a mild and non 
persistent effect on a few of the core Eurozone economies (Austria, Belgium and 
Finland). Despite the previous, there is no further evidence of sovereign risk 
transmission from other peripheral economies to the Northern European countries. 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Effects of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 1 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
Spain Ireland ItalyGreece Portugal
negligible
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor
slightly positive ‐ minor positive negligible negligible
positive negligible negligible
negligible
negligible slightly positive ‐ minor
negligible positive negligible negligible
positive negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
positive negligible negligible
negligible
negligible negligible
negligible positive negligible ‐‐‐
negative ‐‐‐ negligible
‐‐‐
negligible negligible
negligible
positive negligible negligiblenegligible negligible
negligible
negligible negligiblenegligible negligible
Note: This  is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
‐‐‐ positivenegligible
‐‐‐
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Table 3.7.B: Summary of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the inspection of table 3.7.B with the responses to the 
shocks stemming from the core Eurozone economies provides some further useful 
insights. First, as reasonably expected, there is no risk transmission from these 
countries to the weaker economies of the monetary union. Then, an interesting 
bidirectional channel of negative stress transmission between Germany and France is 
spotted. As the two biggest economies in the Euro Area, it seems that their bond 
markets are interconnected, with any negative outlook or expectations for one of them 
to positively reflect to the other market. Another innovative finding here is the role of 
Finland as propagator of bond stress to the rest of the Eurozone economies. Here, the 
impulse response analysis indicate a strong and positive reaction of Austrian, Belgian, 
French and Dutch bond markets to increasing Finnish stress. Interestingly, the same 
holds for Spain as well, up to a certain degree. Nonetheless, these findings shed new 
light to the strongly debated issue of whether peripheral countries, especially Greece 
and Portugal, bear the burden of the exacerbation of Eurozone crisis. As it is apparent 
from our analysis, in all these markets and economies there exist some channels of 
interconnection between these economies but not exactly these propagandized before. 
 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Finland France
Effects of Bond Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries ‐ 2 (FSI ‐ 1 case)
Germany NetherlandsAustria Belgium
negligible negligible‐‐‐ negligible positive negligible
negligible ‐‐‐ positive negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible negligible ‐‐‐ negligible
negligible negligible positive ‐‐‐ slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible negligible negligible slightly negative ‐ minor
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible
negligible
‐‐‐ negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible
negligible ‐‐‐negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negligible
negligible negligible
Note: This  is  a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance ‐ equal financial stress indices  are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
negligible negligible slightly positive ‐ minor negligible
negligible
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5.2 Country – Specific VARS 
 
In this section, a brief discussion of the country-specific VARS and, more 
specifically, of their impulse responses is provided. The relevant figures are presented 
in the appendix of the chapter85. Aim of this section is the examination of any 
potentially strong interrelations between the different markets within each economy 
and the inference on their effect to their relevant financial stress. 
As a first general comment, it is evident the very strong and positive, 
persistent response of most stress indices to their own shock. In particular, the 
banking and bond stress indices exhibit such behaviour for a wide number of 
countries, including Austria, France, Spain, Greece and Italy (the last three for the 
banking sector index only). Especially for Spain, its banking index remains elevated 
and do not converge by the end of the estimation window (even though it has already 
started to decay). In many cases, there is a positive feedback effect of banking and 
bond stress levels. For instance, in Belgium, France, Germany and Greece there is a 
positive response of bond index to a sudden increase to banking stress index. On the 
other hand, the Austrian case is distinctive, since we observe a negative bidirectional 
effect between the two aforementioned markets. In Finland, the bond market’s sudden 
increase of stress leads to a positive reaction of the equity stress index, while the 
banking stress increase has a positive effect on the equity market in Greece. Finally, 
for Portugal, the banking sector is positively related to an equity market effect, while 
for Ireland and Netherlands no particular interconnections are established. 
 
5.3 Further Evidence and Robustness Checks 
 
In order to examine our results resilience, we provide further evidence in 
favour of our baseline model results. Such evidence is provided in three ways. First, 
an alternative specification for the estimation of the relevant impulse response 
functions is provided. This is the generalized version of impulse responses and it is 
discussed in the following section. Then, block exogeneity tests are also presented. 
These are multivariate version of the Granger causality test, as already analysed in the 
methodological part of this chapter. Finally, our VAR models are re-estimated, using 
                                                 
85 They are the graphs labeled A.34 to A.44. 
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the PCA-induced financial stress indices. Since there are stationarity issues, the 
indexes are used in their first differences, so that the systems’ stability can be 
safeguarded. We should note that these models are only estimated for the Euro-wide 
case. 
 
5.3.1 Generalized Impulse Responses 
 
Generalized impulse response analysis was proposed by Koop et al. (1996) 
and Pesaran and Shin (1998), as an alternative to shocks’ orthogonalization, proposed 
by Sims (1980). In this respect, there is no need to apply any judgemental decision on 
the variables ordering. The produced shocks are invariant to ordering and the outcome 
is robust. The generalized impulse responses were estimated for the five major cases 
discussed with the baseline model. In other words, there are five sets of graphs, one 
for the aggregate financial stress indices and their relevant shocks and four for the 
markets under scrutiny (banking, money, equity and bond markets). Inspecting the 
relevant plots, one can concur on their unanimity with the initial impulse response 
analysis. There exist some minor discrepancies on the banking indexes figures as well 
as on the national indexes. Nevertheless, most of them are negligible, in the sense that 
the numerical values of the reactions to the shocks are quite small or dies out 
relatively fast in time. 
 
5.3.2 Block Exogeneity Tests 
 
Additional evidence is provided by the examination of the results of the block 
exogeneity tests. The relevant tables follow the generalized impulse responses figures 
in the appendix of this chapter. In these tables, the respective p-values, indicating the 
statistical significance of the potential causal relationship between the variables under 
examination, are reported. The hypothesis tested is whether the financial stress of 
each country reported in every row (or country’s market in the case of the sectoral 
stress indices) does not Granger cause the level of financial stress for each country or 
market depicted on every column. 
The results confirm the previous discussion, on the lack of extensive and 
sustainable channels of crisis transmission from peripheral to core Euro Area 
countries, along with the special cases (in terms of specific markets interrelations) 
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indicated above. In the case of country-level financial stress indices, Finland provides 
a surprising result. According to this test, there is a unidirectional causal relationship 
with most of the countries in the sample, except Italy where the relationship becomes 
bidirectional. There is no obvious explanation for this outcome, especially since it 
does not manifest itself again in any of the other cases examined. Once more, the 
North Europe’s countries seem to have some causal effect to each other, while Spain’s 
aggregate systemic risk has a unidirectional effect to core countries and Italy. In the 
case of banking sectors, the regionalism is again evident, with most economies to 
interrelate with their respective group (North or South). Apart from this, Greece and 
Ireland provide some indications of causality to Germany, France and Belgium, while 
Spain and Italy do not. Money markets follow the pattern already described (in terms 
of the existence of causal relationships), while the equity markets of Italy and Ireland 
have statistically causal effects to the rest of the Eurozone economies. Finally, in the 
case of bond markets, countries’ grouping is evident again, with the biggest 
economies appearing to have causal effect to each other86. Moreover, Spain is proved 
to be the main propagator of sovereign risk to the rest of the EMU. 
 
5.3.3 VARS with PCA-based Financial Stress Indexes 
 
The final group of figures in the appendix presents the generalized impulse 
responses for the VAR models estimated using the PCA-based financial stress indices 
as endogenous variables. As mentioned above, the first differences of these indices 
are taken, due to the existence of unit roots for a number of these aggregate systemic 
risk indicators. Based on the generalized version of the impulses presented, it is fair to 
say that there is not any contradictory evidence to what has already been established. 
Of course, we should mention here that differencing the series is not the most efficient 
way to deal with a dataset. It cannot be avoided in the present case, though. 
Nevertheless, it is not the type of series used before and it is necessary to affront these 
results with caution. In any case, the least that can be mentioned here is that there is 
no any noteworthy difference in the discussion we offered already, due to the outcome 
of these impulse responses. 
 
                                                 
86 The same holds for the rest, especially Spain and Portugal. Greece and Ireland do not provide 
statistically significant causal effects. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Aim of this chapter is the empirical study of the Eurozone crisis and the 
investigation of its multifaceted nature. There is a strong debated going on, regarding 
the nature of this crisis. The major focus is to the potential channels of risk 
transmission to countries and markets and, of course, the creation and implementation 
of tools that will be able to work as early warning systems of future financial 
catastrophes. Especially for the monetary authorities around the world, one of the 
biggest challenges they face lately is the development of robust macro-prudential 
framework, which can render them able to react as early as possible to forthcoming 
financial distresses. Since most of the studies until now have tried to examine the 
conditions of the sovereign and, sometimes, banking risks, we decided to implement a 
set of innovative tools, in order to measure Euro Area’s financial stress. These are the 
financial stress indexes, which are aggregate systemic risk metrics, able to provide 
clear cut evidence for the current state of the financial system. On top of that, we 
move one step further from current literature by incorporating a very large set of data 
to the development of our indices. For instance, for the case of banking stress 
measurement, we use both market level data, together with a rich set of balance sheet 
data for a wide number of European banks. In our knowledge, this is the first time 
such type of data is used to the construction of systemic risk metrics. Moreover, we 
provide both market-specific stress indices, for banking (as already mentioned), 
money, equity and bond markets and country-specific indices for the eleven initial 
members of the Euro Area (except Luxembourg). Again, this is the first research work 
providing such detailed, in terms of the number of countries and the decomposition of 
the analysis to a wide number of markets, analysis of financial stress in Eurozone 
economies. 
In the first part of our analysis, we provide a narrative of the Eurozone crisis, 
based on the performance of our financial stress indicators. Regarding them, we create 
three sets of them, each one with a different aggregation approach: the variance – 
equal and two PCA-based (the first taking the weights from the first principal 
component, the second using the so called weighted loadings methodology). Here, 
one of the most important findings is the great importance of credit and liquidity 
indicators and conditions in the formation of the financial stress. Moreover, an initial 
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picture of the varying performance of the markets, towards financial stress, is 
provided through the graphs and their discussion. 
The second stage of our work emphasizes the role and importance of 
economies’ interrelations. We incorporate our indices, representing a wide number of 
financial risks, into VAR models. Using impulse response functions, we achieve to 
dwell in the analysis of the potential risk transmission channels. VARS are employed 
for Euro-wide analysis and country-specific one. Many important inferences are made 
here, the most crucial one being the lack of systematic and consistent risk 
transmission to Eurozone economies by the debt ridden countries. Especially for the 
case of Greece and Portugal, there is not any strong empirical evidence, able to justify 
the accusations of being propagators of any type of risk (sovereign or not). On the 
other hand, it seems that Spain’s bond market financial stress agitates core Eurozone 
countries level of stress in these markets. It is also important to emphasize the degree 
of segregation that exists in the Euro Area. Results show that countries react to 
financial stress innovations, mostly, as “clubs” of North or core Eurozone economies 
and peripheral ones. This is an interesting finding that can be useful for the 
implementation of macroeconomic, monetary and stabilization policies from the 
governments and central banks (Constancio, 2012). Additionally, positive feedback 
loops between bond stress and banking stress levels are traced, indicating the strong 
interdependencies between sovereigns and banking institutions. Such evidence 
complements recent calls for the development of pan-European or Eurozone-wide 
monitoring and regulatory bodies (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). A number of 
robustness checks have been successfully implemented in order to verify the validity 
of these results. 
Further empirical work on transmission channels of contagion within the 
European markets should be done. One aspect of this that is still to be studied is the 
existence of such channels, not only within each type of market, but also cross-
sectional. This would enrich our understanding of the way the current crisis works its 
way through Europe and its economies. Such empirical investigation, under a 
different type of models, even more acute for volatility issues, is provided to the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
  
169 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Volatility Co-movements and Spillover Effects within the 
Eurozone Economies: A Multivariate GARCH Approach 
using the Financial Stress Index 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Aim of this chapter is the deeper empirical investigation of potential cross-
covariances and spillover effects between the Eurozone economies and financial 
markets. There is a growing interest in the relevant literature, stimulated by the recent 
financial and sovereign crisis in this monetary union. Our work is innovative, in 
certain aspects. Focusing on the analysis of volatility comovements and spillovers, we 
employ financial stress indexes, as systemic risk metrics in our model. In order to 
provide a more accurate and complete picture of the financial conditions within the 
Eurozone, we construct such systemic risk indices for the first eleven Euro Area 
members. Additionally, extra indices for the four most important financial markets 
(namely, banking, money, equity and bond markets) are also provided. Given the 
series nature, we decide to employ a multivariate GARCH framework, which is able 
to capture markets’ dependencies and volatility spillovers. Thus, a full GARCH-
BEKK model is estimated, both on a market (or country) wide level and, then, one 
with the full spectrum of Euro Area markets. In other words, we complete an 
empirical examination, both “within” and “between” Eurozone economies and 
markets. The results reveal a number of interesting insights: on country wide level, 
there is strong volatility transmission channel from the most heavily hit, from the 
crisis, economies towards the rest. Additionally, the crucial importance and role on 
this transmission from the banking and bond markets is underlined. Contrary to 
common wisdom, Greece is not the main propagator of volatility uncertainty, while it 
is between the most important receivers of volatility risk. The same holds for other 
peripheral economies, while the importance of money market is also evident in the 
large, “between”, empirical approach. Overall, this work provides further insights to 
the ongoing debate, regarding the volatility comovements and financial stress 
spillovers within the EMU economies. 
 
JEL Classifications: C43, C58, G01, G15 
 
Keywords: Financial Crisis, Volatility Spillover Effects, Systemic Risk, GARGH-
BEKK model 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Unquestionably, the recent financial and sovereign crisis outbreak, within the 
Euro Area countries, is one of the most important economic events of the last decade. 
It creates an unprecedented reaction, in terms of non conventional monetary and fiscal 
policies, from the side of the global and local policy makers. The main reason for 
them to proceed to such a large scale bail out programs, for financial institutions as 
well as for a number of heavily indebted countries, indicate the heightening 
uncertainty for the already identified financial, fiscal and real economic meltdown, 
together with the uncertainty for even worse future conditions. Furthermore, the lack 
of a consistent and supra-national macroprudential and crisis mitigating framework, 
leads to even more intensive uncertainty. 
Bearing all the above in mind and, given the lack of conclusive and clear cut 
evidence for the potential risk transmission channels within the Eurozone economies, 
we aim to shed further light in the issue of volatility comovement and spillover effects 
among the EMU countries. In contrast to the existing literature, we move beyond the 
usual focus on sovereign and, sometimes, banking risk channels. Instead, we try to 
investigate a full set of potential volatility transmission channels, by implementing a 
number of financial stress indices for a wide group of financial markets. 
Until now, most researchers have focused on the sovereign risk and the 
relevant contagion issues, arising from it. In this paper, we proceed one step further. 
Instead of focusing only to CDS spreads or governmental bond yields, to unveil the 
risk of sovereign default, we employ the aforementioned stress indices, in order to 
provide a more conclusive picture of the risk transmission channels from one country 
and market to another. In order to do this, a number of multivariate GARCH-BEKK 
model are being employed, where the returns of financial stress indices for the 
Eurozone countries are incorporated. The empirical work is conducted into two 
directions: “within” each one of the sectors we produce financial stress indexes for 
(banking sector, money market, equity and bond market) and “between” all of the 
above markets and countries. The outcome of the empirical investigation reveals some 
innovative and very interesting features for the links of the Eurozone economies. 
We extend the relevant economic research in several respects. First of all, the 
employment of financial stress indices, within the specified analytical and theoretical 
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framework, takes place for the first time. Moreover, the estimation of multivariate 
GARCH model for this kind of analysis is rather neglected. Also, it is the first time 
that such a detailed, in terms of the number of countries and markets examined, 
empirical investigation is conducted. Another important innovation in our work is the 
cross market analysis of spillover effects, since the relevant research has focused to 
specific markets only, until now. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, a section where we discuss 
some important papers examining the volatility spillovers or contagion issues, due to 
the Eurozone crisis, is provided. Thereafter, a description of our financial stress 
indices and their components, along with the aggregation method, is presented. 
Moreover, the GARCH-BEKK modeling approach is analyzed. Section 4 is where the 
estimations outcome is discussed, for both the market level and the cross market 
cases. The last part of this chapter recaps, underline the results of our econometric 
work and suggests further extensions in this literature. 
 
 
2. Eurozone Crisis and Modeling of Spillover Effects 
 
 
There is a growing part of the literature, dealing with the empirical modeling 
of Eurozone crisis contagion and spillover effects. A number of econometric 
techniques have been used, including multivariate GARCH models. In any case, as it 
is already stated above, most researchers have solely analyzed potential crisis 
transmission channels of sovereign risk. A few of them take into account the role and 
effects of the banking sector of Euro Area. Nevertheless, the research on the Eurozone 
crisis and the potential interconnections of these economies is expected to endure for 
the following years. In this section, we discus some important pieces of research, 
mostly related to the current EMU financial crisis. In some cases, we also include 
papers that do not directly cope with the aforementioned event, but they present 
interesting aspects and analytical contributions in the crisis spillovers literature. It 
should also be noted that, at least in our knowledge, there is still no use of financial 
stress indices in this strand of literature. This is another strong motivation for 
implementing our modeling framework by using such successful (in terms of 
signaling forthcoming crises, as well as macroprudential tools) aggregate systemic 
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risk indicators. Moreover, it should be stressed that the literature presentation is based, 
mainly, on the econometric methodologies used, in order to summarize papers into 
distinctive groups. Finally, this short overview should not be considered as 
exhaustive. 
Using factor models and panel regression analysis, Bruyckere et al. (2013) 
examine the existence of contagion channels between the sovereigns and the banking 
markets of fifteen EU countries. In their model, the authors use CDS spreads for a 
number of sovereigns and banks, covering the period from 2007 to 2012. They decide 
to depict contagion as the excess correlation among the aforementioned, measured as 
the degree of correlation that cannot be explained by the economies fundamentals. In 
order to achieve this data refinement, they regress the CDS spreads returns into a 
number of factors, as follows: 
 
 , 1 2 3 4 ,i t t t t t i tCDS c Market Itraxx Vstoxx Term            (4.1) 
 
where Market is a total EU stock market index, Itraxx represents a pan-European 
CDS index, Vstoxx is the well known VSTOXX index and, finally, Term is the yield 
curve for each one of the countries involved. Then, they employ a fixed effect panel 
regression, in order to examine the importance of a number of factors in the formation 
of the excess correlation. Their model is specified as: 
 
 , , 1 , , , , ,i j t i t z j t i j tCorr X        (4.2) 
 
The dependent variable is the excess correlation between a bank i and a country j at 
time t, X  a vector with bank specific measures (size, Tier 1 capital ratio, loan ratio, 
non-interest income/total revenues ratio). The final specification used by them is the 
one where the fixed effects are bank specific, while the explanatory variables are 
country specific (debt-to-GDP ratio, recapitalization, guarantees and asset relief 
measures, all as percentages of GDP). Based on their empirical work, the authors find 
evidence of bank and sovereign risk contagion. Especially since 2009, the contagion 
becomes more intensive, especially between domestic banks and their countries. This 
fact is even more evident for the case of peripheral economies. Regarding the 
measures affecting excess correlation, it is found that capital adequacy and the level 
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of short-term funding are important, for the case of banks CDS spreads. On the other 
hand, the debt-to-GDP ratio is an important determinant for the countries CDS 
spreads. Another paper investigating the banking – sovereign risk nexus is the one by 
Barth et al. (2012). In this case, the authors study 44 large banks and 13 countries, not 
all of them being part of EU or Euro Area87. Their model is based on OLS 
regressions, where the regressand is the changes of sovereign CDS spreads and the 
explanatory variables consist of dummies, representing the European debt crisis and 
the bailout periods for the banks in the sample. They also include country and banks 
dummy variables. Their main finding is the strong linkage between sovereign and 
banking risks, while this link varies according to the country or market scrutinized. 
For instance, the authors provide supportive evidence that those banks that are more 
heavily exposed to public debt from the GIIPS are more prone to abrupt risk shifts. 
Additionally, higher bank – sovereign risk interdependencies exist for countries, in 
which the relative (towards the country’s GDP) banks assets are quite high. The 
question of whether the adoption of a common currency, like euro, can mitigate the 
sovereign risk premiums, Gabrisch et al. (2012) use a panel regression approach, in 
order to examine the influence of internal and external factors into the aforementioned 
variable. Their model’s specification is the following: 
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The dependent variable is the change of the sovereign bond spreads of the economies 
examined (vis-à-vis the German Bund) and the explanatory ones are real GDP growth, 
government spending-to-GDP, public debt over GDP, the TED spread, a financial 
crisis dummy and the exchange rate towards US dollar, respectively88. The sample 
period is 2001Q1 to 2012Q1 and the pooled least squares estimator is employed. 
According to this modelling approach, the peripheral euro countries are driven, 
mostly, by the real GDP growth, the government spending and the debt ratio, while 
the exchange rate is an important external factor. On the other hand, the euro 
candidate countries are mostly influenced by the rate of economic growth. A notable 
                                                 
87 Their sample consists of: Australia, China, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland, UK and US. 
88 The countries of the sample are the GIIPS ones, from the EU, while the euro candidates are Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
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finding here is that increasing government spending leads to lower sovereign risk 
spreads. This is in contrast to the following policies in Eurozone right now. 
A number of relevant recent studies have employed VAR models for the 
examination of sovereign risk transmission within the Euro Area. For instance, Alter 
and Schuler (2012) use unrestricted and cointegrated VAR models, in order to 
examine the credit risk interdependencies between a group of European countries and 
their banks. Their analysis is isolated into country level. That is, they do not take into 
account potential interactions between banks from different countries and the 
potential risk transmission from them abroad. Their dataset consists of CDS spreads 
(for both sovereign and banks), on daily frequency, covering the period from 1 June 
2007 to 31 May 2010. Having analyzed their sample in a pre- and post-state aid to 
banks, they find that (for most of the cases) the banks CDS spreads used to lead the 
sovereign ones, while the opposite holds for the period after the bail outs. Bruttin and 
Saure (2012) employ SVAR analysis of sovereign CDS for eleven Eurozone 
countries. Following the narrative approach, they extract a number of information 
shocks, related to the Greek sovereign state. They find that exposure to Greek 
sovereign debt and Greek banks assets are sources of intensive transmission of risk. 
On the other hand, Kohonen (2012) uses ten year government bond yield differentials 
for the PIIGS countries, into a similar SVAR framework89. Here, the author suggests 
that there was a default risk transmission from the Greek bonds, but only at the 
beginning of the crisis. Moreover, this was not the only risk channel within the 
countries under scrutiny, since relevant evidence for other countries (notably, 
Portugal) is also provided. A combined VAR-event studies approach is used by 
Arezki et al. (2011) in order to study the effects of sovereign rating news from rating 
agents on a number of financial markets and the sovereign CDS spreads. The markets 
examined are represented by the general stock index, insurance and bank sector stock 
indices, while the countries of the sample are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. The inclusion of impulse dummies (so 
as to capture the potential changes in the markets behavior due to rating changes) is 
the innovative factor into their VAR approach. Covering the period until 2010, the 
authors find a statistically significant role for sovereign downgrades, implying their 
importance on the potential outbreak of financial instability periods. Another 
                                                 
89 The PIIGS governmental bond differentials are calculated against the German long term government 
bond yield. 
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interesting point in their research is the systemic importance (in terms of increasing 
spillover effects) from the countries downgrades to near speculative grades (like in the 
case of Greece or Ireland). 
A recent extension in the VAR-based literature is the spillover index approach 
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Taking advantage of the generalized VAR framework, 
which is invariant to the variables ordering, the aforementioned authors develop a 
variance decomposition approach. This is based on the decomposition of the H-step 
ahead forecast error variance for the variables included in the system. In this way, the 
researchers are able to calculate the contribution of each variable’s i shocks to the 
forecast error variance of the variable j. It is a rather straightforward way to assess the 
level of volatility spillover among the variables of interest. As it would be expected, 
there is a recent interest in applying such a technique to the Euro Area financial crisis. 
For instance, Antonakakis and Vergos (2013) make an effort to assess the spillover 
effects of the sovereign bond yields with a number of European economies90. Using 
daily data from March 2007 until June 2012, the authors emphasize that own 
countries bond yields explain most of the forecast error variance. On top of that, they 
also indicate a degree of clustering between the core and peripheral economies, at 
least in terms of sovereign risk transmission. Additionally, Belgium is one of the 
major transmitters of volatility spillovers, while Greece, Portugal and Netherlands are 
the main receivers. Finally, Greece is considered as a source of volatility transmission 
until 2010, when it turned to be a net receiver. Implementing a similar framework, but 
this time for both sovereign and banking risk analysis, Alter and Beyer (forthcoming) 
identify an increasing degree of interdependence in Euro Area, since the initiation of 
the crisis. Furthermore, a shock to Spanish CDS transmits to the rest of the union, 
especially in the first half of 2012. Finally, the adoption of economic consolidation 
programs from the hardly hit economies (Greece, Portugal and Ireland) led to the 
decrease of their contribution to spillovers to the other economies. In contrast, Louzis 
(2013), mentions that the three aforementioned countries are spillovers’ transmitters 
during 2011 and 2012. On top of that, he also underlines the importance of stock and 
money markets in volatility transmission during the Eurozone crisis. 
Similar argument (for the intensity of the risk propagation channel from 
countries like Greece to the rest of the euro union) is provided by Caporin et al. 
                                                 
90 For the periphery, they included Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. For the core countries, 
their sample consists of Austria, Belgium, France and Netherlands. 
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(2013). Here, using a quantile regression model (with Bayesian inference process), the 
authors indicate that contagion effects were not that strong, even though peripheral 
countries went through serious strains because of their heightened fiscal burden. 
Another interesting outcome of their work is that the sovereign risk transmission (as 
measured by the governmental bond yields) is actually smaller, compared to the 
period prior to the Lehman Brothers collapse. On the contrary, Metiu (2012) identifies 
strong contagion effects for the period 2008 to 2012, using the canonical contagion 
model. It appears a lack of clear identification of the true effects among the Eurozone 
countries, based on these papers. 
Turning now to the case of multivariate volatility models, a very popular 
framework is the DCC model91. Developed by Engle (2002), the model is specified as 
follows: 
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where tr  is a vector of the series used in the model, the first term in this equation is 
the conditional mean vector of the aforementioned indices. Also, Ht represents the 
conditional variance covariance matrix, while 1/2 1/2 '( )t iit nntD diag h h   is the diagonal 
matrix of square root conditional variances. Here, the elements of the aforementioned 
matrix hiit are estimated, based on individual GARCH type models. Moreover, 
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is the matrix containing the time-varying conditional correlations. tQ is a nxn 
symmetric positive definite matrix, computed by: 
 
 '1 1 1(1 )t t t tQ Q u u Q           (4.6) 
 
                                                 
91 DCC has been, and still is, extensively used for the analysis of financial contagion and spillover 
effects cases, both for developed as well as for developing economies. For the latter, some examples 
are the papers by Chiang et al. (2007), Yiu et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2012). 
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where tu is a nx1 vector of standardized residuals, Q the nxn unconditional variance 
matrix of the residuals and  and  are non negative scalar parameters, such that 
α+β<1. Dajcman (2012) uses a flight-to-quality indicator to examine the co-
movements of stock returns with bond yields for Germany and PIIGS. The results, 
using the aforementioned modeling approach, are concurrent with Kohonen (2012) 
and Caporin et al. (2013), where the Greek debt crisis, along with the ones in Portugal 
and Italy do not indicate important contagion effects to the rest of the Eurozone. 
Moreover, the flight-to-quality indicator has higher values prior to 2010, indicating 
increasing uncertainty for investors, who turned towards the safe haven of German 
Bunds. Then, Audige (2013) employs a smooth transition conditional correlation 
(STCC-GARCH) model, with long term governmental bond yields, in order to check 
for spillover effects from the Greek crisis. Once more, the author pinpoints contagion 
effects from Greece to Ireland and Portugal in 2010, while such effects weaken after 
that year. The sovereign risk premium for seven Euro Area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) is examined with DCC 
models by Mission and Watzka (2011). According to these authors, there was 
contagion effect from the excessive Greek sovereign risk, especially towards 
peripheral economies. On top of that and in accordance with Arezki et al. (2011), the 
Greek bonds rating downgrades are found to be contagious to some of the other 
economies. 
Similar research work has been conducted, using alternative GARCH models. 
We report some of them, which are somehow related to the purposes and the scope of 
this chapter. Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) examine the transmission of 
financial and sovereign debt shocks through the Eurozone stock markets, for the 
period 2007 – 2010. In order to do this, GARCH modeling of stock returns are 
employed, while the effect of US markets is also taken into consideration. They split 
EMU into three groups of countries, namely the North, South and Small economies92. 
Their findings show strong crisis transmission from US non-financials to European 
non-financials93, while the financial ones from both sides of the world are not that 
interconnected. Additionally, Greek CDS spreads seem to play a much more 
                                                 
92 North consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. The South group 
includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain while the Small one from Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta and Slovenia. 
93 Non-financials consists of the returns of stocks, if the financial institutions listed to the market are 
excluded from the sample. 
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important role in the period after the Lehman collapse, but not for the non-financial 
firms. Caceres et al. (2010) aim to explain the high volatility of the sovereign swap 
spreads in Europe, until 2010. Three reasons are investigated: global risk aversion, 
country-specific risks (countries’ fundamentals) and spillover effects from other 
sovereigns (contagion). Each one of the aforementioned are represented by a global 
risk aversion index (computed using distress dependencies approach), a Spillover 
Coefficient (it is a metric for the dependence of a country’s probability of default to 
other countries financial distress) and, finally, country specific factors94. A 
GARCH(1,1) specification reveals the importance of global risk aversion (decreases 
the spreads), the role of fundamentals (although, decreasing when fiscal burdens arise) 
and the fact that contagion decreases the swap spreads. Finally, there are a couple of 
studies that have used a BEKK model, similar to ours. For example, Groba et al. 
(2013) use the latter, in their preliminary investigation of the CDS spreads, their role 
to sovereign risk spillover and their determinants. The essence of their work is finding 
of spillover effects, up until 2010. Since then, the intensity of this channel is 
minimized. The contagion channels between mature and emerging stock markets are 
the interest of Beirne et al. (2013). Employing a GARCH-BEKK (1,1) model, with 
the addition of dummies (in order to be able to capture any cases of “shift 
contagion”), they conclude that there is volatility transmission from mature to 
emerging stock markets and this situation changes (intensifies or not) during periods 
of financial instability. 
 
 
3. Dataset and Methodological Approach 
 
 
The third section of the chapter is dedicated to the discussion of our dataset, 
together with the presentation of the methodological approach followed in the 
econometric analysis. Regarding the set of variables used for our renewed stress 
indices, we should stress that most of them have also been implemented and analyzed 
to the previous chapter. As a result, the relevant discussion is greatly based to the one 
                                                 
94 These are the public debt and debt/GDP ratio (both series interpolated to obtain daily series out of the 
quarterly data). 
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preceeded. This does not hold for the multivariate GARCH modeling, which is the 
focus of our empirical work in this chapter. 
 
3.1 Dataset Description and Aggregation Method 
 
Since our aim is the depiction of systemic risk on a timely and up to date basis, 
we proceed with the creation of aggregate financial stress indices (FSIs). These 
indexes provide information on the financial markets conditions, based on a range of 
stand-alone indicators representing important features of these markets. Our focus is 
on Eurozone crisis and, thus, the sample of our countries consists of the initial eleven 
euro economies (excluding Luxembourg). These countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Once again, our interest is in the calculation of four market-level indicators, along 
with a systemic risk index for each country individually. These markets are the 
banking one, money, equity and bond markets. The major difference, compared to the 
previous chapter, is the development of FSIs on weekly frequency. The reasons are 
twofold: first, we decided to examine the spillover effects of the Euro Area crisis, 
both within each market (and countries) level, together with a deeper cross-sectional 
investigation of this crisis effects. That is, we explore the transmission channels 
existing between different markets and different countries (e.g. whether there are 
stress spillovers from the, say, Greek banking sector to the French bond market or if 
the Irish equity market affects the Italian money market and so on). Secondly, since 
such an empirical work requires the employment of multivariate GARCH modeling 
and such an econometric approach is highly demanding, in terms of degrees of 
freedom, there is a necessity to employ high frequency dataset. Hence, the variables 
that are used are restrained to those that can be retrieved in such frequencies. 
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Table 4.1: Indicators of Financial Stress 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the variables included in the financial stress indices of 
the economies in our sample. As already mentioned, the aforementioned include high 
frequency only variables. As a result, it is not possible to include a number of macro-
financial and balance sheet variables, as in the previous chapter. In any case, a 
significant number of financial indicators remain at play. Our dataset is of weekly 
frequency, covering the period from January 2001 until 20th of September 2013. There 
are 664 observations in total, which covers the pre- and post-crisis period. We do not 
use daily data for avoiding potential mismatches in public holidays and trading days 
(Yiu et al., 2010). In this way, a uniform dataset is created, without any discrepancies 
in the countries’ series used. Getting into more details, the banking sector index 
comprises of seven variables, while five variables are used in the case of money and 
equity markets and four for the case of bond market. Focusing to the banking market, 
variables representing banks’ sensitivity to market conditions, along with their level 
of profitability and risk level there are included. Dividend yield is negatively related 
to fundamentals of banking institutions and, thus, excessive dividend yields can be a 
signal of increasing default risk for them. On the same time, market value is also 
Banking Sector Money Market
Dividend Yield TED Spread
Market Value Inverted Term Spread
Turnover by Volume Treasury Bill Realized Volatility
P/E Main Refinancing Rate - 2yr 
Government Bond Yield
Bank Equities Realized Volatility Main Refinancing Rate - 5yr 
Government Bond Yield
Banking Sector Beta
Bank Equities Returns
Equity Market Bond Market
Stock Returns Sovereign Spread
Dividend Yield Government Bond Realized Volatility
P/E Corporate Spread
Stocks Realized Volatility Government Bond Duration
Market Value
Variables Used in Financial Stress Indices
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important, since its size directly affects the stability of the market. Increasing 
uncertainty can lead to a significant adverse effect to market value, which is also tied 
to these institutions’ book value. Thus, their financial health is at stake. Another 
strong indicator of instability for banks is the turnover by volume. This increases, 
according to market sentiment and the perceived level of risk and uncertainty by the 
investors. Profitability is also an important metric here, represented by the P/E ratio. 
Here, since banks’ operational efficiency and profitability is indicated by higher 
values for the aforementioned ratio, we impose a negative sign to this variable (so, 
higher P/E ratio coincides with excessive financial stress). Finally, the three last 
variables here (these are, realized volatility of banks equity index, the beta coefficient 
of the aforementioned index and the (negative) stock returns) depict the risk 
perception and the volatility level of this market. At this point, a note of caution 
should be added. Given the nature of our observations (high frequency data) and the 
types of indicators chosen for inclusion to the aggregate systemic risk index, it would 
be fair to say that the variables fragmentation into different types or markets is, 
somehow, tricky. For instance, in the case of the banking sector variables, it would be 
justifiable to say that they are not entirely distinctive (in nature and on what they 
capture) from the stock market indicators. Moreover, many of them include features 
that are highly affected by the price changes and volatility of the banking sector 
equities. Nevertheless, it should be fair to emphasize that the choice of these stand 
alone indicators is driven, among other reasons, from the necessity to keep our dataset 
homogenous and comparable. Additionally, this fragmentation does make sense, 
especially since the source of data for the banking group of indicators is entirely based 
on listed banks sources. I acknowledge the fact that their nature is multifaceted 
(especially, due to the observations frequency), but, I strongly believe they still 
represent the conditions prevailing in the banking markets. 
The aggregate index for the money market sector includes some of the most 
important liquidity, credit and counterparty risk indicators. TED spread (the 
difference between the 3-month Euribor and the respective Treasury bill of the same 
maturity) is one of these measures. It is expected to observe increasing values for this 
spread, in periods of worsening financial conditions. In such times, interbank funding 
markets seize to operate smoothly, while the risk perception reaches unprecedented 
levels. In the same line of thought, inverted term spread is incorporated, as indicator 
of interest rate setting expectations, along with the representation of default risk in 
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money markets. Moreover, the spreads of the main refinancing rate from the short 
term governmental bills yield is another indicator of deteriorating liquidity conditions. 
Negative values in these spreads coincide with higher financial stress and, hence, the 
need to incorporate them in our aggregate index with a negative sign. Lastly, the 
realized volatility of the Treasury bills of the countries in our sample depicts the 
formed risk volatility in this market. 
The conditions in the equity markets are captured by five variables. The 
(negatively signed) stock returns are a good indication of investors’ uncertainty and 
lack of trust to listed firms underlying fundamentals. In periods of increasing financial 
stress, it is expected to have higher volatility in the stock markets. Then, market value 
is included and the dividend yield as well. The rationale is similar to the case of the 
banking sector, emphasizing the level of default risk, lack of credibility and funding 
sources in the market. Again, the level of financial sustainability of the firms is 
sketched by the P/E ratio, while the realized volatility of the general equity market 
index is indicative of the historical risk perception on the specific equity market. 
The last market considered here is the most scrutinized in the current 
Eurozone crisis research. That is, the bond market. Here, we employ the sovereign 
bond spread, vis-à-vis German bond yield, which is considered as a safe haven for 
bond market investors. This is a strong and popular indicator of the perceived 
sovereign risk of the countries under investigation. Then, the realized volatility of the 
long term governmental bond yields is used, as another variable illustrating the 
volatility risk of this market. Then, the corporate bond spread (towards the 
government long term bond yield) is a factor showing the default risk and the 
financial obstacles operating firms in each one of the EMU countries face. Bond 
duration is also included (for the long term government bonds). As explained in the 
previous chapter, it is expected that decreasing credit ratings and increasing concerns 
for the countries solvency, will lead to lower duration for their bonds. Hence, 
decreasing duration represents increasing financial stress and uncertainty. 
The FSIs are computed, following the variance-equal aggregation method. 
Based on this approach, an equal weight is attributed to all variables in each of the 
markets. In this way, the market - level indices are computed, while the same 
approach is followed for the country – wide one. Before the aggregation, each one of 
the single indicator is standardized. That is, its mean value is subtracted by each 
observation and, then, divided by its standard deviation. In this way, problems of mis-
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measurement are avoided. Then, all series are expressed as deviations from the long 
run mean value of them. Thus, there is no any issue, regarding the units of 
measurement of variables that can be of very different nature otherwise. The variance 
– equal approach is rather frequently used in the relevant literature. The most 
important reason for this has to do with the simplicity of the relevant calculations, 
while it is quite efficient approach for the creation of well behaved financial stress 
indices. This means that the aggregate indices produced in this way effectively 
represent the conditions in the financial markets and there is not important value 
added if the relevant weights and aggregation is made through some more 
sophisticated approach95. 
 
 
3.2 Spillovers Definition 
 
At this point, it would be useful to discuss the theoretical definitions and 
pursuit of our empirical work. It is true that the long lasting crisis of the last four years 
in Eurozone ignited research on the roots and cause of the aforementioned crisis 
event. Many economists also tried to analyze potential contagion channels and 
interdependencies within the Euro Area economies, in order to infer on the 
catastrophic effects of the crisis and relevant policies to ameliorate them. A major 
issue here is what exactly is investigated in these papers and whether the empirical 
evidence provided is actually accurate of what the authors try to capture. Many 
economists use the term “contagion”, without really specifying the meaning of it. 
There is a large debate, still intensive, on what constitutes contagion and what are the 
most accurate and sensible tools to represent contagion channels. Seminal work in the 
creation of a well sounded definition of contagion is the one by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001 and 2002). The authors make a distinction between comovements or 
interdependencies of the markets, which can be the case of high correlations between 
them in both pre- and post-crisis periods and “shift-contagion”, as they call it. The 
latter is the observation of excessive markets comovements after a significant 
financial or real economic shock. Hence, someone has to be very careful when he 
examines complex phenomena like crisis transmissions. In most cases, researchers 
                                                 
95 Of course, the same health warning, related to the use of such a fixed weighting scheme on the index 
aggregation, applies here (as in the previous empirical chapters of this thesis). 
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ignore these delicate differences and their argumentation can be problematic. In our 
piece of research, the focus is on the variance-covariance comovements of the 
European economies and markets. On top of that, the modeling framework we use lies 
in the tradition of multivariate GARCH models that try to capture volatility spillovers 
among the constituent markets of the sample. It is closer, as a concept, to the “meteor 
showers” hypothesis of Engle et al. (1990). In this important paper, the authors try to 
explain volatility clustering in the foreign exchange market returns. In order to do it, 
they define spillover effects as the effects of the variance of market one in time t-1, to 
the variance of market two on time t. Hence, our empirical effort mainly focuses on 
spillover effects among EMU markets, with a special emphasis on the different 
transmission channels (as evident from the disaggregated, market-based analysis). On 
the same time, it is the first effort that financial stress indices are employed in this 
type of empirical analysis. 
 
3.3 Volatility Transmission Models: Empirical Methodology 
 
Turning now to the MGARCH model employed, the decision is to use one of 
the most successful models in relevant applications, namely the BEKK model (Marcal 
and Pereira, 2008). It is quite useful, in ensuring that the variance covariance matrix 
will be always positive definite and, as a consequence, the estimation of a model with 
a significantly high number of parameters is less burdensome. Additionally, they are 
also helpful for studying the time-varying properties of covariances and correlations. 
As already mentioned, the GARCH-BEKK model is an alternative to the 
prototype multivariate VEC model, proposed by Bollerslev et al. (1988), ensuring the 
positive definiteness of the conditional variance matrix Ht (Bauwens et al., 2006). Let 
us first describe the BEKK model, as introduced by Engle and Kroner (1995). The 
basic set up includes the mean equation 
 
 1( ) ,  where (0, )t t i t t t tr r N H        (4.7) 
 
where tr is a Nx1 vector of the financial stress indices returns, ( )t ir  is the conditional 
vector of the indices lagged returns (again of the same dimensions as the previous 
vector) and t is the vector of the model’s vector of residuals. The latter, based on the 
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information set available until period t-1 ( 1t ), is assumed to follow a zero mean 
distribution, with a variance covariance matrix tH . According to this model, the NxN 
matrix tH has the following form: 
 
 ' ' ' '0 0 1 1 1t t t tH C C A A B H B       (4.8) 
 
where 0C is the constants vector, A and B are parameter matrices, 1t   is the lagged 
disturbance vector and 1tH  is the lagged variance covariance matrix. The constants 
vector is restricted to be upper triangular, while the parameter matrices are not 
restricted. As emphasized by Bollerslev (2010), this quadratic parameterization 
guarantees that the covariance matrix is positive definite, while the number of 
parameters to be estimated is more compact, compared with the MGARCH model 
firstly proposed by Bollerslev et al.(1988)96. Since out interest is in the potential 
spillover effects of each Eurozone country (or market) to the other participants in the 
common currency area, the main focal point here is on the estimated coefficients of 
matrices A and, especially, B. The type of BEKK model that interests us is the one 
allowing for interactions between the variances of the markets. These are represented 
by the off-diagonal elements of matrix B. Additionally, matrix’s A coefficients depict 
the effects of lagged innovations in equation (4.2) to the conditional variance 
covariance matrix. As it is commonly said in the relevant literature, matrix A provide 
information on “news effect”, while matrix B depict the “volatility spillover” effect 
(Kim et al., 2012). Both effects can provide important insights for the potential 
volatility transmission channels established within the Euro Area countries and 
markets. 
Given the number of variables and the ensuing computational procedures, we 
proceed with the estimation of bivariate BEEK models, for all the cases examined 
here. These are, the BEKK models for the countries and the market level indices 
(banking, money, equity and bond markets), while the same holds for the case of the 
intra-markets analysis. Thus, for the bivariate case, the model will look as follows: 
 
                                                 
96 In this way, model’s convergence is more easily achieved. See, among others, Bauwens et al. (2006) 
and Brooks (2008). 
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In more details, after the matrices’ multiplications, the detailed representation of the 
conditional variance elements is: 
 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
11, 11 1, 1 21 2, 1 11 21 1, 1 2, 1 11 11, 1 21 22, 1 11 22 12, 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
22, 12 1, 1 22 2, 1 12 22 1, 1 2, 1 12 11, 1 22 22, 1 11 22 21, 1
2 2
2 2
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
h h h h
h h h h
           
           
      
      
     
     
 (4.10) 
 
Given the above description of the model, our interest is focused on the statistical 
significance of 21  and 21 in the first part of (4.4). These two coefficients represent 
the volatility spillover from market (or country) 2 to market 1. On the other hand, for 
the second part of the previous equation, 12  and 12  are the coefficients of interest. It 
should be noted here that, since all of these parameters are squared, their signs do not 
have any importance. The models are estimated, using the quasi maximum likelihood 
estimator, using the Matlab algorithms provided by Kevin Sheppard. In what follows, 
a detailed presentation of these computations, along with a discussion on them is 
provided. All models here are estimated, using the quasi maximum likelihood (QML) 
estimator under a multivariate student distribution. In this way, any issues arising 
from the potential non normality of the models’ residuals can be statistically 
accommodated. 
 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 
 
This section is dedicated to the discussion of the computational results 
obtained by the BEKK models estimated. Before getting into them, we briefly show 
some descriptive statistics, along with unit root testing for the financial stress indices 
returns. Regarding the multivariate conditional volatility models, we first present the 
five single market (banking, money, equity and bond one) or country models, while 
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this subchapter is completed with the case of cross-market models and the respective 
volatility spillovers. 
 
4.1 Indexes Descriptive Statistics and Stationarity 
 
The following table (4.2) provides a complete descriptive analysis of all the financial 
stress series returns used in this chapter. They are organized in five different panels, 
according to the type of indices and the market they represent. In the appendix, we 
also provide the graphs of the series, both in levels as well as in returns. The table 
provides a full set of statistics for the distribution of the indexes returns, together with 
their normality and the type of their data generating process. Moreover, the results of 
the ADF test are reported, in order to account for the existence or not of unit roots. 
The inspection of these results provides useful insights to the nature of our dataset. 
First of all, it is evident that the banking and equity stress indexes exhibit the highest 
standard deviations. This is also evident from the respective graphs in the chapter’s 
appendix, where the banking and equity FSIs returns have the most dispersed values, 
compared to the rest of the dataset. In almost all cases, the series’ distributions are 
positively skewed, while the statistically significant kurtosis coefficients indicate the 
non-normality of returns. The latter is strongly verified by the Jarque-Berra test, 
which offers a clear indication of the non-acceptance of the null hypothesis of 
normally distributed FSIs returns. 
On top of the above, table 4.2 reports the Ljung-Box Q and Q2 statistics. Here, 
the purpose of this test is the verification for the existence or not of serial correlation 
for the returns and the squared returns, respectively. Again, in the majority of the 
cases examined, the results are in favor of serially correlated series, exhibiting higher 
order correlation and non-linear dependencies as well (indicated by the Q2 statistic). 
The only exception here is the Dutch bond market financial stress index, while the 
Ljung-Box Q2 test fails to provide relevant evidence for the cases of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain (in the case of the bond markets indices). The same holds for the money 
market stress indexes of Greece and Finland. Nevertheless, the aforementioned are 
limited exceptions to the general conclusion of the existence of autocorrelation. The 
Engle’s ARCH test is also concurrent with the previous findings, emphasizing the 
need to employ GARCH models for the implementation of our empirical work that 
aims to study the spillover effects of financial stress among the Euro Area markets 
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and countries. The last row in each one of the table’s panels provides the ADF unit 
root test. As expected, all series are proved to be stationary. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Stress Indexes Returns 
 
Countries Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Mean 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0010
Std. Deviation 0.0563 0.0520 0.0748 0.0431 0.0609 0.0525 0.0715 0.0489 0.0799 0.0595 0.0503
Skewness 0.039 0.212** -0.073 0.496** -0.074 0.07 0.204* 0.804** -0.152 -0.366** 0.787**
Kurtosis 2.71** 2.428** 7.562** 3.99** 3.741** 7.705** 7.201** 4.812** 8.855** 9.067** 6.783**
J-B Test 203.06** 167.9** 1580.7** 467.19** 387.34** 1640.7** 1437.4** 711.26** 2169.1** 2286.3** 1339.6**
Q(10) 67.78** 29.06** 102** 20.83* 61.15** 89.91** 116.81** 24.12** 56.16** 113.81** 72.2**
Q2(10) 378.06** 93.87** 121.08** 173.83** 77.18** 396.18** 161.23** 121.66** 77.2** 188.18** 140.33**
ARCH(5) 24** 9.07** 40.45** 18.15** 11.32** 36.94** 28.09** 10.36** 11.3** 30.68** 23**
ADF -18.51** -15.23** -18.51** -14.53** -18.54** -17.65** -19.39** -15.63** -18.89** -17.05** -17.73**
Mean 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0016 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0008 0.0021
Std. Deviation 0.2268 0.2204 0.2578 0.2361 0.2328 0.2414 0.2443 0.2263 0.2197 0.2251 0.2344
Skewness 0.257** 0.591** 0.423** 0.283** 0.885** 0.852** -0.077 0.828** 0.948** 0.445** 0.911**
Kurtosis 3.303** 6.676** 10.316** 3.03** 7.001** 10.927** 8.691** 3.93** 13.021** 6.381** 6.277**
J-B Test 309.9** 1270** 2959.6** 262.61** 1440.8** 3378.8** 2087.5** 502.65** 4783.2** 1147** 1180.4**
Q(10) 147.03** 149.63** 178.02** 198.72** 156.15** 169.08** 179.32** 173.05** 118.52** 136.88** 157.4**
Q2(10) 481.28** 305.53** 145.51** 566.97** 387.89** 492.56** 209.03** 155.27** 290.14** 172.64** 160.34**
ARCH(5) 24.67** 20.99** 57.54** 45.99** 33.11** 49.52** 42.78** 11.86** 28.72** 23.77** 21.59**
ADF -21.85** -21.02** -22.24** -22.32** -21.75** -18.67** -22.39** -20.23** -21.25** -22.09** -23.43**
Mean -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0001
Std. Deviation 0.0867 0.0885 0.0748 0.0980 0.0738 0.0483 0.0578 0.0911 0.1739 0.0437 0.0568
Skewness 1.419** 0.911** 1.731** 1.296** 1.241** 3.215** 3.036** 1.14** -0.861 0.118 -0.177
Kurtosis 8.958** 8.602** 11.555** 6.288** 7.973** 77.115** 84.406** 13.077** 30.869** 11.913** 4.431**
J-B Test 2439.8** 2136.3** 4019.3** 1278.1** 1926.7** 165420** 197830** 4867.8** 26405** 3921.8** 545.88**
Q(10) 25.84** 11.30 26.47** 19.01* 21.57* 21.61* 100.95** 15.81 59.74** 37.56** 62.18**
Q2(10) 55.58** 140.53** 7.21 89.33** 77.54** 4.53 75.04** 44.25** 85.82** 297.05** 144.62**
ARCH(5) 2.99* 22.37** 1.31 6.08** 2.88* 0.86 2.72* 4** 22.48** 29.07** 13.42**
ADF -16.42** -14.54** -13.48** -15.74** -15.68** -15.4** -13.88** -14.65** -18.43** -12.99** -15.6**
Mean 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0007
Std. Deviation 0.2802 0.2689 0.2610 0.2777 0.2760 0.2636 0.2808 0.2738 0.2759 0.2687 0.2803
Skewness 0.655** 0.469** 0.292** 0.506** 0.51** 0.477** -0.01 -0.838 -0.367** -0.641** -0.542**
Kurtosis 10.015** 3.601** 2.098** 4.415** 4.73** 4.575** 8.246** 7.547** 4.952** 5.807** 3.859**
J-B Test 2818** 382.75** 131.02** 567.04** 646.89** 603.48** 1878.5** 1651.2** 692.43** 977.27** 444.11**
Q(10) 199.94** 203.66** 209.86** 250.71** 263.4** 167.36** 226.7** 228.91** 217.08** 206.24** 256.23**
Q2(10) 383.69** 206.51** 233.54** 541.81** 539.49** 101.5** 455.26** 256.27** 388.87** 400.24** 459.89**
ARCH(5) 32.92** 21.35** 22.02** 55.04** 67.92** 16.75** 41.68** 42.12** 40.05** 67.98** 64.76**
ADF -25.33** -24.41** -22.34** -23.93** -24.63** -24.65** -27.96** -23.33** -23.95** -24.26** -24.58**
Mean 0.0005 0.0010 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0010
Std. Deviation 0.0704 0.0642 0.0833 0.0748 0.0982 0.0357 0.0918 0.0561 0.1050 0.0768 0.0555
Skewness 1.331** 0.735** 1.28** 0.87** 0.928** 9.693** -1.873 0.617** 1.947** -0.722** 1.592**
Kurtosis 17.613** 14.634** 20.532** 2.688** 13.601** 173.17** 57.139** 5.564** 16.422** 52.808** 11.774**
J-B Test 8766.1** 5976.2** 11827** 283.41** 5205.2** 838780** 90579** 897.48** 7869.5** 77095** 4109.8**
Q(10) 21.54* 30.26** 22.1* 38.98** 21.77* 172.7** 59.1** 24.65** 6.3 27.67** 26.88**
Q2(10) 2.06 32.38** 109.1** 55.73** 21.64* 0.49 89.04** 208.85** 0.98 0.55 6.73
ARCH(5) 0.35 3.95** 25.1** 6.66** 1.95 0.04 17.98** 15.02** 0.13 0.01 0.76
ADF -13.83** -14.94** -14.65** -13.81** -14.58** -10.63** -12.66** -13.96** -14.36** -15.46** -14.43**
Notes: J-B test is the Jarque-Bera test for normality. Q(10) and Q2(10) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in raw  series and squared series, respectively. 
ARCH(5) is the Engle's ARCH effects test. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity. * and ** denote statistical signif icance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.
Panel E: Bond Market Indexes
Descriptive Statistics for Financial Stress Indexes Returns
Panel A: Country Indexes
Panel B: Banking Sector Indexes
Panel C: Money Market Indexes
Panel D: Equity Market Indexes
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An inspection of the FSIs (levels and returns) figures in the appendix (graphs 
labeled A.1 to A.10) provide an overview of their evolution through the period 
examined. In most cases, it is evident (in the case of the original FSI series) an 
upward trend of the early enough. Even from back to 2005, indices exhibit a 
worrisome increase to the financial stress level. In this respect, these metrics could 
provide a timely warning, regarding future financial meltdowns. Something similar is 
depicted in the cases of the returns series. There is higher volatility clustering for all 
countries and markets, especially after 2008 and, even more, since 2010. This is an 
indication of the increasing uncertainty in the markets, due to the financial and 
sovereign turbulence in the area. 
Finally, we also report the unconditional correlation matrices for each one of 
the groups of financial stress indexes used here. Almost all correlation coefficients are 
positive, indicating a positive relation between the levels of financial stress in these 
economies. In the case of country-wide indicators, the core countries are stronger 
related, as it is the case with the periphery ones. Larger correlation exists for the cases 
of the equity and banking markets, while Greece does not seem to be strongly tied to 
the rest of the Euro Area economies. Similar evidence exists for the cases of Ireland 
and Portugal, especially for the case of the bond market and, even more importantly, 
towards the larger economies of the monetary union (Germany and France). 
 
4.2 BEKK Results 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the nature of our series and, also, 
established the suitability of MGARCH modeling for the investigation of volatility 
spillovers between Euro Area markets. It is time now to proceed to the presentation of 
the GARCH-BEKK results, establish the existence of spillover effects (or not) and 
infer on the time-varying dynamics of the current financial and sovereign crisis. As 
mentioned before, we follow two estimating strategies. First, we estimate models, 
examining potential spillover channels between each one of the financial markets for 
which we have created stress indices. These are the banking sector, the money, equity 
and bond markets of Euro Area countries. Additionally, we also employ a BEKK 
model for the case of country-level financial stress metrics. After examining potential 
spillover channels in the aforementioned cases, the next step is the major contribution 
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of this chapter. We strive to get into a deeper analysis of the links between the, 
previously, single examined markets. In order to do this, bivariate GARCH-BEKK 
models are estimated for all possible combinations of stress indices returns of our 
sample. In this way, it is possible to examine the existing spillover effects from any 
market (or country) towards any other taken into account. This is an important step 
towards the detailed and careful consideration of the perplexed nature of the crisis and 
volatility transmission channels among some of the most important economies of the 
world. Also, it is a first step towards assessing the relative importance (in terms of risk 
aggravation) of the different markets analyzed here. Finally, the extraction of, 
potentially, useful policy prescriptions for the amelioration of the effects of current 
turmoil in the markets and their future safeguarding is an additional valuable feature 
of this piece of research. 
 
 
4.2.a Market Level and Country – Wide Models 
 
The following ten tables report the estimation results of the MGARCH-BEKK 
models employed in our empirical investigation. Each set of tables has the same 
structure. The first table is always the estimated coefficients for the “news surprises” 
effects between the markets examined. They are the αij coefficients from equation 
(4.4), representing the lagged squared innovations effect on the conditional covariance 
of each one of the sample series. Moreover, the second table in each case depicts the 
βij estimated coefficients of our models. As previously mentioned, these coefficients 
represent the volatility spillovers between the markets, while it is also an indicator of 
the persistence of the news shocks among them. In all cases, the p-values are reported 
under each one of the reported coefficients, while statistical significance is marked 
with asterisks, right next to the significant parameters. 
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Table 4.3: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Countries Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “news surprises” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, under 
each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to their 
initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the results, we should also explain 
the tables’ diarthosis. In the first column and row, the initials of the countries are 
reported. Because of that, the main diagonal of each table is empty, since there is no 
point in reporting own effects for the economies we examine. Then, the correct way to 
read the tables is by following each row towards each column. For instance, the first 
row reports the estimated coefficients for the news and volatility spillover effects 
from Austria (or the Austrian markets, respectively) to the rest of the sample 
economies. The same is true for Belgium, in the case of the third row, until the 
Spanish case that concludes each one of the tables97. In other words, the spillovers’ 
direction here is from the rows towards the columns (the rows represent the volatility 
spillover sources while the columns the shocks’ recipients). 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 As it is easily understandable, each country’s case uses two rows from the table: one for the 
estimated parameters, the other one for the p-values. Hence, in the case of Belgium, the analysis starts 
from the third row. The same holds for all countries and markets analysed here. 
αij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU ‐0.071   ‐0.012   ‐0.002   ‐0.036   ‐0.016   0.001   0.017   0.020   0.012   ‐0.087  
  0.305 0.965 0.549 0.904 0.801 0.665 0.701 0.899 0.124 0.240
BE 0.133   0.056   ‐0.001   ‐0.106 * ‐0.008   0.004   0.098   0.044   ‐0.032   ‐0.057  
0.547 0.582 0.753 0.091 0.837 0.725 0.241 0.987 0.993 0.809
FI 0.003   0.059   ‐0.431   ‐0.033   0.003 *** ‐0.172   0.002   ‐0.006   ‐0.046   0.154 **
0.979 0.342 0.244 0.499 0.002 0.183 0.620 0.978 0.614 0.016
FR 0.228   0.061   0.051   0.004   ‐0.113 *** 0.118   ‐0.062   0.206   0.073   ‐0.014  
0.206 0.521 0.735 0.676 0.000 0.218 0.451 0.184 0.901 0.653
GE 0.062   0.009   ‐0.064   0.003   0.017   ‐0.005   0.007   0.056   0.048   0.132 ***
0.198 0.330 0.390 0.616   0.820 0.888 0.929 0.944 0.473 0.004
GR 0.002   ‐0.037   ‐0.046 *** 0.167 *** 0.017   0.085 *** 0.045   ‐0.123 ** ‐0.079 ** 0.007 ***
0.749 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.937 0.000 0.817 0.021 0.017 0.000
IR 0.080   0.031   0.008   ‐0.002   ‐0.079 *** 0.003 *** 0.048   0.054   0.016   ‐0.013 ***
0.143 0.975 0.440 0.888 0.004 0.002 0.837 0.741 0.799 0.000
IT ‐0.079 * ‐0.174   ‐0.061   0.024   ‐0.022   ‐0.167 ** ‐0.006   0.069   0.072 *** ‐0.008 ***
0.079 0.263 0.507 0.475 0.815 0.011 0.985 0.675 0.000 0.000
NE ‐0.025   ‐0.002   0.042   ‐0.049   ‐0.019   0.057 *** 0.058   ‐0.204 * ‐0.041   ‐0.055 **
0.795 0.986 0.863 0.185 0.986 0.005 0.388 0.050 0.490 0.030
PO 0.004   ‐0.003   0.002   ‐0.032   ‐0.026   0.045   0.036 * ‐0.219 *** 0.006   ‐0.065 ***
0.651 0.994 0.983 0.490 0.688 0.332 0.060 0.000 0.958   0.000
SP 0.106   ‐0.072   ‐0.039   ‐0.123 ** ‐0.021   ‐0.042 *** 0.184 *** 0.140 *** 0.228 ** 0.043 ***
0.302 0.504 0.711 0.030 0.707 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000
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Table 4.4: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Countries Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “volatility spillover” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, 
under each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to 
their initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
We initialize the results discussion with tables 4.3 and 4.4. Here, the 
investigation of the country-wide financial stress spillovers is examined. According to 
the estimations, the most heavily affected countries are those with the strongest 
spillovers to the rest of the Euro Area countries. Especially Greece and Spain present 
significant news and volatility spillover effects to the rest of the economies. On the 
same time, these two countries are the major recipients of financial stress spillovers, 
together with France. It is interesting to notice that Germany is highly immune to 
volatility transmission in this respect. As a first comment, we can say that surprises, 
regarding the financial conditions in Greece and Spain, are widely dispersed with the 
monetary union and this is a long lasting effect (as it is evident from the volatility risk 
transmission depicted in table 4.4). On the hand, the effects on the Greek case are 
rather small, judging by the size and magnitude of the relevant parameters. Moreover, 
there is a bidirectional spillover effect between Greece and France, while the 
respective French – Spanish comovements are rather weak. Ireland has a statistical 
significant and strong effect to Greece. Finally, Portugal is also an important 
contributor to the financial stress transmission, at least in terms of statistical 
significance. The size of the relevant estimated parameters is quite small. Another 
interesting feature of our results is the strong links between the economies of North 
βij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.039 ‐0.021 0.012 ‐0.048 0.024 0.004 0.008 0.041 ‐0.035 0.055
0.113 0.987 0.891 0.388 0.845 0.817 0.780 0.473 0.000 0.028
BE ‐0.048   0.007   0.061 ** ‐0.004   ‐0.030   0.125   0.007   0.058   ‐0.005   0.037  
0.255 0.822 0.029 0.602 0.417 0.822 0.737 0.906 0.992 0.564
FI 0.038   ‐0.022   ‐0.022 *** 0.098   0.021 *** 0.157 *** 0.043 ** 0.046   0.074   ‐0.076 ***
0.944 0.418 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.908 0.955 0.000
FR ‐0.106   ‐0.131 ** 0.000   ‐0.051   0.182 *** 0.036 * ‐0.025   ‐0.048   ‐0.064 * 0.014 **
0.568 0.015 0.178 0.347 0.000 0.065 0.758 0.511 0.098 0.030
GE 0.034   0.015 ** ‐0.014   0.005   0.023   0.006   0.007   ‐0.031   0.001   0.104  
0.808 0.016 0.829 0.870 0.891 0.831 0.817 0.854 0.936 0.102
GR ‐0.003   0.008   ‐0.003 *** ‐0.093 *** ‐0.050   ‐0.096 *** 0.003   ‐0.084 *** ‐0.117 *** ‐0.030 ***
0.836 0.684 0.000 0.000 0.768 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.001 0.000
IR ‐0.082 ** ‐0.277   ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002   ‐0.167   0.175 *** ‐0.031   ‐0.027   ‐0.064 * 0.002 ***
0.017 0.824 0.000 0.904 0.506 0.000 0.374 0.859 0.065 0.000
IT ‐0.017   0.000   ‐0.019   0.047   ‐0.008   0.004   0.023   0.038 *** ‐0.001 *** ‐0.009 ***
0.611 0.677 0.704 0.458 0.891 0.428 0.827 0.000 0.000 0.000
NE ‐0.011   ‐0.041   ‐0.033   0.018 ** 0.017   0.008 *** ‐0.015   ‐0.126 ** ‐0.038   0.104 ***
0.750 0.488 0.383 0.047 0.838 0.000 0.840 0.042 0.192 0.000
PO 0.019 *** 0.003   ‐0.010   0.013   0.007   0.023 *** 0.022 *** ‐0.026 *** 0.009   0.076 ***
0.000 0.997 0.976 0.418 0.905 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.856 0.000
SP ‐0.069   ‐0.020   0.045   ‐0.036 *** ‐0.072 ** 0.160 *** ‐0.049 *** 0.011 *** ‐0.216 *** ‐0.020 ***
0.358 0.873 0.179 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
193 
 
Europe. A bidirectional link exists between Belgium and France, while Germany 
spillovers to the former as well. 
Turning now to the case of the banking stress transmission, the picture is 
somewhat different. In general, Ireland, together with the Italian and Portuguese 
banking sector is the major volatility risk recipients. Similar vulnerability is indicated 
for the case of Austria, even though, on a more limited size compared to the 
aforementioned cases. Italian banks seem to greatly affect the Irish and Portuguese 
market, with strongly significant parameters. Once again, it is interesting to underline 
the total lack of volatility spillover towards German banking market, with similar 
results holding for the French case as well. Overall, even though there seem to be 
some transmission channels of banking stress among the economies of our sample, the 
effects are not strong enough or lasting (comparing the news effect with the results 
from the second table of this group of stress indexes). 
The next two tables analyze the case of the money market volatility spillovers. 
Once more, the main recipients of the relevant effects are, mainly, Greece and 
Portugal (for the case of “news effects” coefficients), with Ireland and Portugal to 
take the lead in the volatility transmission risks. Nevertheless, the strong statistical 
results are accompanied by very small parameters. On top of that, Greek money 
market shocks greatly affect the Finnish and Spanish cases, as it is evident by table 
4.7. Stronger volatility spillovers can be traced in the cases of Spain and Portugal, 
with Greece being another important contributor here. Most of the estimated βij 
coefficients in the latter case are positive, transmitting turmoil to Belgium, France and 
Netherlands. Portugal and Spain perform poorly here (coefficients with almost 
negligible size). The only exception here is the strong positive effect towards Ireland. 
Another interesting finding here is the case of France. As an extra evidence of the 
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Table 4.5: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Banking Sector Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “news surprises” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, under 
each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to their 
initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
Table 4.6: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Banking Sector Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “volatility spillover” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, 
under each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to 
their initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
αij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.071   ‐0.017   0.056   0.036   0.008   0.179   0.128 *** 0.029   ‐0.051 *** 0.015  
0.851 0.900 0.396 0.287 0.888 0.128 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.520
BE 0.283   0.001 *** ‐0.022   0.020   0.238   0.044   0.058   0.072   ‐0.092 *** ‐0.141 ***
0.690 0.000 0.780 0.994 0.403 0.433 0.962 0.192 0.000 0.003
FI 0.011   0.076 *** 0.025   0.008   0.330 *** ‐0.207 *** 0.010   0.018   ‐0.027 *** 0.120 ***
0.920 0.000 0.494 0.797 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.457 0.000 0.003
FR 0.004   ‐0.073   ‐0.023   0.096   ‐0.071 *** 0.040   ‐0.060   0.049   ‐0.015   0.102  
0.926 0.741 0.708 0.541 0.000 0.488 0.924 0.949 0.761 0.783
GE ‐0.036   ‐0.129   ‐0.001   ‐0.046   0.020   ‐0.123   0.087   0.001   ‐0.021   ‐0.019  
0.236 0.975 0.791 0.758 0.904 0.136 0.348 0.977 0.993 0.950
GR ‐0.161 *** ‐0.125   ‐0.060 *** 0.059   0.001   0.130   0.003   0.117   ‐0.013 *** 0.002  
0.002 0.689 0.001 0.344 0.993 0.955 0.999 0.938 0.000 0.809
IR ‐0.025   ‐0.047   ‐0.025 *** 0.065   ‐0.086   0.048   0.113 ** ‐0.095   ‐0.309 *** ‐0.085  
0.574 0.356 0.000 0.404 0.167 0.971 0.014 0.709 0.000 0.902
IT ‐0.049 *** ‐0.034   0.018   0.022   ‐0.050   0.155   ‐0.068 ** 0.000   0.071 *** ‐0.028  
0.000 0.963 0.953 0.925 0.654 0.811 0.015 0.804 0.000 0.865
NE ‐0.028   ‐0.022   ‐0.014   ‐0.011   ‐0.005   ‐0.130 *** 0.055   ‐0.075   ‐0.001   ‐0.021  
0.929 0.847 0.918 0.979 0.960 0.002 0.930 0.159 0.984 0.778
PO ‐0.217 *** 0.186 *** 0.052   0.000   0.114   0.115 *** 0.011 ** ‐0.007 *** 0.024   0.015  
0.000 0.000 0.172 0.976 0.990 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.683 0.279
SP 0.033   0.097   0.040   ‐0.007   0.033   ‐0.020   0.085   0.012   ‐0.002   0.009  
0.759 0.516 0.146 0.832 0.786 0.981 0.246 0.929 0.922 0.387
βij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.003   0.001   0.018   ‐0.003   0.001   0.036 *** 0.031 *** 0.005   0.021 *** 0.002  
0.971 0.971 0.657 0.712 0.974 0.008 0.000 0.960 0.000 0.412
BE ‐0.080   ‐0.014 *** 0.052   ‐0.015   0.500   0.013   ‐0.009   ‐0.004   0.012 *** 0.063  
0.361 0.000 0.143 0.990 0.629 0.701 0.860 0.905 0.009 0.323
FI 0.018   0.059 *** 0.012   0.013   0.008 ** ‐0.043 *** 0.060   0.013   0.001   0.058 **
0.922 0.000 0.850 0.767 0.028 0.000 0.976 0.815 0.437 0.015
FR ‐0.002   0.001   0.020   ‐0.022   ‐0.014   0.020   ‐0.004   ‐0.032   0.065   0.042  
0.918 0.987 0.729 0.877 0.293 0.145 0.886 0.941 0.374 0.680
GE ‐0.020 *** ‐0.038   0.000   0.008   0.028   0.033 *** ‐0.100 * ‐0.001   0.020   0.011  
0.000 0.929 0.727 0.941 0.789 0.003 0.051 0.980 0.990 0.968
GR 0.024 ** ‐0.032   0.002   0.006 *** ‐0.024   ‐0.001   ‐0.001   0.024   ‐0.123 *** 0.003  
0.042 0.149 0.417 0.002 0.884 0.996 0.999 0.960 0.000 0.987
IR ‐0.021   ‐0.015   0.037 *** ‐0.029   0.005   ‐0.011   ‐0.088 *** ‐0.186   0.016   0.030  
0.520 0.725 0.000 0.380 0.766 0.969 0.000 0.748 0.157 0.831
IT ‐0.098 *** 0.003   ‐0.012   0.026   0.071   0.036   0.069 *** ‐0.043   0.195 *** 0.002  
0.000 0.965 0.991 0.911 0.118 0.860 0.000 0.454 0.000 0.967
NE ‐0.029   ‐0.113 *** ‐0.010   0.005   ‐0.016   ‐0.020   0.015   0.064   0.040   ‐0.050  
0.865 0.000 0.950 0.988 0.901 0.925 0.464 0.237 0.759 0.652
PO ‐0.136 *** ‐0.028 *** ‐0.007 ** 0.000   ‐0.096   0.022 *** ‐0.001   ‐0.033 *** ‐0.028   0.035 ***
0.000 0.000 0.015 0.929 0.948 0.000 0.516 0.000 0.828 0.000
SP ‐0.025 *** ‐0.021   ‐0.026 * 0.000   ‐0.020   ‐0.011   ‐0.014   0.078   0.010   ‐0.124 ***
0.000 0.504 0.057 0.989 0.615 0.975 0.618 0.523 0.495 0.000
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Table 4.7: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Money Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “news surprises” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, under 
each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to their 
initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
Table 4.8: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Money Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “volatility spillover” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, 
under each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to 
their initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
αij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.015   ‐0.064   0.048   0.143   0.037   ‐0.027   ‐0.199   0.102   ‐0.075   0.046  
0.821 0.541 0.277 0.815 0.616 0.774 0.375 0.930 0.215 0.240
BE ‐0.062   ‐0.004   ‐0.031   ‐0.156   0.006   ‐0.055   ‐0.094   ‐0.013   0.109   ‐0.095  
0.338   0.832 0.798 0.600 0.938 0.208 0.377 0.992 0.521 0.481
FI 0.105   ‐0.015   0.006   ‐0.045   ‐0.147   0.004   0.186 * ‐0.059   0.007 *** 0.045 ***
0.329 0.620 0.782 0.690 0.121 0.310 0.056 0.981 0.000 0.000
FR ‐0.057   ‐0.063   ‐0.003   ‐0.055   0.070 ** 0.002   ‐0.095   ‐0.225   ‐0.240 *** ‐0.296 ***
0.110 0.651 0.985 0.949 0.032 0.991 0.991 NaN 0.009 0.000
GE ‐0.021   ‐0.009   0.025   ‐0.007   0.046   0.005   ‐0.002   ‐0.065   ‐0.033   ‐0.002  
0.984 NaN 0.193 0.997 0.151 0.953 0.928 0.974 0.912 0.431  
GR ‐0.002   0.020   0.122 ** ‐0.138 ** ‐0.032   ‐0.156   ‐0.045   0.054   0.003 *** 0.256 ***
0.938 0.975 0.015 0.037 0.322 0.353 0.363 0.825 0.005 0.000
IR 0.009   0.108   ‐0.110   0.039   ‐0.012   0.070   ‐0.020   ‐0.052   0.004   ‐0.002  
0.861 0.164 0.152 0.895 0.941 0.669 0.227 0.801 0.983 0.947
IT ‐0.043   0.126   0.138   ‐0.007   0.002   ‐0.001   0.075   ‐0.004   ‐0.064 *** ‐0.037  
0.882 0.413 0.619 1.000 0.956 0.993 0.241 0.995 0.000 0.165
NE ‐0.118   ‐0.015   ‐0.007   0.041   ‐0.006   ‐0.080 *** 0.016   ‐0.026   ‐0.020   ‐0.015  
0.812 0.964 0.958 NaN 0.972 0.008 0.482 0.994 0.492 0.699
PO ‐0.018   ‐0.267   0.000 *** ‐0.024   0.108   ‐0.023 *** 0.043   0.032 *** 0.077   ‐0.014  
0.883 0.611 0.000 0.771 0.918 0.000 0.951 0.000 0.772 0.128
SP 0.008   0.096   ‐0.065 *** ‐0.057 *** ‐0.013 *** ‐0.080   0.027   0.171   0.000   0.010  
0.795 0.739 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.361 0.433 0.331 0.896 0.823
βij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU ‐0.001   0.015   ‐0.001   ‐0.027   0.039   0.004   ‐0.028   0.014   0.021   0.031  
0.858 0.576 0.920 0.990 0.450 0.924 0.905 0.976 0.325 0.138
BE 0.013   0.005   ‐0.004   0.089   ‐0.002   0.020   ‐0.026   ‐0.090   0.024   ‐0.018  
0.516 0.856 0.953 NaN 0.942 0.442 0.209 0.887 0.441 0.822
FI ‐0.005   0.009   0.013   ‐0.035   0.029   ‐0.006 *** 0.053   0.006   0.001 *** ‐0.002  
0.806 0.741 0.522 0.440 0.510 0.006 0.548 0.962 0.001 0.582  
FR 0.002   0.021   0.000   0.015   ‐0.048 *** 0.014   0.003   0.002   ‐0.091 *** 0.115 ***
0.867 0.469 0.928 0.989 0.000 0.735 1.000 NaN 0.000 0.000
GE 0.004   ‐0.001   0.001 *** 0.002   0.045   0.000   0.025   0.029   0.023   0.007  
0.994 NaN 0.010 0.999   0.213 0.948 0.600 0.987 0.806 0.801
GR ‐0.003   0.161 * ‐0.051 *** 0.140 * ‐0.019   0.044   0.012   0.138 ** 0.002 *** ‐0.081 ***
0.952 0.070 0.000 0.090 0.498 0.345 0.995 0.036 0.000 0.000
IR 0.000   ‐0.070   0.013   ‐0.092   ‐0.025   0.013   0.021 *** 0.041   ‐0.001   ‐0.002  
0.879 0.281 0.853 0.837 0.736 0.940 0.000 0.221 0.943 0.407
IT 0.023   0.035   ‐0.045 * 0.005   ‐0.002   ‐0.026   ‐0.122 *** ‐0.029   0.003 *** 0.015  
0.943 0.505 0.080 0.999 0.949 0.957 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.108
NE 0.012   0.007   0.005   0.001   0.034   ‐0.013 ** ‐0.116 *** 0.025   ‐0.001   ‐0.016  
0.768 0.921 0.976 NaN 0.893 0.040 0.000 0.975   0.905 0.884
PO ‐0.069   0.003   ‐0.131 *** 0.040 * ‐0.220   ‐0.090 *** ‐0.096   0.010 *** 0.155   0.002  
0.540 0.986 0.000 0.056 0.877 0.000 0.749 0.000 0.468 0.883
SP ‐0.003   0.071   0.004   ‐0.026 *** ‐0.007   0.071 *** 0.173 *** ‐0.072   0.004   ‐0.050 ***
0.610 0.625 0.645 0.000 0.885 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.978 0.000
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tight links of this country with the more vulnerable economies of Eurozone, the cross-
volatility relation this country exhibits with Greece, Portugal and Spain are 
statistically significant. But, once more, only Spain’s parameter is not negligible. 
A very different situation appears in the case of equity markets’ volatility 
spillovers. In essence, the identified links are scarce. In both cases, cross-innovations 
and variance volatility transmission parameters, there are very few statistically 
significant parameters. In the case of news shocks, Greece has the prominent role. The 
effect from the Greek stock market is strong for the cases of Germany, Italy and 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, this is not a long lasting effect, since the reflecting 
parameters in the second table are not significant. In fact, only three cases are found to 
be non negligible in table 4.10. Still, the lack of evidence in favour of volatility 
spillovers in the case of equity markets is rather unexpected. It could, probably, be a 
sign of the, rather limited, financial risk propagation taken place through that market 
in the Eurozone case. 
The final set of markets under consideration is the bond ones. In general, there 
is stronger evidence here for the existence of spillovers between the EMU economies. 
The results, reported at table 4.11, indicate the existence of significant and sizeable 
“news effect” between most of the markets. The case of Spain is the most profound 
one, with results being very strong but, on the same time, with very small parameters 
values. Surprisingly, the same does not hold for this country in table 4.12. There, the 
only significant parameter is the one representing the spillover effect to Portugal. 
Beyond the previous results, it is also interesting the fact that other heavily criticized 
economies (for their role as sources of financial instability propagators), like Greece 
and Ireland, do not perform as it would be expected. They are both limited to a minor 
initial shock to Austria while, in the case of volatility spillover parameters, their 
contribution to the financial stress interspersion is rather limited. In the same vein, 
Portuguese bond risk is transmitted to the other member of the PIIGS groups of 
countries but, again, with the size of this transmission to be minimal. This is the only 
sector where the German case produces some significant results, both as propagator 
and received or spillover effects. Another aspect of the bond financial stress 
conditions is the links between the core Euro economies. Austria has a bidirectional 
connection with Belgium, while the same holds for Finland and Germany. The Dutch 
197 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Equity Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “news surprises” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, under 
each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to their 
initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
Table 4.10: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Equity Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “volatility spillover” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, 
under each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to 
their initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
 
αij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.024   0.006   0.032   0.012   ‐0.019   0.018   0.135   0.014   0.022   0.057  
0.990 0.912 0.953 0.904 0.971 0.951 0.931 0.925 0.935 0.420
BE 0.006   0.193 *** 0.003   0.006   ‐0.051   ‐0.025   0.248   0.141   ‐0.004   0.047  
0.981 0.005 0.893 0.969 0.733 0.974 0.934 0.898 0.991 0.940
FI ‐0.011   ‐0.160 * ‐0.015   ‐0.060   ‐0.291 * ‐0.027   ‐0.009   0.001   ‐0.024   0.075  
0.893 0.065 0.934 0.438 0.055 0.862 0.941 0.988 0.727 0.790
FR ‐0.003   ‐0.002   0.006   ‐0.007   ‐0.101   ‐0.033   ‐0.080   0.001   ‐0.028   0.052  
0.948 0.799 0.967 0.989 0.641 0.971 0.792 0.869 0.838 0.820
GE ‐0.001   0.009   ‐0.079   ‐0.011   0.013   ‐0.010   0.009   0.009   0.017   0.007  
0.813 0.946 0.528 0.963   0.946 0.967 0.976 0.968 0.840 0.986
GR 0.020   0.056   0.048   0.067   0.137 ** 0.002   0.247 ** 0.178 *** 0.002   0.009  
0.946 0.784 0.489 0.345 0.038 0.935 0.027 0.006 0.938 0.970
IR ‐0.010   0.007   ‐0.016   0.016   ‐0.011   ‐0.039   0.044   0.039   0.107 *** ‐0.036  
0.943 0.960 0.965 0.978 0.958 0.604 0.643 0.719 0.000 0.869
IT ‐0.024   ‐0.018   0.001   0.099   0.001   0.007   ‐0.013   0.011   0.006   ‐0.004  
0.974 0.949 0.964 0.688 0.775 0.872 0.939 0.891 0.986 0.966
NE 0.009   0.042   0.017   0.008   ‐0.009   ‐0.039   ‐0.007   0.000   ‐0.010   ‐0.027  
0.952 0.975 0.908 0.948 0.945 0.769 0.995 0.936 0.956 0.847  
PO ‐0.012   0.023   0.013   0.056   0.112   0.000   ‐0.006   0.033   0.003   0.179  
0.983 0.931 0.890 0.304 0.235 0.902 0.225 0.938 0.987 0.791
SP 0.048   0.013   0.069   0.034   0.011   ‐0.094   ‐0.023   0.012   0.075   0.037  
0.517 0.950 0.680 0.793 0.993 0.396 0.922 0.928 0.574 0.926
βij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU ‐0.028   ‐0.037 *** ‐0.020   ‐0.033   0.024   ‐0.019   ‐0.060   0.009   ‐0.027   ‐0.026  
0.986 0.000 0.970 0.665 0.952 0.962 0.994 0.929 0.804 0.435
BE ‐0.002   ‐0.045   0.000   0.009   0.052   0.038   ‐0.265   0.115   ‐0.012   0.006  
0.986 0.208 0.887 0.954 0.813 0.944 0.839 0.942 0.954 0.982
FI 0.028   0.040   ‐0.005   0.030   0.111 *** ‐0.013   0.003   ‐0.003   0.008   0.012  
0.680 0.357 0.973 0.703 0.004 0.898 0.936 0.989 0.902 0.931
FR 0.011   ‐0.002   0.024   0.002   0.006   0.030   0.014   0.021   ‐0.026   0.014  
0.778 0.799 0.849 0.978 0.977 0.947 0.951 0.855 0.760 0.918
GE 0.024   ‐0.007   0.058   0.039   ‐0.037   0.027   0.009   ‐0.005   ‐0.005   0.019  
0.599 0.953 0.440 0.815 0.890 0.917 0.979 0.980 0.947 0.943
GR ‐0.025   ‐0.058   ‐0.009   0.043   ‐0.026   ‐0.001   ‐0.119   0.000   0.000   0.006  
0.923 0.834 0.905 0.246 0.696 0.946 0.130 0.860 0.946 0.981
IR 0.059   ‐0.004   0.043   ‐0.022   ‐0.002   0.052   ‐0.009   ‐0.025   ‐0.007 ** 0.024  
0.861 0.952 0.856 0.960 0.993 0.475 0.928 0.869 0.039 0.841
IT 0.015   0.020   0.003   0.095   ‐0.011   0.001   ‐0.004   0.011   ‐0.019   0.004  
0.974 0.984 0.905 0.650 0.980 0.869 0.918 0.836 0.982 0.947
NE ‐0.005   ‐0.091   ‐0.001   ‐0.005   ‐0.013   ‐0.029   0.016   0.000   ‐0.020   0.013  
0.968 0.962 0.975 0.914 0.973 0.824 0.984 0.936 0.888 0.898
PO 0.003   0.016   ‐0.004   ‐0.001   ‐0.056   ‐0.001   ‐0.005 *** 0.026   0.012   ‐0.046  
0.994 0.964 0.943 0.960 0.499 0.907 0.000 0.891 0.921 0.938
SP ‐0.012   ‐0.014   ‐0.067   ‐0.016   ‐0.012   0.015   ‐0.013   ‐0.010   ‐0.039   ‐0.016  
0.754 0.975 0.290 0.843 0.995 0.731 0.944 0.811 0.805 0.947
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Table 4.11: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Bond Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “news surprises” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, under 
each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to their 
initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
 
Table 4.12: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Bond Market Case 
 
Notes: This table reports the “volatility spillover” estimated coefficients from bivariate BEKK-GARCH models. P-values are reported in italics, 
under each parameter reported. The direction of the effects is from each row towards the columns. Countries/Markets are reported, according to 
their initials: AU (Austria), BE (Belgium), FI (Finland), FR (France), GE (Germany), GR (Greece), IR (Ireland), IT (Italy), NE (Netherlands), PO 
(Portugal) and SP (Spain). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
αij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.093 *** 0.013   ‐0.051   ‐0.026   ‐0.021 *** 0.197   ‐0.071 *** ‐0.096   0.205 *** 0.176 ***
0.000 0.960 0.620 0.759 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.841 0.005 0.000
BE 0.108 *** 0.009   ‐0.124 ** 0.100   ‐0.047   ‐0.019   ‐0.072   0.007   0.044   0.025  
0.000 0.749 0.035 0.227 0.180 0.641 0.338 0.856 0.984 0.828
FI ‐0.005   0.000   ‐0.106   ‐0.097 *** ‐0.019   0.013   ‐0.075   0.110 *** 0.098   0.000  
0.959 0.878 0.174 0.000 0.594 0.669 0.279 0.001 0.240 0.960
FR 0.008   0.200 *** 0.222 * 0.110   ‐0.017   0.069 * 0.004   ‐0.161 * 0.035   0.005  
0.934 0.005 0.053 0.565 0.290 0.062 0.890 0.066 0.130 0.846
GE 0.074 *** ‐0.098 * 0.008 *** 0.015   0.041 *** 0.216   0.020   0.027   ‐0.184   ‐0.004 ***
0.002 0.065 0.000 0.720 0.006 0.146 0.345 0.340 0.125 0.000
GR 0.093 *** 0.290   0.030   0.146   ‐0.028   0.144 ** ‐0.067   0.031 *** 0.144   0.007  
0.000 0.152 0.988 0.319 0.597 0.021 0.136 0.009 0.711 0.920
IR ‐0.169 *** 0.017   0.078   ‐0.022   ‐0.048   ‐0.018   ‐0.040   ‐0.003   ‐0.052   0.000  
0.000 0.606 0.532 0.771 0.650 0.322 0.158 0.931 0.127 0.934
IT 0.060 *** 0.081   ‐0.004   ‐0.125   ‐0.081   0.001   0.020   0.212 *** ‐0.009   0.004  
0.000 0.382 0.959 0.350 0.277 0.954 0.896 0.000 0.920 0.958
NE 0.101   0.010   0.111 *** 0.072 ** 0.079   ‐0.291 *** ‐0.007   ‐0.002   0.024 *** ‐0.036  
0.481 0.284 0.002 0.014 0.139 0.000 0.914 0.836 0.000 0.195
PO ‐0.106 * 0.183   ‐0.050   0.039   0.088   0.008   0.120 *** 0.268 * ‐0.024 *** ‐0.031  
0.087 0.950 0.444 0.687 0.591 0.173 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.435
SP 0.029 *** 0.047 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** ‐0.006 *** ‐0.059 *** 0.004 *** 0.015 *** ‐0.093 *** 0.022 ***
0.269 0.614 0.963 0.080 0.129 0.193 0.976 0.952 0.606 0.502
βij AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE PO SP
AU 0.007 *** ‐0.005   0.147 *** ‐0.033 ** 0.002 *** ‐0.051   0.031 *** 0.000   ‐0.045   ‐0.028 **
0.008 0.964 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.940 0.138 0.034
BE ‐0.011 *** 0.001   ‐0.026   ‐0.031   0.002   0.002   ‐0.011   ‐0.021   0.012   0.014  
0.000 0.798 0.728 0.773 0.920 0.957 0.737 0.718 0.966 0.877
FI 0.000   ‐0.004   0.005   0.102 *** 0.026   ‐0.037 ** ‐0.034   0.018   ‐0.046 *** 0.002  
0.992 0.650 0.900 0.000 0.777 0.040 0.859 0.215 0.000 0.955
FR 0.000   0.041 ** ‐0.143   ‐0.016   0.013 ** 0.018   0.076 *** ‐0.027 *** 0.074   0.003  
0.866 0.028 0.131 0.806 0.042 0.801 0.000 0.000 0.418 0.900
GE 0.021 * 0.026   ‐0.011 *** 0.011 * 0.047 *** 0.045 *** 0.025   0.034 *** 0.064   0.000  
0.075 0.122 0.000 0.092 0.002 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.244 0.640
GR ‐0.012 *** ‐0.039   ‐0.021   ‐0.040   ‐0.088 *** ‐0.025   ‐0.052 *** ‐0.006 *** ‐0.022   0.089  
0.000 0.812 0.978 0.193 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.196 0.234
IR 0.049   0.022 *** 0.122   ‐0.036   ‐0.003   0.019 *** 0.002   ‐0.002   0.040 *** 0.003  
0.209 0.009 0.209 0.871 0.833 0.003 0.929 0.924 0.000 0.858
IT 0.004 *** 0.001   0.003   ‐0.066   ‐0.014   0.000   0.014   ‐0.099 *** 0.014   0.000  
0.000 0.958 0.970 0.445 0.891 0.944 0.694 0.000 0.390 0.868
NE 0.004   0.019 ** ‐0.044 * 0.095 *** ‐0.035 *** 0.040 *** 0.034   0.008 *** 0.020 *** ‐0.008  
0.932 0.038 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.297 0.005 0.000 0.170
PO 0.022 * ‐0.015   0.021   ‐0.035   ‐0.034   0.001 ** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.036 ** ‐0.002 *** 0.028 ***
0.087 0.985 0.229 0.333 0.370 0.046 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
SP 0.007   ‐0.021   ‐0.001   ‐0.001   0.000   ‐0.035   ‐0.004   0.008   0.105   ‐0.151 ***
0.469 0.817 0.964 0.846 0.794 0.305 0.967 0.964 0.371 0.000
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bond stress is also evident of its volatility spillover towards, mostly, the stronger 
EMU economies (Belgium, Germany, and France). In general terms, the bond market 
is profoundly succumbed to strong volatility spillovers, from both peripheral and core 
bond markets. The news shocks turn into important and enduring stress transmission, 
so that it can be said that this Eurozone financial sector is one of the most volatile and 
susceptible to increasing financial distress and episode of financial catastrophes. 
Overall, the market-level analysis provides some useful insights in the 
conditions prevailing to Euro Area economies and markets. We find evidence of 
strong spillover effects among most of the economies under scrutiny. Moreover, the 
most volatile and vulnerable to risk transmission are the bond market (mostly 
representing sovereign risk) and the banking sector (sketching the operational 
efficiency, profitability and risk tolerance of financial institutions). A notable 
exception is the equity markets analysis, where no suitable conditions for volatility 
spillover were detected. With regards to the sector analyzed, the main risk spillover 
propagators vary but, again, there is no clear cut evidence whatsoever against a 
specific country or group of countries as the major contributors of these financial 
risks. 
 
4.2.b Cross-Market Models 
 
The previous section provided interesting insights into the links and causality-
in-variance relations between the different financial stress levels of the markets under 
consideration. Some useful points were made, together with directions toward the 
macroeconomic and financial policies should be switched to. In order to provide 
further insight, we proceed to the empirical investigation of the potential spillover 
effects among all the previous financial markets together. Instead of isolating the 
possible sources of instability within each one of them, the models employed here 
allows for any kind of volatility transmission channels. To put it differently, the 
analysis is cross-sectional, in the sense that any market can influence any other of 
them. It is a major step further in this research area, for a number of reasons. First, it 
is the first ever effort to apply such a multivariate GARCH framework for the analysis 
of the Eurozone case, in such detailed level and markets’ decomposition. Then, it is 
also interesting the chance to implement this empirical work, using financial stress 
indices, since they successfully bespeak the past, present and forthcoming financial 
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conditions. Finally, it should be emphasized that this is the first piece of research 
applying such computational effort and in such deep analysis (in terms of countries 
and markets included in the empirical work) for the EMU economies. Instead of 
eliminating the scope of our research in a few countries and only in indicators of 
sovereign risk or banking instabilities, we provide evidence based on many more 
features of the financial system. In this respect, a deeper understanding of the 
comovements and financial links of the economies under the recent financial strain 
can be provided. Such fully fledged work can be proved fruitful for the market 
participants, along with the interested policymakers. 
As it is easily understood, that the complexity of the econometric 
computations, together with the number of cases taken into account, make it almost 
impossible to present the results with tabulated estimated parameters and relevant 
statistics. In order to make things more comprehensible, we present the results using a 
graphical representation of them. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 summarize the relevant 
parameters of interest, as in the previous section. The difference is the usage of 
coloured cubes, which represent the statistically significant coefficients. For the sake 
of consistency and for emphasizing the importance of the spillover effects, we use 
three different colours (depending on the level of statistical significance). The red 
cubes are indicative of meaningful spillovers, for which the model provides evidence 
of strong significance (1%). Then, the orange ones are those with a milder effect 
(significant at 5% level), while the light grey ones are those that have a smaller 
statistical power (10% level). As in the previous case, the direction of the spillover 
effects is from the rows towards the columns of these tables. 
Table 4.13 summarizes the cross-markets case of financial stress spillovers, 
for the surprises effects from the Euro Area markets. It is obvious the large number of 
news leakages, although, they are not as many as in the following table that presents 
the volatility spillover persistence. In the case of αij parameters, we detect the 
importance of banking sector and bond markets, as the sectors from which most of the 
cross-innovations are sourced from. Especially for the case of PIIGS, the banking 
sector is the market with the greatest importance, based on the above terms. The same 
holds for the case of Belgium, from the group of the more robust Euro Area 
economies. On the country financial stress level (as measured by the total aggregate 
index), we detect an intensive transmission of news surprises from Ireland and 
Greece, predominantly. Also, the Italian index contributes significantly here. This 
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Table 4.13: BEKK-MGARCH Model for αij: Cross-Markets Case 
 
 
 
outcome is in accordance with the priors of the Eurozone financial conditions and the 
evolution of the relevant crisis, since all of these countries were at the epicenter of the 
debate between economists, market participants and politicians, regarding their 
potential contribution to the aggravation of the union’s financial instability. These 
countries affect, in a certain degree, the bond markets’ conditions, for both core and 
peripheral economies of our sample. On top of that, the money markets are also 
affected by Greece and Ireland, emphasizing the important role of liquidity and 
interbank funding strains in the current crisis. Another interesting finding is the fact 
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Notes: This is a graphical representation of the estimated "news effect" coefficients from the bivariate GARCH-BEEK(1,1) models for the case of cross-markets analysis. Markets FSIs are represented as: ba (banking sector), bo 
(bond market), mo (money market), eq (equity market) and T (country). Red colour is the strong effect (1% significance level), orange the mild effect (5% significance level) and the light grey is the marginal effect (10% significance 
level). The white cubes represent the lack of any statistically significant effect.
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that Greece is also a news shocks receiver, especially for the case of bond and money 
markets. This tight link of all countries and markets within the Euro Area is sensible, 
 
 
Table 4.14: BEKK-MGARCH Model for βij: Cross-Markets Case 
 
 
 
given the existence of a common monetary policy maker, the formation of markets’ 
expectations from the ECB decisions and, also, the commonality of the 
unconventional monetary policies followed by the union members. Again, as in the 
case of single markets analysis in the previous section, some countries are less 
responsive to cross-innovations, such as Germany, Finland and France. Spain is also 
rather neutral, in this respect. Portuguese news effects are primarily spill over to 
Greece and, secondarily, to Italy. In line with this, we also pinpoint the bidirectional 
βij
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Notes: This is a graphical representation of the estimated "volatility spillover" coefficients from the bivariate GARCH-BEEK(1,1) models for the case of cross-markets analysis. Markets FSIs are represented as: ba (banking sector), 
bo (bond market), mo (money market), eq (equity market) and T (country). Red colour is the strong effect (1% significance level), orange the mild effect (5% significance level) and the light grey is the marginal effect (10% 
significance level). The white cubes represent the lack of any statistically significant spillover effect.
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banking spillovers from this peripheral economy to most of the other markets (with 
the exception of Finland, France and Spain. 
In contrast to the previous discussion, the table representing the cross-markets 
volatility persistence indicates the existence of significant and multiple spillover 
effects. It is of great importance and interest that the GIIPS are among the major 
receiver of such spillovers. On the same time, a number of them (namely Portugal, 
Italy and Greece) are also significant contributors to the cross-volatility persistence 
effects. Again, this is reasonable, if we take into account the uncertainty, lack of 
credibility and the crisis unfolding in the past few years. Additionally, table 4.14 
provides further evidence for the main drivers of these spillover channels. Again, the 
banking and bond markets are the most influential ones, in the case of North European 
economies, while the money market case is, also, of interest for the peripheral 
countries. In either way, especially in the latter case, this can be perceived as an 
indication of the crisis changing nature. It has evolved from a purely banking and 
liquidity meltdown to a sovereign crisis. Furthermore, the results here are supportive 
of the existence of markets’ segregation, given the very strong ties between the Club 
Med countries (like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) and the North European 
economies. Especially for the cases of periphery, the statistical significance of the 
estimated parameters is very strong (almost all of them significant at 1% level). 
Finally, again against the common wisdom, the spillover effects towards the larger 
European economies (i.e. Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Belgium and France) exist 
but are relatively limited. Overall, these findings dictate the necessity for the 
implementation of custom-made policies, based on the distinctive features and 
economic imbalances of each economy or groups of economies. Nevertheless, the 
lack of unanimity in the relevant economic research, regarding the major propagators 
of financial stress transmission, indicates the need for further analysis and 
investigation in this field of research. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Our aspiration for this chapter is the Eurozone crisis that is fully fledged and 
prevalent to the economic profession debates during the last four years. On its peak, 
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this crisis rendered the European economy under severe strains, while a prolonged 
recessionary period is its reflection to the real economy. Additionally, both 
governments and market participants were alerted for the eventuality of crisis 
transmission from the most vulnerable economies of the EMU to the rest of them. It is 
not by chance that the economic research interest soon turned towards the quest of 
empirical verification of such conditions. Lately, there is a growing production of 
pieces of research focusing on the examination of contagion among some of the major 
protagonists of the Euro crisis. 
As a result, our work aims to extend the relevant literature in several ways. 
First of all, our interest is to study the crisis to its fully diverse nature. That is, we do 
not limit our study only to the sovereign risk or the banking instability issues, as most 
of the research have done until now. Instead, we try to encapsulate the necessary 
information into a number of metrics that are able to provide clear cut insights to the 
crisis and its constituents. In order to do it, we employ the so-called financial stress 
indices. These are aggregate indicators, representing the level of systemic risk in each 
one of the markets we analyze. These are, the banking sector, the money market, the 
equity and bond markets, while we also provide an index for each national economy. 
The next important extension is the adoption of a multivariate GARCH framework for 
the empirical investigation of potential spillover effects among the aforementioned 
markets. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such a modeling 
approach is used in conjunction to such successful systemic risk indicators. In our 
view, it is an excellent combination, given the very nature of the financial stress 
indexes and the ability of the MGARCH type of models to estimate time-varying co-
variances. Another important step further in our research is the simultaneous 
assessment of potential volatility spillover channels between and within the 
previously mentioned markets and countries. Finally, our dataset covers the Eurozone 
crisis until very recent, since our sample stops at September 2013. 
In brief, our results shed new light into the Euro Area’s volatility transmission. 
There is strong evidence that there exist multiple links between the EMU markets. 
Depending on the sector discussed, the main receivers and transmitters of the spillover 
effects vary. For instance, it is true that the GIIPS countries significantly contribute to 
the cross-volatility, especially in the case of the country level analysis and the banking 
and bond markets. On the same time, the core is also an important channel of variance 
volatility transmission, both within the North European countries, but also towards the 
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peripheral ones. Such a, somewhat surprising, result for part of the profession is in 
accordance to latest findings (Antonakakis and Vergos, 2013, Kohonen, 2012). 
Moreover, we find strong bidirectional effects between countries of the same group 
(for instance between Germany, Belgium and France as well as between Greece, 
Portugal and Spain). Equity market, on its single market analysis, does not provide 
convincing evidence as a sector where volatility spillovers take place. On the 
contrary, the banking and bond markets are, in both the “within” and the “between” 
econometric investigation, found to be the most volatile and risky from the markets 
scrutinized. Also, the case of money market is interesting. In the cross-markets case, it 
proves itself as a major player in the volatility spillovers. Given the representation of 
the interbank funding conditions, along with the relative volatility measures and the 
yield curve, this sector manifests itself as one which central bankers should pay 
special attention to. Once more, the aforementioned facts underline the direction 
towards macroprudential policies should aim to. 
The work in this area is, by no means, conclusive. There are many more that 
can be done, in order to further investigate the root causes of the Eurozone crisis. This 
is a first step only. Some recommendations for further work are the employment of 
alternative MGARCH specifications. It would be interesting to use a DCC framework, 
in order to capture the time-varying conditional correlations of the markets under 
examination. It is a rather flexible modeling approach, allowing for a number of 
different specifications for the computation of the initial univariate GARCH 
processes. Even in the case of our BEKK-GARCH model, modifications, in terms of 
the series filtering approach, can be applied. Other potential extensions have to do 
with the grouping of the most linked economies or markets and the empirical 
examination of them solely. In any case, this research area is currently expanding and 
it will keep so, as long as the need for solid evidence in the formation of relevant 
policies is vivid. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
1. Overview 
 
 
This thesis investigates in depth several aspects of economic activity through 
an aggregated metric that aims to account for the inherent distressful characteristics of 
the financial system. This thesis is strongly motivated by the extraordinary evolution 
of the financial and economic landscape and the induced fragility within its 
foundations especially during the last years. 
For quite a while, most economists argued that the combination of stable, 
steady growth rates, together with a controllable monetary policy under the prevailing 
inflation targeting framework (what has been called as “Great Moderation”), rendered 
the economic environment stable and safe from any considerably serious crisis. In 
short, policymakers and relevant researchers have connived at the fact that past crises 
is just a phenomenon of the past. Thus, the only challenge was the safeguarding of 
these, relatively low, but steady growth rates. Alas, this was only a veil of what was 
going on in financial markets. On an ex-post basis, the consequences induced by 
global financial crises, were assessed critically underling the importance and the 
necessity of the development of metrics that would account for the nature and the 
persistence of potential distressed periods. Beyond this, the added value of such 
developments would come up in a quantitative and qualitative framework the 
implications of which are strong mostly for policy makers.  
The objective of this thesis is twofold; the exposition of conventional financial 
stress indices throughout a wide set of countries and the proposal of innovative 
methodologies on the quantification of stress indices. While the former objective aims 
to investigate whether stress indices could be used as indicators of future state of the 
economy, in a worldwide sense, the latter one proposes a methodology that considers 
the segments of economic activity. To this end an application is attempted in the 
207 
 
Eurozone era in order to investigate further the transmission channels of these 
distressed characteristics within and between economies. 
 
 
2. Key Findings and Policy Implications 
 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis. In this chapter, we set the 
research questions, the motivation behind this research effort, while a discussion of 
the theoretical background on systemic risk and financial stability is provided. The 
perplexed nature of the financial system is emphasized, together with the necessity for 
the development of the relevant macroprudential metrics. Additionally, an overview 
of the construction of aggregate indices (in the nature of financial stress indexes) is 
supplied. It is proved that central banks have tried to compute such indices, like the 
monetary conditions indices. Of course, these metrics are useful for different type of 
policy analysis, like the assessment of the monetary policy conditions. At the end of 
this chapter, an overview of the contents of this thesis is compiled. 
Chapter 2 is an effort to examine the leading indicator properties of the 
financial stress indices. The main question here is how successful such systemic risk 
indicators are, to the improvement of the forecasting performance of models aiming to 
predict the evolution of real economic activity. The first step here is the creation of 
FSIs for a wide number of countries, namely twenty five. This is one of the first 
efforts to construct systemic risk indices of the same fashion and directly comparable, 
for such a wide number of developed and developing economies. We separate them 
into three groups of countries. These are the OECD, Latin American and Asian 
economies. Then, an analysis of their properties, in terms of capturing past financial 
stress events and the increasing vulnerabilities towards them, is provided.  
We also proceed to an identification of the types of financial turmoil events in 
each one of the regions examined (together with their duration), based on threshold 
values representing periods of excessive financial stress. Regarding the forecasting 
exercise, we model the evolution of the real economic activity as an autoregressive 
model for the industrial production index, while the alternative specification includes 
the (contemporaneous and lagged) FSIs effects. We employ two estimations 
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processes, a dynamic and a rolling window forecasting procedure. According to our 
findings, most of the scrutinized countries and regions are sensitive to securities-
sourced financial instabilities, which are the most frequent and durable ones. Banking 
excessive risk episodes are also quite frequent. The most pronounced period of 
financial abnormality is, by far, the recent financial crisis, with the indexes reaching 
their climax since 2007 onwards. The forecasts evaluations are based on the RMSFE 
ratios, together with extra evidence from two equal forecast accuracy statistical tests 
(the Diebold-Mariano and the Clark-West tests). The outcome is that the aggregate 
financial conditions indexes can be used for the assessment of the forthcoming 
economic conditions as well, beyond their apparent utility as systemic risk metrics. 
Additionally, there is evidence that these indices perform better, in the case of 
OECD economies, for short and medium term forecasts, while they are slightly better 
in longer periods for Asian and South American economies. These results are very 
acute, given the apparent strong interwoven nature of financial and economic 
conditions. It is a clear signal for monetary authorities to develop such tools and 
effectively incorporate them into their macroprudential toolbox. It is not by accident 
that there is large research effort conducted by central banks and international 
economic organizations, attributed exactly to these financial stress indices. Finally, 
since these indexes are representations of the expectations formation in financial 
markets, while they also provide a timely depiction of their conditions, they can be 
very useful for those agents or investors acting into the global financial markets. For 
instance, they can be an additional risk assessment measure, in order to decide on the 
formation of their investment portfolios and exposure to global financial risks. 
In the following two chapters, our interest is focused on the still evolving 
Eurozone financial and sovereign crisis. We decide to empirically examine the 
conditions of this crisis, using the financial stress indices. In chapter 3, the main 
question to be answered is whether we can identify interrelations and any tight 
financial connections between the Euro Area economies and financial markets. In 
order to do this, we first calculate aggregate systemic risk indexes for eleven EMU 
countries and their four, most important, financial markets. These are the first 
economies that joined the euro (excluding Luxembourg), while the sectoral analysis 
incorporates the banking sector, the money, equity and bond markets. This is the first 
ever effort for such a detailed and decomposed analysis of the financial stress and 
relevant sources of it, for the Euro Area.  
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Another innovative feature of our work is the employment of a large and 
diverge dataset. The latter includes many stand alone indicators that were never being 
employed for such a research before. For example, the incorporation of bank’s 
balance sheet variables, along with the number of banks included in the sample 
verifies the distinctive characteristics of our financial stress indicators and their 
improved properties and ability to represent the prevailing financial conditions. The 
narrative analysis of these indices’ performance reveals the divergent character of the 
crisis, as it is manifested in each one of the countries examined. For instance, the 
crucial role of credit and liquidity indicators is underlined, while a number of 
countries (like Italy, Ireland) is mainly affected by banking sector instabilities and 
others (like Spain and Portugal) from the level of perceived sovereign risk. The time-
varying nature of the financial stress composition is also evident, for the period 
investigated. Regarding the examination of financial stress interconnections among 
these economies, we use a wide number of empirical modeling for the inference on 
them. 
The baseline approach consists of VAR models, each one of which examines 
the prevailing conditions in each financial market. In other words, we do provide 
evidence based on a country specific and market wide level. The analysis is based on 
impulse response functions, where different recursive orderings are followed. The 
empirical findings are in contrast to the common wisdom of blaming Greece and 
Portugal for the potential “curse” of financial shocks transmission to the rest of the 
Eurozone, while the Spanish bond market agitates excessive risk in the 
aforementioned market. Positive interactions between banking and bond markets are 
found. Furthermore, a degree of disaggregation is evident within EMU, in the sense 
that core and peripheral countries are mostly responsive to their own “club” financial 
shocks. 
A number of robustness checks and further empirical examination verifies 
these results. The outcome of our work provides clear and obvious evidence for the 
necessity to follow alternative macroeconomic and financial policies, depending on 
the conditions prevailing in different countries or groups of countries. Additionally, it 
should be considered as a wake-up call for the final implementation of a common 
regulatory and monitoring program for the financial markets of all EU or EMU 
countries. The current multilateral framework, where the national authorities have the 
main responsibility for overseeing and intervening to each economy, is not optimal. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the investigation of volatility comovements and spillover 
effects within the Euro Area economies. This time, apart from the separate 
examination of the markets, an investigation of the cross markets case is also 
provided. The renewed features of our work are numerous. First, we decide to proceed 
with high frequency financial stress indices, something not common until now. Then, 
we employ multivariate GARCH modeling, which is also a rather different approach 
from what has been done until now. Furthermore, as already indicated, we do not 
restrict our analysis into a single market or a limited number of countries. We, rather, 
decide to provide solid evidence for the most important Eurozone economies and, of 
course, markets. Finally, our research covers a long time period, reaching the third 
quarter of 2013. In this way, we take into account the whole crisis period, both the 
initiation of it from outside Eurozone, the evolvement of the crisis within the union, as 
well as the most recent period after the implementation of the several bail-out 
programs and funding assistance to the debt ridden economies. 
The results indicate, once more, the importance of the banking and bond 
markets in the volatility transmission of excessive financial stress. On top of that, it is 
evident the crucial role of money market as risk transmitter, especially in the case of 
cross-markets analysis. Strong bidirectional effects between core, as well as 
peripheral, countries are established, while the equity markets do not provide 
sufficient evidence for their role in the financial risk transmission. Although, GIIPS 
countries significantly contribute to the cross-volatility, larger and considerably more 
robust European economies (like France, Belgium and Netherlands) are also 
consistent transmitters of volatility risk and comovements. These results lead to 
questions, regarding earlier findings and the common perception of economists, the 
public and policy makers, related to the interest of the markets to specific economies. 
Given the combination of macroeconomic and financial shocks for some of the 
hardest hit Euro economies, as well as the lack of clear cut evidence of excessive 
volatility transmission from these economies, it would be fair to say that the followed 
policies from the EMU should be rectified. Since a degree of disaggregation and 
asymmetries in the response to financial shocks exists, the ECB and the relevant 
national authorities should decide on policies specifically adjusted for the needs of the 
economies under serious strain. The combination of such policies, with the creation of 
the necessary supranational monitoring and regulatory body, together with 
macroeconomic policies to stimulate growth again, would probably be a more 
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successful recipe for the quicker exit from the Eurozone crisis. As it is emphasize by 
Manasse (2013), the perils for the monetary union are still present and loud. 
 
 
3. Future Research Avenues 
 
 
This thesis is completed and the findings reflect on the specific assumptions, 
conditions, models and dataset used. It should not be considered as a flawless work, 
since the evolution of the swiftly changing financial conditions can create different 
situations where further work should be conducted. Nevertheless, they provide useful 
insights, which can further expand and improve. Here, some suggestions for such 
extra research effort are provided. 
Additional research is feasible in the improvement and refinement of the 
financial stress indices. These improvements can take place in two respects. First of 
all, improvements in the selection and aggregation methods of the stand alone 
indicators can be applied. Until now, the most popular approaches are those based on 
the variance-equal approach, as well as some model-based approaches (like factor 
models or VAR models). It would be interesting to further explore this issue, with 
techniques that can explicitly model the relation between the potential indicators that 
can be included in the aggregate index and the real economy. A quantile regression 
approach seems like a promising econometric framework, able to help researchers to 
the variables selection, based on the specific characteristics of the economy in each 
period examined (for instance, connect indicators’ performance with the existence of 
economic peaks or troughs). Moreover, the use of Bayesian techniques, both in 
indexes’ construction, as well as on the development of forecasting models, is still 
rather limited. 
In terms of the dataset employed in the creation of these indices, it is fair to 
say that there still lack of full markets coverage. This happens, for a number of 
reasons. The major one is the lack of consistent variables, covering many markets and 
long time periods. For example, house prices (which would be representative of one 
of the most important asset classes in modern economies) series are not available for a 
wide number of countries. The same holds for other financial markets as well, like the 
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hedge funds positions and transactions (it is believed that a major part of global 
investment positions are taken from such funds but relevant data are not publicly 
available or, at best, scarce). As a result, we do believe that the greater transparency 
and further availability of relevant data will improve the synthesis of these indices and 
their suitability as systemic risk monitoring tools. 
Another useful extension would be the employment of financial stress indices, 
in order to provide an accurate crisis time line. The identification of crisis periods is 
possible, through the establishment of optimal cut-off points. This is feasible with the 
implementation of regime switching models. For instance, a Markov-Switching 
modeling framework is relevant. Additionally, threshold VAR models can be 
estimated, with the stress indices being the variable of interest to specify the regime 
changing periods. Such an empirical investigation would be particularly useful, both 
for investors as well as central bankers, since the crisis definition is a crucial aspect on 
the decision, from the side of central banks or governments, to intervene to the 
economy or not. 
Focusing on the study of crisis transmission and interconnections, further 
investigation with the help of alternative multivariate GARCH models seem feasible. 
The time varying nature of the crises, together with the multifaceted nature of the 
most recent of them, renders such models particularly helpful. Of course, it is still an 
open question the accurate examination of contagion channels. In order to do this, the 
development of models, in the tradition of the true contagion ones, is necessary. 
The strong interaction between financial upheaval and the fiscal imbalances, 
as evidenced by the current Eurozone crisis, dictates the simultaneous examination of 
them. The development of fiscal stress indices, representing the fiscal stance of the 
economies, is interesting and possible. Hence, apart from being a tool for the 
assessment of countries fiscal prudence, they would be useful in the development of 
models able to analyze and indicate channels of risk transmission between these two 
sides of the economy. 
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Appendix 
Chapter 2 
Graph A.1: OECD Countries FSI Indices – 1 
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Graph A.2: OECD Countries FSI Indices – 2 
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Graph A.3: Asian Countries FSI Indices 
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Graph A.4: Latin American Countries FSI Indices 
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Chapter 3 
 
Figures 1 – 3: Austrian Financial Stress Indices 
Figure 1: Austria ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 2: Austria ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 3: Austria ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 4 – 6: Belgian Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 4: Belgium ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 5: Belgium ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 6: Belgium ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 7 – 9: Finnish Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 7: Finland ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 8: Finland ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 9: Finland ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 10 – 12: French Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 10: France ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 11: France ‐ 1st Principal Component
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
15
20
20
04
M
01
20
04
M
04
20
04
M
07
20
04
M
10
20
05
M
01
20
05
M
04
20
05
M
07
20
05
M
10
20
06
M
01
20
06
M
04
20
06
M
07
20
06
M
10
20
07
M
01
20
07
M
04
20
07
M
07
20
07
M
10
20
08
M
01
20
08
M
04
20
08
M
07
20
08
M
10
20
09
M
01
20
09
M
04
20
09
M
07
20
09
M
10
20
10
M
01
20
10
M
04
20
10
M
07
20
10
M
10
20
11
M
01
20
11
M
04
20
11
M
07
‐5
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
Bond
Stock
Money
Banking
FSI
Figure 12: France ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 13 – 15: German Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 13: Germany ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 14: Germany ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 15: Germany ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 16 – 18: Greek Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 16: Greece ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 17: Greece ‐ 1st Principal Component
‐8
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
20
04
M
01
20
04
M
04
20
04
M
07
20
04
M
10
20
05
M
01
20
05
M
04
20
05
M
07
20
05
M
10
20
06
M
01
20
06
M
04
20
06
M
07
20
06
M
10
20
07
M
01
20
07
M
04
20
07
M
07
20
07
M
10
20
08
M
01
20
08
M
04
20
08
M
07
20
08
M
10
20
09
M
01
20
09
M
04
20
09
M
07
20
09
M
10
20
10
M
01
20
10
M
04
20
10
M
07
20
10
M
10
20
11
M
01
20
11
M
04
20
11
M
07
‐3.5
‐2.5
‐1.5
‐0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
Bond
Stock
Money
Banking
FSI
Figure 18: Greece ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 19 – 21: Irish Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 19: Ireland ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 20: Ireland ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 21: Ireland ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 22 – 24: Italian Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 22: Italy ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 23: Italy ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 24: Italy ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 25 – 27: Dutch Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 25: Netherlands ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 26: Netherlands ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 27: Netherlands ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 28 – 30: Portuguese Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 28: Portugal ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 29: Portugal ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 30: Portugal ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Figures 31 – 33: Spanish Financial Stress Indices 
 
Figure 31: Spain ‐ Equally Weighted
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Figure 32: Spain ‐ 1st Principal Component
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Figure 33: Spain ‐ Weighted Loadings
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Table A.1: Principal Component Analysis for Banking Sector - 1 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
-0.048 -0.166 -0.120 -0.058 -0.039 0.010 0.053 -0.049 0.331 0.031 -0.023
0.079 -0.137 -0.124 -0.061 -0.042 0.014 0.052 -0.049 0.335 0.028 -0.026
0.019 -0.204 -0.038 -0.047 -0.050 0.008 0.054 -0.026 0.188 0.029 0.026
-0.005 -0.239 0.097 0.028 -0.040 0.027 0.047 0.019 -0.013 -0.033
0.034 -0.122 0.054 -0.017 0.030 -0.008 -0.059 0.021 -0.266 -0.004 -0.023
0.072 -0.134 -0.028 0.079 0.079 0.021 0.064 -0.013 -0.015 0.065 0.047
0.068 -0.143 0.055 0.041 0.086 0.008 0.049 -0.029 0.293 -0.050 -0.029
-0.062 0.275 -0.047 0.061 -0.023 0.000 0.017 0.042 -0.214 0.001 0.010
0.025 0.111 0.065 0.020 -0.031 -0.006 -0.034 0.026 -0.006 0.016 -0.026
0.054 0.304 0.131 0.048 -0.056 -0.013 -0.031 0.044 -0.261 -0.006 0.013
0.012 0.201 -0.016 0.028 -0.063 0.001 -0.053 0.034 -0.167 0.056 0.039
-0.005 0.297 0.262 0.043 0.074 -0.007 -0.066 0.056 -0.312 -0.027 0.039
-0.051 0.294 0.136 0.062 0.061 -0.004 -0.065 0.052 -0.233 -0.022 0.037
-0.057 -0.268 0.242 -0.015 -0.039 0.006 0.061 -0.042 0.339 0.024 -0.038
0.040 0.241 -0.105 0.028 0.033 0.004 0.038 -0.004 0.104 0.043 -0.021
0.032 0.259 -0.138 0.027 -0.015 0.021 0.013 -0.009 0.121 0.042 -0.014
0.029 0.054 0.180 0.058 0.081 -0.007 -0.042 0.045 -0.226 -0.022 0.039
-0.008 0.143 -0.047 0.047 0.081 0.001 -0.033 0.046 0.111 0.004 0.042
0.010 -0.054 -0.014 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.006 0.109 0.009 -0.001
-0.013 0.095 -0.109 0.011 0.029 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.122 0.007 0.028
0.019 -0.254 0.133 -0.044 -0.077 0.009 0.061 -0.021 -0.062 0.023 0.005
-0.011 0.249 0.092 0.043 0.059 -0.006 -0.032 0.038 0.164 0.002 0.027
0.575 0.045 0.485 0.602 0.565 0.687 0.626 0.591 -0.071 0.417 0.574
0.561 0.030 -0.392 0.566 0.552 0.667 0.596 0.568 -0.082 0.450 0.557
0.527 0.190 0.587 0.466 0.502 0.201 0.468 0.498 -0.074 0.512 0.540
0.131 0.061 0.070 -0.045 0.145 -0.206 0.184 -0.053 -0.063 -0.153 0.008
-0.244 -0.065 -0.511 -0.313 -0.321 -0.018 0.000 -0.276 0.103 -0.581 -0.260
36.9% 33.7% 33.3% 38.4% 35.8% 40.0% 38.8% 44.9% 31.3% 44.8% 49.5%% of Variance Explained
Bank Equities Index Returns
Turnover by Volume
Deposit Gap
Loan Gap
Banks Index Realized Volatility
Banking Sector Beta
Panel F: Market - Level Indicators
Size
Market Power
NPL/Gross Loans
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans
Net Interest Margin
Interbank Ratio
Loan Loss Reserves/Impaired Loans
Net Loans/Total Assets
Loans/Deposits
Total Liabilities/Liquid Assets
Interbank Funds/Liquid Assets
Indicators
Principal Components Loadings for Banking Sectors - First Component Case
Panel B: Liquidity
Panel C: Assets Quality
ROE
EPS
P/E
Inefficiency
Panel A: Operational/Profitability
ROA
Panel D: Capital Adequacy
Equity Price Returns
Dividen Yield
Market Value
Panel E: Volatility Risk
Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio
Total Regulatory Capital Ratio
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Table A.2: Principal Component Analysis for Banking Sector - 2 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
-0.004 -0.004 -0.024 -0.022 -0.015 0.007 0.036 -0.020 0.081 0.018 -0.002
0.032 0.020 -0.020 -0.023 -0.014 0.008 0.036 -0.021 0.092 0.016 -0.004
0.007 0.002 -0.018 -0.014 -0.023 0.011 0.026 0.001 0.133 0.018 0.024
-0.004 -0.023 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.015 0.021 -0.003 -0.005 -0.022
0.008 0.022 -0.025 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 0.018 -0.084 -0.001 -0.020
0.036 0.051 0.011 0.022 0.028 0.012 0.027 0.006 -0.072 0.037 0.026
0.033 -0.096 0.003 0.024 0.031 -0.002 0.040 -0.003 0.074 -0.017 -0.015
-0.029 0.140 -0.019 0.025 0.021 0.006 0.011 0.030 -0.002 -0.005 0.020
0.014 0.131 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.000 -0.020 0.016 0.085 0.001 0.000
0.024 0.124 0.071 0.029 -0.013 0.000 0.001 0.019 -0.046 -0.004 0.015
0.030 0.133 0.029 0.023 -0.009 0.007 -0.019 0.009 0.030 0.022 0.019
0.021 0.069 0.147 0.020 0.041 -0.004 -0.021 0.024 -0.128 -0.012 0.018
-0.003 0.084 0.116 0.027 0.012 -0.004 -0.019 0.022 -0.133 -0.007 0.017
-0.009 -0.028 0.125 -0.001 -0.032 0.000 0.032 -0.017 0.108 0.017 -0.019
0.010 0.106 -0.044 0.026 0.009 0.003 0.011 -0.009 0.055 0.034 -0.011
0.023 0.137 -0.042 0.023 0.016 0.014 0.011 -0.008 0.056 0.027 -0.006
0.019 0.054 0.110 0.020 0.034 -0.003 0.012 0.025 -0.144 -0.007 0.018
0.011 0.064 0.035 0.018 0.032 0.001 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.004 0.018
-0.003 -0.065 0.015 -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 0.032 0.009 0.008
-0.006 0.081 -0.040 0.012 0.017 0.002 -0.006 0.005 0.137 0.009 0.017
0.014 -0.038 0.028 -0.018 -0.031 0.011 0.028 0.003 -0.017 0.015 0.009
-0.008 0.121 0.030 0.019 0.025 -0.004 -0.015 0.022 0.064 0.008 0.021
0.250 0.089 0.289 0.224 0.160 0.276 0.281 0.230 0.011 0.325 0.241
0.261 0.073 -0.197 0.195 0.171 0.259 0.205 0.211 0.015 0.160 0.259
0.172 0.114 0.142 0.243 0.259 0.278 0.120 0.347 0.032 0.230 0.339
0.123 0.048 0.079 0.187 0.258 0.094 0.184 0.144 0.020 0.064 0.181
0.114 -0.079 -0.052 -0.108 -0.016 -0.033 0.197 -0.099 -0.017 -0.227 -0.108
82.5% 80.0% 74.4% 81.5% 81.6% 84.9% 83.7% 84.3% 76.2% 82.9% 85.1%
Deposit Gap
Loan Gap
Panel F: Market - Level Indicators
Banks Index Realized Volatility
Banking Sector Beta
Bank Equities Index Returns
% of Variance Explained
Dividen Yield
Market Value
Turnover by Volume
Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio
Total Regulatory Capital Ratio
Panel E: Volatility Risk
NPL/Gross Loans
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans
Loan Loss Reserves/Impaired Loans
Equity Price Returns
Size
Market Power
Panel D: Capital Adequacy
Total Liabilities/Liquid Assets
Interbank Funds/Liquid Assets
Interbank Ratio
Net Loans/Total Assets
ROA
ROE
Panel A: Operational/Profitability
Loans/Deposits
EPS
P/E
Inefficiency
Net Interest Margin
Panel B: Liquidity
Indicators
Panel C: Assets Quality
Principal Components Loadings for Banking Sectors - Weighted Loadings Case
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Table A.3: Principal Component Analysis for Money Markets 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Principal Component Analysis for Equity Markets 
  
Indicators Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
TED Spread 0.475 0.371 0.457 -0.483 0.462 0.234 -0.539 0.056 0.386 -0.329 -0.364
Inverted Term Spread 0.484 0.481 0.517 -0.417 0.337 -0.426 -0.038 0.541 0.396 -0.490 -0.359
Euribor - 2yr Govt. Bond Yield -0.359 -0.375 - 0.440 -0.354 0.512 0.521 -0.217 -0.316 0.461 0.428
Euribor - 5yr Govt. Bond Yield -0.477 -0.503 -0.496 0.527 -0.478 0.519 0.544 -0.415 -0.499 0.487 0.441
M2 growth 0.331 0.109 0.231 -0.130 0.219 -0.330 -0.186 0.200 0.079 -0.130 -0.231
M2/Foreign Reserves -0.141 0.422 0.192 0.017 0.439 0.098 -0.212 0.493 0.386 -0.072 -0.347
Treasury Bill Realized Volatility - -0.217 0.065 0.132 -0.043 0.036 0.233 -0.130 -0.299 0.051 0.073
Intermediation Rate -0.233 0.006 0.428 0.297 -0.276 -0.337 0.078 0.430 0.317 0.422 0.427
% of Variance Explained 41.7% 45.5% 47.5% 39.1% 44.8% 40.9% 39.1% 34.6% 41.8% 48.7% 57.4%
TED Spread 0.105 0.088 0.215 -0.229 0.211 0.280 -0.241 0.035 0.085 -0.247 -0.184
Inverted Term Spread 0.289 0.238 0.207 -0.077 0.263 -0.080 0.138 0.247 0.249 -0.214 -0.269
Euribor - 2yr Govt. Bond Yield 0.005 -0.145 - 0.232 -0.119 0.141 0.228 0.112 -0.032 0.220 0.269
Euribor - 5yr Govt. Bond Yield -0.307 -0.224 -0.246 0.175 -0.267 0.148 0.213 -0.002 -0.169 0.233 0.287
M2 growth 0.219 0.192 0.243 0.075 0.220 -0.122 0.054 0.045 0.191 0.021 -0.120
M2/Foreign Reserves -0.157 0.187 0.193 -0.089 0.121 0.240 -0.130 0.248 0.206 0.107 -0.128
Treasury Bill Realized Volatility - -0.184 0.188 -0.042 -0.083 0.124 0.003 -0.069 -0.155 0.173 0.185
Intermediation Rate 0.051 0.147 0.099 0.240 0.046 -0.275 0.175 0.218 0.161 0.208 0.195
% of Variance Explained 80.8% 78.4% 82.4% 73.2% 81.9% 87.3% 76.7% 70.8% 73.7% 81.5% 83.1%
Principal Components Loadings for Money Markets
Panel A: First component
Panel B: Weighted Loadings
Indicators Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Stocks Returns 0.419 0.365 0.357 0.465 0.578 0.385 0.524 0.372 0.538 0.471 0.373
EPS -0.043 0.359 0.443 0.021 -0.030 0.248 -0.258 - -0.133 -0.365 -0.405
Dividend Yield 0.476 0.540 0.569 0.474 0.474 0.463 0.542 0.516 0.335 0.363 0.421
P/E -0.487 -0.477 0.265 -0.472 -0.053 -0.562 - -0.556 -0.479 -0.539 -0.562
Stocks Realized Volatility 0.599 0.469 0.532 0.580 0.661 0.510 0.604 0.535 0.593 0.472 0.450
% of Variance Explained 43.1% 47.9% 42.6% 43.5% 38.8% 47.8% 50.8% 62.5% 45.1% 48.8% 53.6%
Stocks Returns 0.168 0.377 0.036 0.220 0.160 0.365 0.249 0.391 0.304 0.383 0.331
EPS 0.261 0.078 0.358 0.293 0.282 0.176 0.145 - 0.201 -0.023 -0.039
Dividend Yield 0.344 0.136 0.161 0.310 0.270 0.041 0.339 0.190 0.288 0.124 0.222
P/E -0.091 -0.114 0.382 -0.027 0.100 -0.176 - -0.229 -0.018 -0.140 -0.237
Stocks Realized Volatility 0.273 0.396 0.116 0.288 0.274 0.346 0.383 0.474 0.352 0.377 0.377
% of Variance Explained 89.1% 91.7% 89.2% 92.5% 83.0% 89.2% 91.4% 96.2% 93.3% 89.6% 90.9%
Panel B: Weighted Loadings
Panel A: First component
Principal Components Loadings for Equity Markets
231 
 
Table A.5: Principal Component Analysis for Bond Markets 
Indicators Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Sovereign Bond Spread 0.586 0.429 0.575 0.562 -0.509 0.621 0.618 0.578 0.598 0.557 -0.470
Bond Realized Volatility 0.481 0.521 0.505 0.530 0.632 0.263 0.409 0.422 0.463 0.345 -0.016
Corporate Bond Spread 0.571 0.558 0.520 0.551 0.548 - -0.514 0.157 0.561 -0.544 0.627
Government Bond Duration 0.038 0.327 0.252 0.162 0.079 -0.623 -0.368 -0.571 -0.199 -0.470 0.616
Realized Correlation with Bund 0.313 0.354 0.284 0.270 0.188 0.396 0.227 0.370 0.271 0.232 -0.081
% of Variance Explained 48.2% 44.5% 53.8% 47.8% 39.5% 51.4% 47.5% 48.9% 47.0% 40.6% 37.3%
Sovereign Bond Spread 0.297 0.261 0.260 0.333 -0.078 0.214 0.219 0.232 0.247 0.280 -0.063
Bond Realized Volatility 0.274 0.133 0.266 0.219 0.245 0.295 0.328 0.240 0.333 0.353 0.196
Corporate Bond Spread 0.209 0.196 0.173 0.162 0.256 - -0.114 0.331 0.299 -0.140 0.309
Government Bond Duration 0.287 0.066 0.286 0.335 -0.077 -0.220 -0.223 -0.248 0.167 -0.049 0.277
Realized Correlation with Bund 0.148 0.376 0.324 0.116 0.351 0.421 0.285 0.162 0.124 0.126 0.216
% of Variance Explained 86.8% 81.8% 90.0% 87.4% 82.5% 94.7% 85.0% 86.0% 86.8% 79.6% 85.8%
Panel A: First component
Panel B: Weighted Loadings
Principal Components Loadings for Bond Markets
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Table A.6: Sample of European Banks 
Austria 
Unicredit Bank Austria Raiffeisen Bank Oesterreichische Volksbank Oberbank AG 
Belgium 
Dexia Bank 
Finland
Pohjola Bank Bank of Aland 
France 
BNP Paribas Credit Agricole Societe Generale Natixis 
Germany 
Deutsche Bank Commerzbank 
Greece 
National Bank of 
Greece EFG Eurobank Alpha Bank Piraeus Bank 
ATE Bank Marfin Egnatia Bank Hellenic Postbank Attica Bank 
Ireland
Bank of Ireland Allied Irish Bank Irish Life and Permanent 
Italy 
Unicredit Spa Intesa Sanpaolo Spa Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Banco Popolare 
UBI Banca Mediobanca Spa Banca Popolare dell’ Emilia Romagna 
Netherlands 
Van Lanshot NV 
Portugal 
Bank Comercial 
Portugues 
Banco Espirito Santo 
SA Banco BPI SA 
Banco 
International do 
Fuchal SA 
Spain
Banco Santader SA BBVA Banco Popular Espanol SA 
Banco Espanol de 
Credito SA 
Banco de 
Sabadell SA 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure A.1: Euro Area Countries FSIs 
 
 
Figure A.2: Euro Area Countries FSIs Returns 
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Figure A.3: Euro Area Banking FSIs 
 
 
 
Figure A.4: Euro Area Banking FSIs Returns 
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Figure A.5: Euro Area Money FSIs 
 
 
 
Figure A.6: Euro Area Money FSIs Returns 
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Figure A.7: Euro Area Equity FSIs 
 
 
 
Figure A.8: Euro Area Equity FSIs Returns 
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Figure A.9: Euro Area Bond FSIs 
 
 
 
Figure A.10: Euro Area Bond FSIs Returns 
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Table A.1: Euro Area Countries FSIs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Euro Area Banking FSIs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Euro Area Money FSIs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Euro Area Equity FSIs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1
Belgium 0.314 1
Finland 0.178 0.219 1
France 0.546 0.484 0.261 1
Germany 0.279 0.405 0.245 0.396 1
Greece 0.234 0.177 0.099 0.168 0.166 1
Ireland 0.143 0.235 0.084 0.191 0.180 0.175 1
Italy 0.454 0.465 0.230 0.506 0.376 0.229 0.297 1
Netherlands 0.385 0.363 0.213 0.386 0.294 0.169 0.115 0.372 1
Portugal 0.224 0.316 0.170 0.230 0.304 0.169 0.247 0.407 0.249 1
Spain 0.316 0.406 0.271 0.460 0.352 0.113 0.347 0.533 0.358 0.250 1
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1
Belgium 0.561 1
Finland 0.423 0.478 1
France 0.581 0.691 0.490 1
Germany 0.502 0.623 0.388 0.698 1
Greece 0.333 0.323 0.206 0.306 0.289 1
Ireland 0.399 0.399 0.283 0.443 0.338 0.235 1
Italy 0.553 0.658 0.461 0.726 0.647 0.351 0.445 1
Netherlands 0.219 0.447 0.211 0.420 0.284 0.156 0.207 0.294 1
Portugal 0.426 0.538 0.367 0.455 0.474 0.303 0.362 0.550 0.181 1
Spain 0.510 0.580 0.431 0.697 0.621 0.260 0.529 0.743 0.270 0.467 1
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1
Belgium 0.733 1
Finland 0.355 0.277 1
France 0.886 0.747 0.305 1
Germany 0.885 0.636 0.478 0.837 1
Greece 0.259 0.147 0.220 0.246 0.267 1
Ireland 0.181 0.186 0.100 0.150 0.176 -0.033 1
Italy 0.537 0.660 0.129 0.496 0.438 0.030 0.305 1
Netherlands 0.529 0.395 0.155 0.460 0.511 0.096 0.057 0.221 1
Portugal 0.250 0.355 0.220 0.260 0.259 -0.042 0.407 0.409 0.172 1
Spain 0.599 0.624 0.270 0.529 0.540 0.110 0.326 0.610 0.298 0.397 1
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1
Belgium 0.670 1
Finland 0.589 0.685 1
France 0.715 0.867 0.774 1
Germany 0.641 0.800 0.728 0.907 1
Greece 0.492 0.486 0.406 0.517 0.502 1
Ireland 0.609 0.661 0.531 0.703 0.661 0.459 1
Italy 0.717 0.817 0.697 0.889 0.823 0.510 0.648 1
Netherlands 0.684 0.859 0.752 0.926 0.865 0.489 0.686 0.838 1
Portugal 0.667 0.648 0.576 0.693 0.666 0.515 0.550 0.707 0.647 1
Spain 0.687 0.783 0.690 0.850 0.801 0.494 0.612 0.871 0.783 0.732 1
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Table A.5: Euro Area Bond FSIs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Austria 1
Belgium 0.338 1
Finland 0.373 0.304 1
France 0.499 0.490 0.377 1
Germany 0.263 0.150 0.244 0.318 1
Greece 0.167 0.202 0.108 0.177 0.067 1
Ireland 0.159 0.165 0.147 0.246 0.085 0.107 1
Italy 0.310 0.306 0.325 0.446 0.230 0.153 0.075 1
Netherlands 0.474 0.295 0.269 0.400 0.269 0.087 0.081 0.279 1
Portugal 0.092 0.025 0.013 0.155 0.101 0.007 0.061 0.066 -0.077 1
Spain 0.187 0.271 0.208 0.402 0.271 0.075 0.110 0.531 0.267 0.059 1
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